NIPS Proceedingsβ

Learning Mean-Field Games

Part of: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32 (NIPS 2019)

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Authors

Conference Event Type: Poster

Abstract

This paper presents a general mean-field game (GMFG) framework for simultaneous learning and decision-making in stochastic games with a large population. It first establishes the existence of a unique Nash Equilibrium to this GMFG, and explains that naively combining Q-learning with the fixed-point approach in classical MFGs yields unstable algorithms. It then proposes a Q-learning algorithm with Boltzmann policy (GMF-Q), with analysis of convergence property and computational complexity. The experiments on repeated Ad auction problems demonstrate that this GMF-Q algorithm is efficient and robust in terms of convergence and learning accuracy. Moreover, its performance is superior in convergence, stability, and learning ability, when compared with existing algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning.