

488 **A One-Shot vs Iterative Removal**

489 If the definition of outlier depends on the other examples that are present, it is possible that removing
490 5,000 outliers in one pass might somehow impact the results—because we might miss some new set
491 of examples that become outliers only after we have trained the model for a subset of epochs.

492 Here, we experiment with an iterative removal approach. In particular, starting with the 50,000
493 example dataset, we first run LiRA to find the easiest to attack samples then remove just the top
494 100 (instead of 5,000) examples. We then repeat our experiment on the remaining 49,900 example
495 dataset; this gives us a *new* set of 100 examples to be removed from this dataset, which we do, giving
496 us a dataset of 49,800 examples. We repeat this procedure 50 times until we are left with a dataset
497 of 45,000 examples. We then plot in Figure 7 the ROC curve when attacking this dataset, and find
498 that the results are almost completely identical to our initial experiments where we directly removed
499 5,000 outliers in one shot. Upon investigation, we find that the reason this occurs is because over
500 80% of the examples removed by the 1-shot approach are also removed by the 50 shot layer-by-layer
501 approach.




Figure 7: The Onion Effect is not a result of the outliers changing after each removal step. We repeatedly iterate 50 steps of identifying outliers and removing the top-100 outliers. This ends up also removing 5,000 outliers, and performs identically to the baseline configuration where we remove all 5,000 outliers in one shot.

502 **B Visualization of Easy-to-Attack and Hard-to-Attack Examples**

503 Figure 8 visualizes the easy to attack examples from CIFAR-10 training set, according to their privacy
504 scores. The examples that are vulnerable to membership influence attack are generally outliers
505 memorized by the models. The results are consistent with previous work that identify outliers and
506 memorized examples in neural network learning [e.g. 12, 18].




Figure 8: The easy to attack (top 3 rows) and difficult to attack (bottom 3 rows) CIFAR-10 examples from each of the 10 classes. Each column shows images from one class, with the top 3 rows randomly sampled from the top 100 most vulnerable examples, and the bottom 3 rows randomly sampled from the 100 least vulnerable examples.

507 **C Details of CIFAR-10 Deduplication**

508 We use the open source image deduplication library `imagededup` [17], available at [https://](https://github.com/ideal0/imagededup)
509 github.com/ideal0/imagededup, to deduplicate the CIFAR-10 training set. Specifically, we use
510 the Convolutional Neural Network based detection algorithm with a threshold of 0.85, which ended
511 up removing 5,275 duplicated images from the training set. We have manually inspected a random
512 set of duplicated clusters identified by the software to verify the correctness. Figure 9 visualizes one
513 of the largest duplicated clusters identified.



Figure 9: Duplicated images from the CIFAR-10 training set identified by the open source image deduplication library `imagededup` [17]. The number on top of each image is its index in the original CIFAR10 training set ordering.