NIPS Proceedingsβ

Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games

Part of: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 28 (NIPS 2015)

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Authors

Conference Event Type: Oral

Abstract

We show that natural classes of regularized learning algorithms with a form of recency bias achieve faster convergence rates to approximate efficiency and to coarse correlated equilibria in multiplayer normal form games. When each player in a game uses an algorithm from our class, their individual regret decays at $O(T^{-3/4})$, while the sum of utilities converges to an approximate optimum at $O(T^{-1})$--an improvement upon the worst case $O(T^{-1/2})$ rates. We show a black-box reduction for any algorithm in the class to achieve $\tilde{O}(T^{-1/2})$ rates against an adversary, while maintaining the faster rates against algorithms in the class. Our results extend those of Rakhlin and Shridharan~\cite{Rakhlin2013} and Daskalakis et al.~\cite{Daskalakis2014}, who only analyzed two-player zero-sum games for specific algorithms.