
MoCa: Measuring Human-Language Model Alignment on Causal and Moral Judgment Tasks

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Abstract

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people’s causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people’s judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

1 Introduction

Humans rely on their intuition to understand the world. This intuition helps us to understand not only physical events (e.g., one ball caused the other to move) but also complex social situations (e.g., the collapse of Sam Bankman-Fried’s FTX caused unprecedented turmoil in the cryptocurrency market). Given a complex set of events, even with a great amount of ambiguity, we can answer questions such as “What or who caused it?” Our answers to this question reflect how we intuitively understand events, people, and the world around us (Sloman & Lagnado, 2015; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018). How do humans handle this complexity?

Cognitive scientists have proposed that we do so by organizing our understanding of the world into intuitive theories (Gerstenberg & Tenenbaum, 2017; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). Accordingly, people have intuitive theories of the physical and social world with which we reason about how objects and agents interact with one another (Battaglia et al., 2013; Ullman et al., 2017; Gerstenberg et al., 2021; Baker et al., 2017; Davis & Marcus, 2015; Lake et al., 2017). Concepts related to causality and morality form key ingredients of people’s physical and social theories. Given a story, humans can readily make causal and moral judgments about the objects and agents involved in the story.

Studying these human **intuitions** or systematic **tendencies** when making decisions or judgments is the central focus of psychological experimentations. What are these tendencies? How do they influence our judgment? Over the last several decades, using text-based vignettes, psychologists

have disentangled what factors influence people’s causal and moral judgments. These factors can be understood as the building blocks of our thought processes for making causal and moral judgments.

Over the last few years, large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly successful in emulating certain aspects of human commonsense reasoning ranging from tasks such as physical reasoning (Tsividis et al., 2021), visual reasoning (Buch et al., 2022), moral reasoning (Hendrycks et al., 2020), and text comprehension (Brown et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2019b; Bommasani et al., 2021). Here, we investigate to what extent pretrained LLMs align with human intuitions about the role of objects and agents in text-based scenarios, using judgments about causality and morality as two case studies. We show how carefully constructed text scenarios from cognitive science can help shed light on the extent to which humans and LLMs align in a way that goes beyond mere agreement in aggregate.

Prior work on alignment between LLMs and human intuitions usually collected evaluation datasets in two stages. In the first phase, participants write stories with open-ended instructions. In the second phase, another group of participants labels these participant-generated stories (e.g. Hendrycks et al., 2020). The upside of this approach is the ease of obtaining a large number of examples in a short period of time. The downside of this approach is that the crowd-sourced stories are often not carefully written, and that they lack experimental control. Here, we take a different approach. Instead of relying on participant-generated scenarios, we collected two datasets from the existing literature in cognitive science: one on causal judgments and another on moral judgments. These scenarios were carefully written by researchers with the intention of systematically manipulating one or a few factors that have been theorized to influence people’s judgments. These latent factors naturally bring structures to the otherwise plain text stories, which aim to explain human judgments (see Figure 1). Using these scenarios, we can design a series of experiments that aim to measure the LLMs’ alignment with human intuition and use the scientific framework around human judgments to analyze where the differences occur. We have released the code and dataset here: <https://github.com/cicl-stanford/moca>

Our Contributions

- (C1): We summarize the main experimental findings of 24 cognitive science papers into factors that have been shown to influence participants’ judgments on moral and causal stories (see short version in Table 2a, full version in Table A1). From these papers, we create a causal and moral judgment challenge set in which only a few words are changed, yet they lead to big differences in people’s judgments. We collected 5150 human responses to our stories and annotated the latent factors with experts (see Figure 1).
- (C2): We evaluate how a wide range of LLMs align with human judgments. This includes models of different sizes, models fine-tuned via reinforcement learning using human feedback (RLHF), and those distilled from instruction-following, like **Alpaca-7B**. Our results show that larger models and RLHF techniques lead to better alignment.
- (C3): We compute the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) to reveal the implicit tendencies for each factor from human and LLM judgments. Our analysis reveals a number of implicit tendency differences between models trained within the same company or trained with the same technique. Our analysis highlights the importance of using a carefully constructed dataset to understand tendency alignment.

2 Related Work

For causal reasoning, there is an active line of research at the intersection of natural language processing (NLP) and commonsense reasoning that involves extracting and representing causal relationships among entities in text. In some cases, these relationships are based on commonsense knowledge of how objects behave in the world (Sap et al., 2019; Bosselut et al., 2019; Talmor et al., 2019). In other cases, models identify scenario-specific causal relations and outcomes. Sometimes, the causal relationship between entities is explicitly stated (e.g., *those cancers were caused by radiation*) (Hendrickx et al., 2010), while at other times the relationship is left implicit and needs to be inferred (Mostafazadeh et al., 2016). Causal reasoning is also included in broad benchmarks for language understanding, such as the Choice of Plausible Alternatives (COPA) in SuperGLUE (Roemmele et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2019).

For moral reasoning, tasks have focused on evaluations of agents in narrative-like text. These tasks and datasets vary in the amount of structure they provide, ranging from pairs of free-form anecdotes and judgment labels (Lourie et al., 2021; Hendrycks et al., 2020), to inputs with components separated




Figure 1: Two examples from our collected dataset. (a) shows a causal judgment story, and (b) shows a moral judgment story. In (a), a conjunction of two events was required, an abnormal event occurred, and Jane violated a prescriptive norm (scenario taken from [Knobe & Fraser, 2008](#)). In (b), the teenager’s death was inevitable; his death is a necessary means to save others, and bringing about his death requires the use of personal force (scenario taken from [Christensen et al., 2014](#)).

out into norms, intention, actions, and consequences ([Emelin et al., 2021](#)). Prior work has also looked into moral dilemmas, particularly around everyday scenarios ([Hendrycks et al., 2020](#); [Jiang et al., 2021](#)). In this work, the moral scenarios were generated through crowd-sourcing ([Emelin et al., 2021](#); [Ziems et al., 2022](#)), and there is general agreement about what’s the morally right thing to do in a scenario (i.e. these scenarios weren’t moral dilemmas). Alternatively, scenarios have been scraped from online communities such as Reddit ([Forbes et al., 2020](#); [Lourie et al., 2021](#); [Roemmele et al., 2011](#)). While these scenarios have greater external validity, they lack the experimental control of scenarios from cognitive science research. How LLMs align with people’s intuitions across a range of moral dilemmas hasn’t systematically been studied before. [Kiciman et al. \(2023\)](#) proposed modularized tests to understand whether LLMs can perform different types of causal analysis. Our work investigates whether these LLMs exhibit implicit tendencies similar to those of humans. [Scherrer et al. \(2023\)](#) evaluated LLMs on moral scenarios but focused on moral rule violation along the axis of moral “ambiguity”. There are also discussions of moral behaviors with reinforcement learning agents in game-like environments ([Hendrycks et al., 2021](#); [Reinecke et al., 2023](#); [Pan et al., 2023](#)) and with respect to legal reasoning ([Almeida et al., 2023](#)).

Our work falls under a broad range of research on commonsense reasoning, where models are encouraged to produce outputs that match human intuitions ([Gabriel, 2020](#); [Kenton et al., 2021](#)). In some cases, such as physical commonsense reasoning, alignment with human behavior is straightforward, while in the case of social commonsense, the subjectivity and diversity of human intuitions make alignment more challenging ([Davani et al., 2022](#)). Prior analysis of language models’ reasoning abilities includes measuring their behavior in zero-shot settings, after task fine-tuning ([Jiang et al., 2021](#); [Hendrycks et al., 2020](#)), or with human-curated support, such as chain-of-thought prompt engineering ([Wei et al., 2022b](#); [Wang et al., 2022](#)). Evaluating LLMs with causal hypotheses has also been explored by [Kosoy et al. \(2022\)](#). While they focused on the influence of causal structure, we investigate a variety of factors (including causal structure). Concurrently, [Jin et al. \(2022\)](#) curated a challenge dataset to examine and verify LLMs’ ability to conform to three categories of social norms. We look at five factors that have been shown to influence people’s moral judgments and analyze whether LLMs respond to these factors similarly to humans.

3 Judgment Tasks

We study the alignment between LLMs and human participants in two case studies: (1) a causal judgment task about whether someone or something caused the outcome of interest, and (2) a moral judgment task where the question is whether what a protagonist did (or failed to do) was morally permissible. [Figure 1](#) shows an example of each task.

3.1 Causal Judgment Task

Deciding what “the” cause of an outcome was can be challenging because there are often multiple events that contributed to an outcome. Here is an example story:

A merry-go-round horse can only support one child. Suzy is on the horse. Billy is not allowed to get on, but he climbs on anyway. The horse broke due to the two children’s weight. Did Billy cause the horse to break?

Even though both children were involved in breaking the horse, when participants are asked to assess whether Billy (who wasn’t allowed to get on) caused it to break, they tend to answer with “yes”. Formal models of causal selection have been developed that capture choice patterns in scenarios like this one (Kominsky et al., 2015; Icard et al., 2017; Gerstenberg & Icard, 2020; Quillien & Lucas, 2023). In this example, Billy violated a prescriptive norm, whereas Suzy didn’t. People often select norm-violating events as the cause of an outcome (Knobe & Fraser, 2008; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Alicke et al., 2011; Hilton & Slugoski, 1986; Hart & Honoré, 1959/1985). It is worth noting that causality is closely related to responsibility and blame. In fact, formal models of responsibility and blame have been built on top of a causal selection model (Halpern, 2015; Lagnado et al., 2013).

In addition to norm violations, prior work has identified a number of factors that systematically influence people’s causal judgments. Here, we focus on the following six factors: causal structure, agent awareness, norm type, event normality, action/omission, and time. Table 2a provides brief definitions of the different factors.

3.2 Moral Permissibility Task

Philosophers and cognitive scientists have used moral dilemmas to develop and evaluate normative theories of ethical behavior, and to investigate what moral intuitions people have. A popular moral dilemma is the trolley problem (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976), where the question is whether it’s morally permissible for the protagonist to re-route a trolley from the main track (saving some) to a side track (killing others). Some LLMs already show a certain degree of alignment with human responses in various versions of the trolley dilemma (Hendrycks et al., 2020; Jiang et al., 2021). However, only a few factors varied in these trolley dilemmas, such as the number of people on each track or personal attributes (age, social status, etc.; Awad et al., 2018).

A large number of factors have been shown to influence people’s moral intuitions. For example, in Figure 1b, people may consider factors such as whether personal force was required to bring about the effect (Greene et al., 2009), whether there was a risk for the protagonist themselves (Bloomfield, 2007), whether the harm was a side effect or a means for bringing about the less bad outcome (Moore et al., 2008), and whether the harm was inevitable (Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007). This work has shown that people’s moral judgments are sensitive to a variety of factors that haven’t been considered in existing work on the alignment between LLMs and people’s moral intuitions (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Liao et al., 2012; Christensen et al., 2014; Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2015). Table 2b provides brief definitions of these factors.

3.3 Dataset

For each task, we transcribe stories from a number of papers. For the Causal Judgment Task, we transcribed 144 stories from a selection of 20 papers, and for the Moral Permissibility Task, we transcribed 62 stories from 4 papers that covered a wide range of moral dilemmas. High-level descriptions of the dataset are presented in Table 1. We select these papers relying on expert domain knowledge – as these papers contain robust scientific findings and cover different kinds of scenarios.

Table 1: **Dataset:** We report dataset statistics on the label distribution, average length of each story, and inter-rater agreement between two annotators on the factors and the sentences they highlight. Additionally, we collect a binary response for each story from 25 people.

Dataset	# Stories	Yes ($p > 0.6$)	No ($p < 0.4$)	Ambiguous	# words per story	# words per translated story
Causal	144	48	50	46	162	82.9
Moral	62	23	10	29	72.5	53.5
Total	206	71	60	75	135	74.1

Table 2: **Factors:** Factors that influence causal selection judgments (top) and moral permissibility judgments (bottom). We provide definitions for each factor in Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2. See the full version in Table A1.

(a) Causal Factors		(b) Moral Factors	
Factor	Attribute	Factor	Attribute
Causal Structure	Conjunctive Disjunctive	Causal Role	Means Side Effect
Agent Awareness	Aware Unaware	Locus of Intervention	Instrument Patient of Harm
Norm Type	Prescriptive Statistical	Personal Force	Personal Impersonal
Event Normality	Normal Abnormal	Counterfactual Evitability	Avoidable Inevitable
Action / Omission	Action Omission	Beneficence	Benefit Self Benefit Other
Time	Early Late Same Time		

We collect 25 yes/no answers for each story from a crowd-sourcing platform with IRB approval for our data collection process. We describe the experimental design and data collection details in Appendix A.15. We additionally recruited two domain experts to annotate what factors are present in each story. We report the inter-rater agreement between the two annotators and describe their annotation process in Appendix A.14.

4 Experiment and Result

4.1 Do LLMs make the same judgments as people on these stories?

Setup. We first directly compare the responses of a set of LLMs to those of human participants across the set of stories in the original cognitive science experiments. We choose a wide range of language models that have achieved good performance with fine-tuning on other natural language understanding tasks (Radford et al., 2019; Devlin et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2019a; Lan et al., 2019; Clark et al., 2020). We conduct a 3-class comparison to compute accuracy: a response of “Yes”, “No”, and an additional response of “ambiguous” when the agreement between the average human responses or the probability of model output is $50\% \pm 10\%$. We normalize the model output probability to compute $P(\text{“Yes”}|\text{Story} + \text{Prompt})$ and $P(\text{“No”}|\text{Story} + \text{Prompt})$. For chat-based APIs, we prompt the model to output these labels directly. See Appendix A.3 for details about how we computed the probability for each model. Results should not be compared between completion and chat models.

We report discrete agreement (Agg) between LLMs and human participants. The agreement is computed in the same way as accuracy, but since we don’t want to imply that higher agreement is necessarily better, we use the term “agreement” instead of “accuracy”. We also report additional measures of agreement, such as the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), the absolute-mean-squared error (MAE), and cross-entropy (CE) on the probability of the matched label.

Zero-shot Alignment We report the result in Table 3. We notice that there is no model that perfectly aligns with human judgments on these metrics. We first find that larger models (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Claude) generally align with humans better than smaller models (GPT-2, RoBERTa, etc.). This is most apparent when one compares the performance of GPT3-curie-v1 (6.7B) to GPT3-davinci-v1 (175B). Both models are trained using the same setup, but on both the Moral Permissibility Task and the Causal Judgment Task, GPT3.5-davinci-v2 aligns better than GPT3-curie-v1. While existing literature has shown improved performances of LLMs on general deterministic tasks (Wei et al., 2022a), we show here that LLM alignment also improves on ambiguous tasks.

Recently, techniques such as supervised fine-tuning on human instructions (GPT3.5-davinci-v2; Ouyang et al., 2022), using reinforcement learning to update LLM weights from human feedback (RLHF; GPT3.5-davinci-v3, GPT3.5-turbo, Anthropic-claude-v1; Stiennon et al., 2020; Bai et al., 2022a), and multi-modal joint training on both language and images (GPT-4; OpenAI, 2023) have improved LLMs on various tasks. Perhaps surprisingly, unlike the monotonic improvement we find by increased model size, these techniques impact these models’ aggregate-level alignment differently. Comparing the result between GPT3.5-davinci-v2 and GPT3.5-davinci-v3, RLHF seems to increase aggregate alignment on causal judgment but decrease alignment on moral judgment. Comparing the

Table 3: **Original Story**: We ran our experiments and compute the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval for the result. We report discrete agreement (Agg), the area under the curve for the unambiguous stories (AUC, higher is better matched, 0.5 is chance, and below 0.5 is worse matched than chance), mean absolute error (MAE, lower is better matched), and cross-entropy (CE, lower is better matched). In Table 3b, we only report results from the best model. Red shows the alignment decreased compared to before. Blue shows the alignment increased. See Table A2 for a full comparison.

(a) Zero-shot with Different Large Language Models

Models	Causal Judgment				Moral Permissibility			
	Agg (↑)	AUC (↑)	MAE (↓)	CE (↓)	Agg (↑)	AUC (↑)	MAE (↓)	CE (↓)
RoBERTa-large	34.0±5.6	0.50	0.50	2.6	26.6±7.3	0.50	0.50	2.65
ALBERT-xxlarge	35.1±5.6	0.51	0.38	1.37	23.4±8.1	0.48	0.37	1.82
Electra-gen-large	34.7±5.9	0.53	0.44	1.94	26.6±8.1	0.49	0.46	1.59
GPT2-XL	34.4±5.6	0.49	0.42	1.47	26.6±8.1	0.51	0.43	1.71
GPT3-babbage-v1	31.2±5.9	0.47	0.33	0.74	18.5±7.3	0.43	0.41	1.03
GPT3-curie-v1	36.8±6.2	0.51	0.37	1.14	26.6±8.1	0.45	0.39	1.32
GPT3.5-davinci-v2	37.8±5.6	0.61	0.31	0.72	32.3±8.1	0.67	0.30	0.74
GPT3.5-davinci-v3	41.3±5.6	0.67	0.41	1.39	20.2±7.3	0.61	0.51	2.61
Alpaca-7B	32.3±5.6	0.51	0.28	0.65	32.3±8.1	0.45	0.32	0.91
Anthropic-claude-v1	36.1±5.9	0.57	0.34	1.37	37.1±8.9	0.59	0.29	1.29
GPT3.5-turbo	35.4±5.6	0.51	0.45	2.11	40.3±8.9	0.65	0.33	1.49
GPT-4	43.1±5.9	0.61	0.44	1.89	41.9±8.9	0.74	0.31	1.28
Delphi	—	—	—	—	22.6±11.3	—	—	—

(b) Zero-shot with Social Simulacra and Prompt Optimization

Models	Causal (GPT3.5-davinci-v3)				Moral (GPT3.5-davinci-v2)			
	Agg (↑)	AUC (↑)	MAE (↓)	CE (↓)	Agg (↑)	AUC (↑)	MAE (↓)	CE (↓)
Persona (average)	39.7±1.1	0.60	0.31	0.73	28.9±1.6	0.55	0.33	0.86
Persona (best)	42.7±5.6	0.60	0.31	0.71	37.1±8.5	0.58	0.27	0.72
Persona (worst)	37.2±5.4	0.62	0.29	0.61	18.5±6.5	0.58	0.46	0.71
Auto Prompt Engineer	40.6±5.8	0.64	0.41	1.55	40.4±8.8	0.46	0.28	0.63

results between Anthropic-claude-v1 and GPT3.5-davinci-v3, it seems that even though both models are fine-tuned with RLHF, on aggregate, their alignment with human judgments differs. In the next section, we will design a method to examine how different training methods cause subtle shifts in the model’s implicit tendency.

Social Simulacra Park et al. (2022) proposed a framework to elicit diverse social behaviors from LLMs by prompting them with different personas. For example, adding the persona, “Jane Smith is a liberal activist.” before the question. The human responses we collect on each story are diverse (see Figure A4 for the distribution of P(Yes)). We shouldn’t expect LLMs to generate a single response that matches the diversity of human perspectives. Therefore, we designed an experiment where we sample 5 personas from 5 simulacra defined by Park et al. (2022) (25 in total). We elicit $P(\text{“Yes”}|\text{Persona+Story+Prompt})$ and $P(\text{“No”}|\text{Persona+Story+Prompt})$ from the model.

We report three ways of incorporating personas: Persona (average), where we average P over all personas. Persona (best), where we find the persona that gave the most human-aligned responses. Persona (worst), where we use P from the persona that gave the least human-aligned responses. See how we designed this experiment in Appendix A.4 and our sampled personas in Table A3. We chose the GPT3.5-davinci-v2 and GPT-3.5-davinci-v3 for this experiment because their API endpoints explicitly provide the probability of Yes or No answers, and they align with humans best.

Personas elicit very different *moral permissibility* responses – the most and least-aligned persona have close to 18.6% difference in discrete agreement. However, *causal judgments* do not vary much based on different personas. We show the most and least aligned persona in Appendix A.4.

Automatic Prompt Optimization We additionally explore whether we can use a black box method to automatically identify a prompt that is maximally aligned with collected human responses. Zhou et al. (2022) proposed Automatic Prompt Engineer (APE), a method that uses LLMs to generate prompts and then use the log-probability of a few training examples to select the best prompts. Note that APE does not currently have a workflow defined for chat-based models. Our experiment used five stories as training examples to select prompts. We describe how we searched the optimal prompt in Appendix A.5. We see that APE is still limited by the generative capability of LLMs – we are unable to find a better prompt for the Causal Judgment Task for GPT3.5-davinci-v3. However, for the Moral Permissibility Task, we found a prompt that substantially improved GPT3.5-davinci-v2’s discrete agreement by 8.1%. The discovered prompt is “James is a consequentialist.” On average, we found that prompts for the Moral Permissibility Task with words like “consequentialist” or “utilitarian” lead to the highest alignment with humans. However, this observation is nuanced, and we provide an extended discussion in Appendix A.6. For causality, good prompts are with the words “a good student”, “a good researcher”, or “a very logical person”. We report all the generated prompts in Appendix A.5.

4.2 Do LLMs have the same implicit tendencies as people on these stories?

In the previous section, we focus on analyzing aggregate metrics such as agreement over all stories. Such analysis often provides no information beyond comparing highly complicated systems with a single number. Since each of our stories is a combination of factors with corresponding attributes (see Figure 1), we can leverage conjoint analysis and compute the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) for each factor attribute (Hainmueller et al., 2014; Awad et al., 2018), where AMCE reveals the implicit tendency of the underlying system when a particular attribute is present.

4.2.1 Method

Average Marginal Component Effect We provide an overview of how AMCE is computed for each factor that reveals the implicit tendency of the system. For N responses, K stories, and J factors. Each factor has 2 attributes/levels. For 3-level factors such as “Time”, we only pick “Early” and “Late” attributes. Each response is $Y_{jnk} \in \{0, 1\}$, denoting n -th response, j -th factor, and k -th story. For LLMs, $Y_{jnk} = P(\text{Yes}|\text{Story})$. We also define a factor profile matrix $T \in \{0, 1\}^{J \times K}$, where T_{jk} denotes the attribute level of the j -th factor in k -th story. Now, we can use a non-parametric difference-in-means estimator to compute AMCE:

$$\Delta(j) = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbb{1}\{T_{kj} = 1\} Y_{jnk}}{\sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbb{1}\{T_{kj} = 1\}} - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbb{1}\{T_{kj} = 0\} Y_{jnk}}{\sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{n=1}^N \mathbb{1}\{T_{kj} = 0\}} \quad (1)$$

Note that if there is no preference between the two attributes of the same factor, $\Delta(j) = 0$. Here is an example of how this estimator works. If we want to know if a system has a stronger tendency to find causing harm to be more morally permissible when they are “Inevitable” than “Avoidable” for the factor “Counterfactual Evitability”, we can find all stories where “Counterfactual Evitability” has the attribute of “Inevitable”, compute the average of all the binary responses Y for all respondents, then subtract the average responses Y for all stories with attribute “Avoidable”. We additionally compute the 95% confidence interval on ACME using Bootstrap and show these results in Figure A2 and Figure A3. We only plot the average $\Delta(j)$ in Figure 2 and Figure 3. More details in Appendix A.7.

Zero-shot Implicit Tendency We use the standard radar chart to capture the multi-factor tendency of each LLM and human. We put the attributes of the same factor (e.g., Abnormal and Normal) on opposite sides – since the leaning is over one attribute or the other: $\Delta(j) \in [-1, 1]$. Each concentric circle is marked with a probability (e.g., 0.1), which represents the change in $P(\text{Yes})$ if the factor attribute had been present in the story. The implicit tendency is defined as the expected change in the probability of the system outputting “Yes” if this attribute had been present in the story. Intuitively, we can say a model has an implicit tendency for one attribute when it’s more likely to judge an event to be the cause, or the impending harm to be more morally permissible, if this attribute is present.

4.2.2 Results

Causality: Sensitivity to Abnormality People tend to cite abnormal events as the cause of the outcome. In our stories, the normality of events is clearly stated. However, a model still needs to first, identify the norm specified in the story and then, determine which event violated the norm. We find that text-davinci-003 exhibits a strong tendency for citing abnormal events as causal compared to any other models (and to humans). We also find that smaller models (text-babbage-001, text-curie-001, and Alpaca-7B) don’t have a tendency for abnormal over normal events, which might indicate an inability to perform the required chained reasoning.

Causality: Statistical or Prescriptive Norm Statistical norms refer to commonly and naturally occurring events, such as “David usually comes home around 6 pm.” or “When you flip the switch, lights usually turn on.” Prescriptive norms refer to human-made rules, such as “You are not allowed to run in the hallway.” or “The speed limit is 60 mph.” People tend to find events that violate prescriptive norms to be the cause of the outcome. Surprisingly, although GPT-4, Claude-v1, text-davinci-002, and smaller models, such as text-curie-001 and Alpaca-7B, have similar tendencies to humans, text-davinci-003 and its counterpart ChatGPT exhibit a strong tendency for statistical norms. This shows that LLM implicit tendencies can change for different training methods.

Morality: Benefit Self or Others The stories in the Moral Permissibility Task often involve scenarios where participants must make a choice: they are either safe from danger, and their decision only affects others, or they need to save their own lives along with other people. Humans are more likely to save themselves (self-beneficial). Interestingly, smaller models such as text-babbage-001 and text-curie-001 find actions more morally permissible when they are self-beneficial, while larger models do not. RLHF makes the models more other-beneficial. For example, while Claude-v1 seems to prefer more self-beneficial actions, text-davinci-003, ChatGPT, and GPT-4, all prefer to be other-beneficial. Human and model tendencies do not align on this factor, but since models are lifeless systems, we may want models to be more other-beneficial. See Figure A2 for a clearer comparison.

Morality: Inevitable or Avoidable Harm Some stories involve situations where harm would inevitably happen to a group of people regardless of the participant’s choice. Harm directed towards inevitable consequences is often considered less bad. This requires the model to comprehend the information described in the story about the counterfactual scenario. We find that ChatGPT, Claude-v1, and GPT-4 find harmful actions toward inevitable consequences much more morally permissible than any other model.




Figure 2: **Causal Implicit Tendencies.** Each concentric circle marks the implicit tendency – the change in probability of responding “Yes” if the attribute had been present in the story. For example, if “Abnormal” is present in the story, humans will have a 25% higher probability to respond “Yes” on average than “Normal” being present. The left figure compares models of different sizes. The right figure compares models trained or finetuned with different methods.




Figure 3: **Moral Implicit Tendencies**. Note that the Left and right figures have different scales.

Morality: Intervening on Agent or Patient of Harm A hijacked airplane full of passengers is about to hit a building full of people. The people in the hijacked airplane are referred to as agents of harm, and the people in the building are the patients of harm. Since we compute the confidence interval on AMCE, although some models (such as GPT-4) seem to have a tendency to intervene on the agent of harm, the upper/lower bound of the confidence interval shows there might not be a clear tendency (see [Figure A2](#)).

Morality: Personal or Impersonal Force This factor captures whether or not the outcome was brought about by using personal force (e.g., pushing a person). Generally, people are less likely to find actions morally permissible that involve personal force. We find that only two models, ChatGPT and GPT-4, align with human intuitions about personal force.

Morality: Means or Side Effect Assessing an agent’s causal role is important for moral judgments. Generally, people find actions more morally permissible when they lead to harm as side effects rather than when the harm is necessary to bring out the outcome. This can be illustrated as a diagram in [Figure A1](#). We find that no model exhibits a clear preference for harm as a side effect.

We additionally saw the following larger trends across models:

- (1): **Non-monotonicity**: The alignment to human biases does not necessarily increase with model size. We speculate that alignment is an area where the inverse scaling law applies ([McKenzie et al., 2023](#)).
- (2): **Heterogeneity**: Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, models that used the same training method and fine-tuned for human preferences do not have the same implicit tendencies – we highlight the difference between Claude-v1 and GPT3.5-turbo.
- (3): **Self-Tendency vs. Other-Preference**: Humans are ego-centric and often make self-beneficial decisions. However, when asked to judge the behaviors of others, we prefer others to be altruistic. For example, in scenarios involving self-driving cars, [Kallioinen et al. \(2019\)](#) reported a stark contrast between what we tend to do versus what we want other people to do. This difference will make models trained on human preferences through RLHF different from how humans would tend to act in a given situation. As it is more prevalent to use LLMs as proxy humans for data labeling or experiments ([Dillion et al., 2023](#); [Gilardi et al., 2023](#)), it is increasingly important to understand and measure these implicit differences.

4.2.3 Other Analyses

Same Model with Different Prompting Methods We also investigate how different prompting methods shift a model’s implicit tendencies. Prompting methods shifted the model’s implicit tendency significantly for some factors (e.g., abnormal sensitivity, benefit self or others) but not much for others (e.g., inevitable or avoidable harm). We report this in [Figure A3](#).

Predicting Factor-Attribute as Few-shot Learning We asked LLMs to predict which factor attribute each story contains as a few-shot natural language understanding task. Across all prediction tasks, text-davinci-v2 achieved 85.5% accuracy on causal factors and 70.9% on moral factors. We report more details in Appendix A.10. This shows that even though LLMs and humans do not align, they are very capable of following examples and instructions to annotate stories with factors that are relevant to human judgments.

Hallucination We conduct a small-scale analysis to investigate whether the tendency difference is due to actual tendency difference or model hallucinations. We annotated 80 examples by sampling 10 examples where 4 models made mistakes across 2 tasks. We prompt the model to explain why they made the choice for the original story. We use the explanation to check if the model hallucinates and has an accurate grasp of the facts represented in the story. A model hallucinates when they re-state the core story in a way that’s inconsistent with the facts provided in the story. For example, if an action is not performed by character A, and the model thinks it is performed by character A, we count this as a hallucination. In Table 4, we can clearly see that when a model makes a mistake, smaller models tend to hallucinate more.

Table 4: **Model Hallucination:** number of stories where the model hallucinated.

Model	Causal	Moral
text-curie-001	8/10	3/10
Claude-v1	2/10	2/10
GPT3.5-turbo	2/10	0/10
GPT-4	0/10	0/10

We read the model explanations on examples where no hallucination is found, and we conclude that larger models indeed have a different tendency compared to humans in these stories. On moral stories, Claude-v1, GPT3.5-turbo, and GPT-4 all seem to be bound by pre-entered moral principles and choose the same action regardless of the story circumstances (potentially due to the influence of AI constitution; Bai et al., 2022b), while humans tend to consider a few more factors (i.e., nuances in the story). For example, when faced with intricate situations, language models tend to take a very passive stance. This is true even if the action could save a greater number of people by putting a smaller number of people in danger. However, when self-sacrifice is in question, the language model is inclined to metaphorically “sacrifice” itself. Our observation is based on a limited set of examples. We leave more extended evaluation to future work.

5 Conclusion

We summarized the main findings of 24 cognitive science papers around human intuitions on causal and moral judgments. We collected a dataset of causal and moral judgment tasks and used the scientific findings to enrich the stories with structural annotations. Using conjoint analysis, we compute the average marginal component effect (AMCE) for people’s and the models’ implicit tendency on the factors important to making causal and moral judgments. We find subtle differences in what humans and models prefer. Our work illuminates the importance of using a richly annotated dataset to understand a model’s systematic tendencies, an important step to understanding where models and humans align or misalign.

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A Appendix

Ethical considerations

It is imperative that we assess implicit intuitions underlying commonsense reasoning abilities in LLMs capable of open language generation. This is especially important for cases related to morality, considering that algorithmic neutrality is not possible: systems reflect the data they ingest and the people who build them (Green, 2021). In addition, even if a model is not explicitly given the responsibility to make moral judgments, these judgments can appear across many forms of freely generated text. Some may argue that equipping models with moral reasoning skills can allow them to behave better in complex environments, but an AI capable of reasoning is not necessarily bound to be ethically well-aligned, as many humans themselves have demonstrated (Cave et al., 2019; Talat et al., 2021). Using carefully curated data, we advocate for the inspection of *how* choices are made and whether factors used in human cognitive processes are or can be incorporated by models. In the case of our moral permissibility task, we would like it to be a dataset for investigating these underlying factors rather than a flat benchmark to beat. Whether alignment between LLMs and human participants is a desired goal in this context is also unclear. For example, there are well-documented biases that affect people’s moral intuitions, and we wouldn’t want to replicate these biases in LLMs (Eberhardt, 2020). However, we argue that despite these challenges and difficulties, our research, which focuses on utilizing the insights and frameworks proposed by cognitive science and philosophy to analyze and scaffold LLMs to generate more human-aligned judgments, is a small step forward in a promising direction.

A.1 Factors in Causal Selection Task

Causal Structure In a situation where multiple events are present in a story, and the outcome is caused by one or more of these events, it’s important to understand the causal structure of the situation: Is one event sufficient to bring about the outcome (disjunctive causes) or are all of the considered events required (conjunctive causes)? (Wells & Gavanski, 1989; Mandel, 2003; Sloman & Lagnado, 2015).

Event Normality People have a general tendency to cite abnormal events (rather than normal events) as causes (Knobe & Fraser, 2008; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Alicke et al., 2011; O’Neill et al., 2021; Morris et al., 2019). This effect is present for both children and adults (Samland et al., 2016). Norms can be broadly classified into “statistical norm” (norms about what tends to be) or “prescriptive norm” (norms about what should be) (Icard et al., 2017; N’gbala & Branscombe, 1995; Kominsky et al., 2015). Event normality applies to inanimate objects as well. For example, a malfunctioning machine is judged by more people to be the cause than a machine that functions as it should (often called the “norm of proper functioning”) (Sytsma, 2021).

Agent knowledge The epistemic state of the agent also plays an important role in how people judge whether the agent is the cause of the outcome. For example, an agent who is aware of the potential consequences of their action and knowingly performs an action that leads to a foreseeable bad outcome is judged more harshly than an agent who lacks the relevant knowledge. This is often characterized as knowledge versus ignorance (Samland et al., 2016; Kominsky & Phillips, 2019).

Action/omission People tend to select an action as the cause rather than inaction. This phenomenon is often called the “omission bias” (Ritov & Baron, 1992; Baron & Ritov, 2004). In a scenario where one person acts, and another one doesn’t, the person who acted tends to be cited as the cause of the outcome (Henne et al., 2017, 2019; Clarke et al., 2015; DeScioli et al., 2011; Gerstenberg & Stephan, 2021).

Temporal effect Causal selections are also affected by the order in which the events occur (Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2012). When several events unfolding over time lead to an outcome, people have a general tendency to select later events rather than earlier events as the actual cause of the outcome (Reuter et al., 2014). However, it also depends on how the events are causally related to one another (Hilton et al., 2010; Spellman, 1997). When earlier events determine the course of action, these events tend to be selected (Henne et al., 2021).

Table A1: Factors that influence causal selection judgments (left) and moral permissibility judgments (right). We provide a list of simplified definitions for each tag in the story. We also added references to papers that primarily investigate these factors. We refer to higher-level concepts (e.g., “Causal Role”) as factors and the possible values for each factor (e.g., “Means” or “Side Effect”) as tags.

CAUSAL SELECTION		MORAL PERMISSIBILITY	
Factors	Definitions	Factors	Definitions
Causal Structure	(Wells & Gavanski, 1989; Mandel, 2003; Sloman & Lagnado, 2015)	Causal Role	(Hauser, 2006; Christensen et al., 2014; Wiegmann et al., 2012)
Conjunctive	All events must happen in order for the outcome to occur. Each event is a necessary cause for the outcome.	Means	The harm is instrumental/necessary to produce the outcome.
Disjunctive	Any event will cause the outcome to occur. Each event is a sufficient cause for the outcome.	Side Effect	The harm happens as a side-effect of the agent’s action, unnecessary to produce the outcome.
Agent Awareness	(Samland et al., 2016; Kominsky & Phillips, 2019)	Personal Force	(Christensen et al., 2014; Wiegmann et al., 2012)
Aware	Agent is aware that their action will break the norm/rule or they know their action is “abnormal”.	Personal	Agent is directly involved in the production of the harm.
Unaware	Agent is unaware or ignorant that their action will break the norm/rule, or they don’t know their action is “abnormal”.	Impersonal	Agent is only indirectly involved in the process that results in the harm (e.g., using a device).
Norm Type	(Icard et al., 2017; N’gbala & Branscombe, 1995; Kominsky et al., 2015; Sytsma, 2021)	Counterfactual Evitability	(Moore et al., 2008; Huebner et al., 2011; Christensen et al., 2014; Wiegmann et al., 2012)
Prescriptive Norm	A norm about what is supposed to happen.	Avoidable	The harm would not have occurred if the agent hadn’t acted.
Statistical Norm	A norm about what tends to happen.	Inevitable	The harm would have occurred even if the agent hadn’t acted.
Event Normality	(Knobe & Fraser, 2008; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Alicke et al., 2011; O’Neill et al., 2021; Morris et al., 2019; Samland et al., 2016)	Beneficence	(Bloomfield, 2007; Christensen et al., 2014; Wiegmann et al., 2012)
Normal Event	The event that led to the outcome is considered “normal”.	Self-Beneficial	The agent themselves benefits from their action.
Abnormal Event	The event that led to the outcome is considered “abnormal/unexpected”.	Other-Beneficial	Only other people benefit from the agent’s action.
Action or Omission	(Ritov & Baron, 1992; Baron & Ritov, 2004; Henne et al., 2017, 2019; Clarke et al., 2015; DeScioli et al., 2011; Gerstenberg & Stephan, 2021)	Locus of Intervention	(Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007)
Action as Cause	Agent performed an action that led to the outcome.	Instrument of Harm	The intervention is directed at the instrument of harm (e.g., the runaway train, the hijacked airplane).
Omission as Cause	Agent did not perform the action, and the omission led to the outcome.	Patient of Harm	The intervention is directed at the patient of harm (e.g., the workers on the train track).
Time	(Reuter et al., 2014; Henne et al., 2021)		
Early	The event happened early.		
Late	The event happened late.		
Same Time	Multiple events happened at the same time.		

A.2 Factors in Moral Permissibility Task

Causal Role Assessing an agent’s causal role is important for moral judgments. Actions are more likely to be seen as permissible when they didn’t play an important causal role in how the negative outcome came about. One important distinction is between an event as a means versus a side effect of the outcome (illustrated in Figure A1). In Figure A1a, the action (A) leads to a desired outcome (O) but also has the side effect of harming someone (H). In Figure A1b, the harm is a means to bringing about the outcome. Generally, people find actions more morally permissible when they lead to harm as side effects rather than when the harm is a means for bringing about the outcome.

Personal Force This factor captures whether or not the outcome was brought about by the use of personal force (e.g., pushing a person). Generally, people are less likely to find actions morally permissible that involve personal force.

This is also a factor that connects causal judgment and moral judgment – in causal judgment, a normative framework that describes whether a cause will be selected by human tendency is through the judgment and observation of force transfer (Wolff, 2007). Moral philosophy that studied the mass murders during the Second World War has suggested that killing via a mechanism (e.g., “press a button”) is much easier than actively involved in the killing acts (Eatherly & Anders, 2015).

Counterfactual Evitability Could the harm have been avoided? In the story where the teenager was going to trigger the bomb, which would kill him and the others in the building, in a counterfactual world, had the agent not killed the teenager, they would have died from the explosion they caused anyway. Harm directed towards inevitable consequences is often considered less evil (Hauser, 2006).

Beneficence People are more likely to take actions that benefit themselves (Bloomfield, 2007). In the stories, participants were not asked to choose themselves over others; instead, the framing often is they are either safe from danger, and their decision only affects others, or they need to save their own lives along with other people.

Locus of Intervention People are often asked to choose to intervene on the instrument of harm or recipient of harm. For example, a hijacked airplane with passengers can crash into a building full of people. If we use a missile to shoot down the hijacked airplane, killing all the passengers onboard, then we would be intervening on the instrument of harm (the plane). If we choose to misdirect the hijacked airplane’s navigation system to hit another smaller building also filled with fewer people, then we would be intervening on the patient of harm. Presented with this type of choice, human tendency is usually to intervene on the instrument of harm (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007).

A.3 Original Story Experiment Details

We conduct a 3-class comparison, a binarized response of “Yes” or “No”, and an additional class of “ambiguous” when the agreement between human or model output is $50\% \pm 10\%$. We test alignment using a prompt-based zero-shot task setup. For each model and scenario, we use the normalized probability and compare $P(\text{“Yes”}|\text{Story} + \text{Prompt})$ and $P(\text{“No”}|\text{Story} + \text{Prompt})$. We apply temperature-based sampling to generate samples of “Yes” or “No” answers per story for each




Figure A1: **Causal Role** We show the causal diagram of the difference between means and side effects. A represents action conducted by the agent. H represents the harm. O represents the outcome. (a) is the diagram that represents harm as a side effect, and (b) represents harm as a means.

experimental run. For models that are trained with a masked language model objective, we append a mask token after the prompt question. For a generative language model like GPT2, we directly ask it to produce the next word. We also included two models for which we didn't have direct access – GPT-3 (Brown et al., 2020) and Delphi (Jiang et al., 2021). We used their APIs to evaluate alignment.

For Chat-based APIs (Alpaca-7B, Anthropic-claude-v1, GPT3.5-turbo, GPT-4), since the probability of each token is not provided, we first experimented with sampling multiple times from a model with a high temperature. We sampled 10 responses for a few stories to see if we have any variation in generated responses – to our surprise, we always get the same response. After this initial exploration, we only generate one response per story and set $P = 1$ for the chosen response. In our prompt, we tell the chat-based models that they can output “not sure” if they are not certain. When “not sure” is found, we assign $P = 0.5$ for either choice.

A.4 Social Simulacra Experiment Details

There are 50 simulacra (community) in total provided by Park et al. (2022); each simulacra has 200 persona prompts. The persona in each simulacrum roughly shares a common theme. Some of such themes include “A community for discussing Yu-Gi-Oh! Master Duel!” or “A community for discussing Disney’s movie, Encanto.”

Most of the simulacra themes are highly irrelevant to our task domain and evaluating all simulacra personas are cost prohibitive. Therefore, we choose 5 simulacra that are most relevant to us – they contain personas that usually describe ideological or political perspectives. We then randomly choose 5 personas out of 200 personas in each simulacrum. We show our selection in Table A3. You can access the complete list of 200 personas, such as personas listed in LuxuryLifeHabits here¹.

For both models, the persona that most closely aligned with our collected responses for Causal Judgment Task is “Emily White is a Republican who got fed up with the party”, and the least aligned persona is “Angela Campbell is a woman who likes to party until the sun comes up”. For Moral Permissibility Task, the most aligned persona for both models is “Allen Lee is a really cool guy”, and the least aligned persona is “Paul Brown is an anti-vaccine activist”.

A.5 Automatic Prompt Engineer Experiment Details

We use the official implementation of Automatic Prompt Engineer². We asked LLMs to generate 200 prompts for GPT3.5-davinci-v2 and GPT3.5-davinci-v3.

Automatic Prompt Engineer provides us with a few default templates for engineering prompts. These prompts are fine if the prompt you’re trying to engineer can be described as an imperative statement, like “produce X” or “generate Y.” However, in our experiment, these default templates do not lead to any good prompts. Inspired by the Social Simulacra experiment results, we switched to a more persona-like template.

“James gave these answers to the following questions:

[EXAMPLES]

James is a [PROMPT]”

We chose “James” because it is a common first name. We are aware that LLMs have implicit biases towards gendered names, and we suspect the generated prompt will be different if the name changes. We leave a systematic exploration of bias in automatic prompt generation for future work.

In this prompt, [EXAMPLES] is replaced with input-output pairs from the dataset in the format of the default demos template, which is: [STORY] OUTPUT: [ANSWER]. After the prompt has been generated, APE evaluates the quality of the prompt by the following template:

“James is a [PROMPT].

James is given this prompt: “[STORY]”

James is asked to please answer Yes or No.

James answers: [ANSWER]”

¹<https://social-simulacra.herokuapp.com/LuxuryLifeHabits#simulacra>

²https://github.com/keirp/automatic_prompt_engineer

Table A2: The full zero-shot performance of two GPT3.5 models with Social Simulacra and Prompt Optimization methods.

(a) Zero-shot with Social Simulacra and Prompt Optimization (text-davinci-002)

Methods	Causal Judgment				Moral Permissibility			
	Agg (↑)	AUC (↑)	MAE (↓)	CE (↓)	Agg (↑)	AUC (↑)	MAE (↓)	CE (↓)
GPT3.5-davinci-v2	37.8±5.6	0.61	0.31	0.72	32.3±8.1	0.67	0.30	0.74
Persona (average)	39.7±1.1	0.60	0.31	0.73	28.9±1.6	0.55	0.33	0.86
Persona (best)	42.0±5.9	0.60	0.30	0.71	37.1±8.5	0.58	0.27	0.72
Persona (worst)	36.8±5.9	0.62	0.29	0.61	18.5±6.9	0.58	0.46	0.71
Auto Prompt Engineer	38.5±5.8	0.60	0.36	0.89	40.4±8.8	0.46	0.28	0.63

(b) Zero-shot with Social Simulacra and Prompt Optimization (text-davinci-003)

Methods	Causal Judgment				Moral Permissibility			
	Agg (↑)	AUC (↑)	MAE (↓)	CE (↓)	Agg (↑)	AUC (↑)	MAE (↓)	CE (↓)
GPT3.5-davinci-v3	41.3±5.6	0.67	0.41	1.39	20.2±7.3	0.61	0.51	2.61
Persona (average)	39.6±1.1	0.60	0.31	1.56	28.8±1.6	0.55	0.33	0.86
Persona (best)	42.7±5.6	0.60	0.31	0.71	37.1±8.5	0.57	0.28	0.72
Persona (worst)	37.2±5.4	0.62	0.29	0.61	18.5±6.5	0.58	0.46	0.71
Auto Prompt Engineer	40.6±5.8	0.64	0.41	1.55	33.3±8.3	0.50	0.47	1.62

We randomly sampled 5 causal and moral stories to use as training examples and excluded them from the experiment result. These stories are indices 1, 8, 23, 29, 112 for Causal Judgment Task and indices 0, 7, 28, 49, 61 for Moral Permissibility Task. For evaluation and numbers reported in Table 3b, we select the best prompt for each model and use it to generate responses for all our stories.

We show the generated prompt and their average log-probability (the higher, the better):

Causal

text-davinci-002

- 0.97: very honest person, so his answers are all correct.
- 1.01: good student, and he always gives correct answers.
- 1.02: good student, and he always does his homework on time.
However, he is not very good at tests.
When he took his last math test, he got a C.
- 1.08: very good student, and he always gives correct answers.
- 1.10: good researcher, and he is careful to make sure that his answers are correct.
- 1.11: very logical person, and he has thought about these questions very carefully.
He is certain that his answers are correct.
- 1.11: very good student, and he always gets full marks on his tests.
- 1.12: good researcher, and he is very methodical. He is very careful to make sure that all of his answers are consistent with the information given in the question.
- 1.12: very logical person, and he seems to be very sure of his answers. I would trust his answers.
- 1.13: very literal person. He always answers questions with a simple yes or no, regardless of whether that is the most accurate answer.

Table A3: List of sampled persona from the Social Simulacra Dataset

Category	Persona Prompt
insaneProtestors	Amy Hsuis a lawyer with a former history working with social movements Jared Cox is a firefighter who is married and has 3 children Ryan Andrews is a photographer who likes to go on adventures Tom Smith is a teacher who is preparing the next generation Jane Smith is a liberal activist
luxuryLifeHabits	Jake Williams is a person who has been abused Polly Wangerin is a feminist and a democratic socialist Jordan Sanders is a woman who supports Medicare for All Emily White is a Republican who got fed up with the party Nadia Rasheed is a scientist who is really good at science
newDealAmerica	Nia Ellis is a Bernie Sanders supporter; a woman of color Kayla James is a person who studied biology Sarah Lee is a Bernie Sanders supporter who loves dogs Jon Blair is the Director of the Office of LGBT Affairs Sam Thompson is a retired union worker and Hillary Clinton supporter
nonPoliticalTwitter	Angela Campbell is a woman who likes to party until the sun comes up Liz Akins is a mom who wants to know how the plant will help her son Tristan Wright is a person who likes to make new friends Anthony Woods is a man who likes to meditate Allen Lee is a really cool guy
politicsPeopleTwitter	Suzy Han is a doctor trying to give mental health support to the alt-right Dennis Johnson is a local minister fighting against misinformation Paul Brown is an anti-vaccine activist Ann Watson is a law student that has been trying to spread political awareness Sam Thompson is a student trying to expose right-wing lies

Causal

text-davinci-003

- 0.87: trustworthy source.
- 0.98: very smart person!
- 1.25: reliable answerer.
- 1.27: good listener!
- 1.29: responsible answer-giver.
- 1.34: very smart student!
- 1.49: reliable source of answers.
- 1.51: reliable answer giver.
- 1.61: reliable source of answers!
- 1.63: reliable source of accurate answers.

Moral

text-davinci-002

- 1.11: consequentialist.
- 1.15: consequentialist, so he would always choose the option that leads to the best outcome, even if it means sacrificing one life to save many.
- 1.17: consequentialist, meaning he believes that the morally right thing to do is the one that will produce the best consequences. In each of the scenarios above, James believes that the best thing to do is the one that will save the most lives.
- 1.21: utilitarian. He believes that the morally right course of action is the one that results in the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In the first scenario, releasing one person from the helicopter will result in the greatest

good for the greatest number of people
-1.23: utilitarian, so he would always choose the option that will result in the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In the first scenario, he would throw one person off the helicopter to save the other eight. In the second scenario, he would drive

Moral
text-davinci-003

-0.00: utilitarian and believes in maximizing overall happiness. Therefore, his answer to all of the questions is yes, as sacrificing the lives of one or a few people for the sake of saving more lives is the action that will bring the most happiness overall.
-0.00: utilitarian, so he believes that the greatest good for the greatest number should be pursued. Therefore, his answer to all of the questions is yes, because in each case sacrificing a few people will save the lives of many more people.
-0.01: utilitarian, believing that decisions should be made to produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people. His answers of "yes" in all of these scenarios reflects his belief that it is best to sacrifice a few individuals in order to save the many.
-0.01: utilitarian and believes that the most ethical action is the one that results in the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In each of these scenarios, sacrificing one person for the sake of saving more lives is the best option according to utilitarianism, so
-0.01: person who believes that the ends justify the means, as his answers demonstrate. He believes that sacrificing the lives of a few to save the lives of many is justified in certain circumstances.

A.6 Additional Discussion on the Utilitarian Principle in Moral Judgments

There is a difference between what prompt aligns LLMs best with humans and the actual responses produced for each story. The prompt that makes LLMs align best with human reasoning is “adopt a utilitarian/consequentialist framing”, but this does not mean that human participants explicitly considered consequentialist principles when providing judgments for the different scenarios. Indeed, there are scenarios where human participants make judgments that go against utilitarian principles. For example, in one of the stories, participants are asked whether it’s morally permissible to kill 5 children of a particular race in an orphanage in order to save hundreds of other children in WWII. Here, participants overwhelmingly refuse to kill even if it means that this would have resulted in the greatest number of lives saved. So, as the reviewer suggests, while utilitarian principles certainly seem to play an important part in human moral reasoning, it’s not the only consideration that matters to humans.

Different people’s moral intuitions vary substantially. For some individuals, utilitarian principles matter a lot, whereas, for other individuals, deontological rules that prescribe what actions are right or wrong (e.g., do not kill) have a strong impact on their judgments. Currently, our evaluation of LLM alignment is against the aggregate of human judgments, and here it looks like prompting the LLM to adopt a utilitarian framing leads to the best alignment. That said, it’s possible that different prompts would help the model to align better with different subgroups of human participants. While we are ultimately interested in better capturing the variance in human moral and causal intuitions, we chose not to focus on this aspect and leave it for future work.

A.7 Additional Details on Average Marginal Component Effect Experiment

We discuss the three assumptions that the conjoint analysis needs to have in order to claim the non-parametric estimator we used is an unbiased estimation of the AMCE. The first assumption is the stability and no carryover effect. In our context, this means the set of factor attributes from the story fully determines how the respondents will produce their responses. Since each of our stories has been used in previous scientific experiments and has validated scientific hypotheses, we believe these stories were written very carefully to highlight the factor attributes within the story. The second

assumption is no partial order effect. All the stories are independent, and we randomly sample the stories to present to the respondents. The second assumption is thus satisfied. The third and last assumption is the randomization of factors. This assumption is satisfied in [Awad et al. \(2018\)](#) because the scenarios in their experiment are randomly generated. We argue by collecting stories from a large number of papers, and with each paper focusing on investigating different scientific theories, the factors present in each story should be random if they are drawn from different studies. However, we acknowledge that because we are performing a meta-analysis over existing experiment designs, the stories we collected might be implicitly biased by our selection process. So it is possible that the AMCE we compute is a biased estimate. We compute confidence intervals via bootstrapping on AMCE and report them in [Figure A2](#) and [Figure A3](#). Any ACME effect that crosses over 0.0 should be regarded as our analysis is inconclusive about whether the given model or human has a clear tendency given our dataset.




Figure A2: **AMCE for Different LLMs**: We show the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval on AMCE.

A.8 Annotation Guidelines

We provide the annotation guidelines as PDFs in our supplementary material. The annotator has a master’s degree, and the annotation guidelines were developed jointly by researchers (authors) affiliated with computer science and psychology.

A.9 Additional Statistics on Data

We provide two figures on the distribution of P(Yes) for the stories in our dataset. This corroborates our claim that human causal and moral reasoning are diverse. We show the distribution in [Figure A4](#).




Figure A3: **AMCE for LLM with Prompting Methods:** We show that, with different prompting methods, the AMCE could change.




Figure A4: The probability distribution of $P(\text{Yes})$ for aggregate human responses of Yes and No over 25 participants for each story.

A.10 Factor Inference Experiment

We test if LLMs like GPT-3 have the ability to infer and assign the correct tag for the text segments in the story. We manually write a few examples of high-level instructions for each of the factors in [Table A1](#). We include all the examples we used in the appendix and provided in our code.

We find that LLMs such as GPT-3 are very good at inferring tags based on a few examples – especially for factors that can be clearly specified by instructions and examples. We report the performance of inferring causal and moral factors in the story in [Table A4a](#) and [Table A4b](#). Though GPT-3 performed poorly in the original story, on the causal factor inference task, the lowest accuracy is 74.7%, and the highest is 97.3%. This means that even though GPT-3 is unable to directly generate the human-matching answer for causal stories – they can accurately recognize and assign the right tags for the text segments with minimal guidance from an expert human.

Table A4: **Factor Inference Experiment**: We test if GPT-3 models can correctly analyze a sub-segment of stories (extracted by human annotators). We run models 5 times to compute an average score and 95% confidence intervals.

(a) **Causal Factor Inference**

GPT3 Size	Weighted Average (N=497)	Action Omission (N=112)	Norm Type (N=88)	Time (N=67)	Agent Awareness (N=43)	Causal Structure (N=98)	Event Normality (N=89)
Majority	68.2	71.4	76.1	86.6	53.5	67.3	50.6
GPT3-babbage-v1	64.7 ± 3.5	80.5 ± 2.4	68.2 ± 3.7	35.8 ± 7.1	88.8 ± 3.2	58.6 ± 7.3	58.0 ± 8.2
GPT3-curie-v1	82.8 ± 0.8	88.8 ± 2.3	91.4 ± 1.3	81.8 ± 2.0	96.7 ± 4.8	76.1 ± 4.1	68.1 ± 2.9
GPT3.5-davinci-v2	85.5 ± 1.0	88.0 ± 2.2	97.3 ± 0.8	81.5 ± 2.1	97.2 ± 2.4	74.7 ± 3.4	80.0 ± 1.8

(b) **Moral Factor Inference**

GPT3 Size	Weighted Average (N=202)	Personal Force (N=48)	Beneficence (N=48)	Locus of Intervention (N=48)	Causal Role (N=48)	Counterfactual Evitability (N=48)
Majority	55.4	50.0	54.2	60.0	62.5	54.2
GPT3-babbage-v1	51.9 ± 2.5	56.7 ± 5.6	50.8 ± 5.0	60.0 ± 15.2	40.0 ± 7.2	58.3 ± 5.2
GPT3-curie-v1	65.2 ± 2.7	67.5 ± 5.4	53.7 ± 1.2	66.0 ± 14.2	59.2 ± 7.0	80.4 ± 2.9
GPT3.5-davinci-v2	70.9 ± 2.4	72.9 ± 7.3	77.5 ± 2.2	86.0 ± 14.2	57.9 ± 5.0	72.1 ± 5.4

However, there are also factors that are more difficult to clearly define for LLMs. Generally, GPT-3 performed much worse on the moral structural inference task (Table A4b), with a performance from 57.9% to 86.0%. For example, what “causal role” a person’s action played in a scenario is a particularly difficult category for GPT-3 to correctly annotate.

We report the weighted recall and precision for the factor attribute inference task. We show that with limited instructions, GPT3.5-davinci-v2 can infer the correct attributes with high precision and recall for the causal factor inference task.

Table A5: **Factor Inference Experiment (Recall)**: We report weighted recall for each of the subtask. We **boldface** results that outperform the majority baseline.

(a) **Causal Factor Inference (Recall)**

GPT3 Size	Action Omission (N=112)	Norm Type (N=88)	Time (N=67)	Agent Awareness (N=43)	Causal Structure (N=98)	Event Normality (N=89)
GPT3-babbage-v1	28.6	76.1	19.4	69.8	32.7	49.4
GPT3-curie-v1	32.1	23.9	7.5	46.5	67.3	49.4
GPT3.5-davinci-v2	92.0	97.7	85.1	100.0	98.0	84.3

(b) **Moral Factor Inference (Recall)**

GPT3 Size	Personal Force (N=48)	Beneficence (N=48)	Locus of Intervention (N=48)	Causal Role (N=48)	Counterfactual Evitability (N=48)
GPT3-babbage-v1	50.0	54.2	40.0	37.5	56.2
GPT3-curie-v1	50.0	50.0	40.0	62.5	54.2
GPT3.5-davinci-v2	75.0	75.0	90.0	64.6	68.8

A.11 Prompts for Factor Inference

We also designed the prompts for asking GPT-3 to infer factor attributes. Unlike the standard setup in few-shot LLM inference tasks, where K samples are randomly chosen from a pool of training

Table A6: **Factor Inference Tasks (Precision)**: We report weighted precision for each of subtask. We **boldface** results that outperform the majority baseline.

(a) **Causal Factor Inference (Precision)**

GPT3 Size	Action Omission (N=112)	Norm Type (N=88)	Time (N=67)	Agent Awareness (N=43)	Causal Structure (N=98)	Event Normality (N=89)
GPT3-babbage-v1	8.2	58.0	72.6	76.0	10.7	24.4
GPT3-curie-v1	79.9	5.7	0.6	21.6	62.2	24.4
GPT3.5-davinci-v2	92.8	97.8	86.4	100.0	98.0	86.1

(b) **Moral Factor Inference (Precision)**

GPT3 Size	Personal Force (N=48)	Beneficence (N=48)	Locus of Intervention (N=48)	Causal Role (N=48)	Counterfactual Evitability (N=48)
GPT3-babbage-v1	25.0	29.3	16.0	14.1	57.7
GPT3-curie-v1	25.0	28.3	16.0	39.1	29.3
GPT3.5-davinci-v2	78.1	77.5	91.4	65.3	81.4

data, we manually write high-level instructions for GPT-3 or makeup examples that are different from the data. Also, unlike randomly sampling K examples, we treat our manually written prompt as “instructions” and keep it the same across examples. Although this strategy is very simplistic, we find it to work well for our task.

We provide the full set of prompts in the supplement. Here are some examples. For causal factor inference, we show an example of inferring conjunctive or disjunctive causal structure. Note how high-level our description is.

Both A and B need to happen in order for C to happen.

Is this conjunctive or disjunctive?

Answer: Conjunctive.

Either A or B (or both) need to happen in order for C to happen.

Is this conjunctive or disjunctive?

Answer: Disjunctive.

[Text Segment to Infer]

Is this conjunctive or disjunctive?

Answer: [LLM Generated Answer]

For moral factor inference, we show an example of inferring personal and impersonal force:

In the scenario, I pushed a button to trap another person.

Is the action personal or impersonal?

Answer: Impersonal.

In the scenario, my action directly affected another person through the use of physical force.

Is the action personal or impersonal?

Answer: Personal.

[Text Segment to Infer]

Is the action personal or impersonal?

Answer: [LLM Generated Answer]

A.12 Disambiguation: Factor vs. Factor-Attributes

In the paper, we use “factor” to refer to high-level concepts that can be attributed to a text segment. For example, “location” is a higher-level concept and maps to “factor” in our definition. However, the underlying specific location, such as “hotel” or “restaurant” – we address as “attributes”. It is crucial to know that they correspond to two separate steps: the model should identify the factor for which the text segment contains information. Then, the model should identify the underlying attribute for this factor. This is a rather complicated process, and in this paper, we focus on the second step – given a pre-selected text segment with a known factor for that segment (by a human), whether LLMs can infer the underlying attributes accurately. We find that LLMs can accomplish this task relatively well. We leave the investigation of the full pipeline to future work.

A.13 Delphi API Response Labeling Guideline

Delphi has provided a FreeQA API where we can submit the text, and the returned response falls under three classes: *good*, *discretionary*, and *bad*. Since we are calculating our accuracy using a 3-class strategy, we treat *good* as “Yes”, *bad* as “No”, and *discretionary* as “ambiguous”.

A.14 Annotation Agreement Calculation

We calculate the agreement between two annotators on both causal and moral datasets. Each annotator is allowed to assign as many or as few factors per story as they choose. After assigning the factor, they are asked to select text inside the story that best supports their decision to assign the factor to the story.

We calculate the agreement by IoU (Intersection over Union). The factor-attribute assignment overlap between two annotators on the causal dataset is 0.8920. The moral dataset’s factor annotation is pre-specified by the authors of the original papers, therefore needing no manual annotation. For text segments for each factor, we only compute IoU if both annotators agree the factor is present. Under this condition, the IoU for causal text segments is 0.8145, and for moral text segments, it is 0.8423.

We include our calculation in COMPUTE_CORRELATION.PY file.

A.15 Crowd Sourced Voting Experiment Design and Interface

We recruit participants from Prolific to give responses to our stories. For each story, we elicit a yes/no answer from a single participant. We pay wages equivalent to \$12/hr, and we only recruit participants from the US and UK, with English as their first language. Each participant is presented with 5-6 stories either from the causal dataset or the moral dataset. We present the story and question and then ask them to choose yes or no. The interface is designed so that the participant is presented with one story at a time. Participants are allowed to change their decisions to any story before final submission. We keep track of how long they spend on each story. We do not collect personal, private information of any sort from the participants except their yes/no responses. All the raw data from our experiment is provided in the supplement.

A.16 Model API Card

Since our works use many models that can only be accessed through API, we provide details of these models and access time in Table A7. We obtained early access to Anthropic’s claude-v1, a chat model. Anthropic has since discontinued the API access, and we cannot use the same API anymore.

A.17 FAQs

Are there domain experts in moral psychology/philosophy involved in the design process of this paper? All the factors mentioned in Table 2 are taken directly from the papers that conducted the original experiments. A graduate student and a moral/causal psychology professor were involved in carefully discussing and designing these factors. A thorough literature review was conducted to make sure these factors are comprehensive enough.

Model	Access Date	Details
GPT3-babbage-v1	2023-04-03	GPT3-babbage-001 model that involves supervised fine-tuning on human-written demonstrations.
GPT3-curie-v1	2023-04-03	GPT3-curie-001 model that involves supervised fine-tuning on human-written demonstrations.
GPT3.5-davinci-v2	2023-04-03	GPT3.5-davinci-002 model that involves supervised fine-tuning on human-written demonstrations. Derived from code-davinci-002.
GPT3.5-davinci-v3	2023-04-03	GPT3.5-davinci-003 model that involves reinforcement learning (PPO) with reward models. Derived from GPT3.5-davinci-002.
Anthropic-claude-v1	2023-04-03	A model trained using reinforcement learning from human feedback.
GPT3.5-turbo	2023-10-20	Sibling model of GPT3.5-davinci-003 is optimized for chat but works well for traditional completions tasks as well. Snapshot from 2023-06-13.
GPT4	2023-10-20	GPT-4 is a large multimodal model (currently only accepting text inputs and emitting text outputs) that is optimized for chat but works well for traditional completions tasks. Snapshot of gpt-4 from 2023-06-13.

Table A7: List of models that are accessed through API in this work, including 6 OpenAI models and 1 Anthropic model.

A.18 Data Sheet

A.18.1 Motivation

- **For what purpose was the dataset created?** The dataset was created to evaluate language models on causal selection problems and moral trolley problems.
- **Who created the dataset (e.g., which team, research group) and on behalf of which entity (e.g., company, institution, organization)?** The dataset is created by a multidisciplinary team at (Anonymous) University with researchers in the background of Computer Science, Statistics, Natural Language Processing, and Psychology.
- **Who funded the creation of the dataset?** This project did not receive external funding.
- **Any other comments?** N/A

A.18.2 Composition

- **What do the instances that comprise the dataset represent (e.g., documents, photos, people, countries)?** The instances are all text descriptions of scenarios, not based on real events or people.
- **Does the dataset contain all possible instances, or is it a sample (not necessarily random) of instances from a larger set?** Yes, there is some filtering – for example, we did not transcribe ALL story snippets that the causal papers we cited. This is for the purpose of label balancing. We try to select pairs of stories based on whether there is a significant change in human judgments that were verified by the paper’s experiments. This helps make our dataset more balanced. For the moral dilemma dataset, we transcribed all the texts from each paper, resulting in a large label imbalance.
- **What data does each instance consist of?** Text.
- **Is there a label or target associated with each instance?** Yes, for each instance, we have a binarized Yes/No label.
- **Is any information missing from individual instances?** No
- **Are relationships between individual instances made explicit (e.g., users’ movie ratings, social network links)?** Multiple examples can come from the same paper, which is used to measure the same or similar factors (scientific hypotheses).
- **Are there recommended data splits (e.g., training, development/validation, testing)?** The entire dataset should only be used for testing.
- **Are there any errors, sources of noise, or redundancies in the dataset?** No
- **Is the dataset self-contained, or does it link to or otherwise rely on external resources (e.g., websites, tweets, other datasets)?** The dataset is self-contained.

- **Does the dataset contain data that might be considered confidential (e.g., data that is protected by legal privilege or by doctor-patient confidentiality, data that includes the content of individuals' non-public communications)?** No
- **Does the dataset contain data that, if viewed directly, might be offensive, insulting, threatening, or might otherwise cause anxiety?** No
- **Does the dataset relate to people?** Yes, we collected human responses on each story.
- **Does the dataset identify any subpopulations (e.g., by age, gender)?** No
- **Is it possible to identify individuals (i.e., one or more natural persons), either directly or indirectly (i.e., in combination with other data) from the dataset?** No
- **Does the dataset contain data that might be considered sensitive in any way (e.g., data that reveals racial or ethnic origins, sexual orientations, religious beliefs, political opinions or union memberships, or locations; financial or health data; biometric or genetic data; forms of government identification, such as social security numbers, criminal history)?** No

A.18.3 Collection Process

- **How was the data associated with each instance acquired?** The data (text) were transcribed from research papers. Papers sometimes would display multiple segments of the text in a table. Therefore, we assemble the text according to the table and experimental settings. We do have to interpret the experimental results based on the paper's table/figures. When papers report an actual mean response score, we add them to the data file (comment section); when the paper doesn't report a mean response score but instead provides a bar plot of ratings, we try to read the height of the bar. Note that since we binarize the responses to "Yes" and "No" – we only need to compare the bar height to the median height, which is relatively easy to do.
- **What mechanisms or procedures were used to collect the data (e.g., hardware apparatus or sensor, manual human curation, software program, software API)?** Data were collected by two graduate students. Follow-up factor annotation was conducted on TagTog.
- **If the dataset is a sample from a larger set, what was the sampling strategy (e.g., deterministic, probabilistic with specific sampling probabilities)?** N/A
- **Who was involved in the data collection process (e.g., students, crowd workers, contractors) and how they were compensated (e.g., how much were crowd workers paid)?** Two graduate students are the data collectors. One of them is the lead author of the paper, who does not seek compensation. The other one is compensated at \$15/hr. The data collection process took about 70 hours, and are compensated for \$1025 in total. The additional text span annotation took about 20 hours for \$25/hr and is compensated for \$500 in total. We additionally use Prolific to collect 25 human responses for each story for \$12/hr rate. In total, Prolific workers were compensated for \$2500 in total for 205 hours of annotation work.
- **Over what timeframe was the data collected?** Does this The original papers of the dataset were published between 1976 to 2021. We transcribed the data between March 2021 and August 2021. The text segment annotation happened between March 2022 and May 2022. The Prolific crowdsourcing annotation happened during the month of September 2022.
- **Were any ethical review processes conducted (e.g., by an institutional review board)?** Yes, we obtained IRB approval for our study.
- **Does the dataset relate to people?** Explained above.
- **Did you collect the data from the individuals in question directly, or obtain it via third parties or other sources (e.g., websites)?** We accessed the papers through the paper publisher's websites. Our dataset does not include a copy of the original paper, except we do provide a comment that links each data to which paper it was transcribed from.
- **Were the individuals in question notified about the data collection?** Yes. We have a consent and notification form at the beginning of every study.
- **Did the individuals in question consent to the collection and use of their data?** Yes. We have a consent form at the beginning of every study.
- **If consent was obtained, was the consenting individuals provided with a mechanism to revoke their consent in the future or for certain uses?** Yes, on the consent form, we provide the email, phone number, and address of the primary investigator (PI) for the participants to contact.

- **Has an analysis of the potential impact of the dataset and its use on data subjects (e.g., a data protection impact analysis) been conducted?** All our participants' data have remained anonymous. We do not collect PPI (Private Personal Information).
- **Any other comments?** N/A

A.18.4 Preprocessing/cleaning/labeling

- **Was any preprocessing/cleaning/labeling of the data done (e.g., discretization or bucketing, tokenization, part-of-speech tagging, SIFT feature extraction, removal of instances, processing of missing values)?** We perform quality checks on our labels by analyzing how long each participant took to label the example. We rejected participant labels if they didn't spend an adequate amount of time. Additionally, for 16 stories we transcribed from "Immoral Professors and Malfunctioning Tools: Counterfactual Relevance Accounts Explain the Effect of Norm Violations on Causal Selection (Kominsky, Phillips, 2019)", we have to make them shorter because they are longer than some of the language models can handle. We removed some sentences that only add additional context to the story but do not contribute to overall causal judgment (i.e., sentences like "Alex and Benni are very reliable and Tom is satisfied with their work."). We still include the raw, unprocessed instances in our dataset. We did not modify any other instance.
- **Was the "raw" data saved in addition to the preprocessed/cleaned/labeled data (e.g., to support unanticipated future uses)?** We add the original mean response score in the comment field of our data file whenever the original research paper provides the actual score. We also kept the original transcription text in the data file.
- **Is the software used to preprocess/clean/label the instances available?** No
- **Any other comments?** No

A.18.5 Use

- **Has the dataset been used for any tasks already?** No
- **Is there a repository that links to any or all papers or systems that use the dataset?** No. We hope future users of this dataset will cite this paper, and then all the follow-up papers/systems will show up in the Google Scholar search engine.
- **What (other) tasks could the dataset be used for?** N/A
- **Is there anything about the composition of the dataset or the way it was collected and preprocessed/cleaned/labeled that might impact future uses?** MoCa is not a certification task, i.e., if the language model achieves high performance on MoCa, it is human-aligned. MoCa is only an evaluation task that tests if the model's behavior is similar to humans. Our focus is narrow and only on certain aspects of alignment with humans. It cannot and should not be used to make a sweeping and general statement about AI-human alignment.
- **Are there tasks for which the dataset should not be used?** N/A
- **Any other comments?** No

A.18.6 Distribution

- **Will the dataset be distributed to third parties outside of the entity (e.g., company, institution, organization) on behalf of which the dataset was created?** Yes. The link can be found in the paper.
- **How will the dataset will be distributed (e.g., tarball on website, API, GitHub)?** Data will be stored in a GitHub repo.
- **When will the dataset be distributed?** The data are available right now.
- **Will the dataset be distributed under a copyright or other intellectual property (IP) license, and/or under applicable terms of use (ToU)?** The dataset is under a Creative Commons license (CC BY 4.0).
- **Have any third parties imposed IP-based or other restrictions on the data associated with the instances?** N/A
- **Do any export controls or other regulatory restrictions apply to the dataset or to individual instances?** N/A

- **Any other comments?** N/A

A.18.7 Meta-Data for Stories

We made detailed comments for each of our collected examples. We include the experiment conditions, which table/figure from the original paper we derive the true label, and if possible, we include the average Likert scale score from the human responses. We provide them as part of the appendix for ease of reading, but they are also accessible through the data files we provided in the supplementary material.

We only sub-sampled some stories to put here:

- Story Normality and actual causal strength (Dropbox) (Icard, Kominsky, Knobe, 2017). Experiment 1, Vignette 1. (Same as Kominsky et al. 2015). Condition: normative vs. abnormal, conjunctive. $M=3.37$ vs. $M=5.61$.
- Story Normality and actual causal strength (Dropbox) (Icard, Kominsky, Knobe, 2017). Experiment 1, Vignette 1: Motion detector. Condition: normative vs. abnormal, disjunctive. $M=3.25$ vs. $M=4.18$. Prescriptive norm.
- Story Normality and actual causal strength (Dropbox) (Icard, Kominsky, Knobe, 2017). Experiment 1, Vignette 3: Train. We skip "battery" because it's a moral Condition: normative vs. abnormal, conjunctive. Prescriptive norm.
- Story Normality and actual causal strength (Dropbox) (Icard, Kominsky, Knobe, 2017). Experiment 1, Vignette 3: Train. We skip "battery" because it's a moral Condition: normative vs. abnormal, disjunctive. Prescriptive norm.
- Story What you foresee isn't what you forget: No evidence for the influence of epistemic states on causal judgments for abnormal negligent behavior. (Murray, et al., 2021) (Dropbox). Experiment 1: Epistemic advantage is not necessary for abnormal inflation, Vignette 1 (No knowledge), 2 (Knowledge) x 2 (Normality). Normal vs. abnormal. ($M = 7.50$, $SD = 1.50$, $n = 85$) vs. ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 2.47$, $n = 77$). Changed (Henne et al. 2017), add whether Kate noticed or not.
- Story What you foresee isn't what you forget: No evidence for the influence of epistemic states on causal judgments for abnormal negligent behavior. (Murray, et al., 2021) (Dropbox). Experiment 1: Epistemic advantage is not necessary for abnormal inflation, Vignette 1 (No knowledge), 2 (Knowledge) x 2 (Normality). ($M = 7.48$, $SD = 1.74$, $n = 85$) vs. ($M = 4.79$, $SD = 2.60$, $n = 101$). Changed (Henne et al. 2017), add whether Kate noticed or not.
- Story What you foresee isn't what you forget: No evidence for the influence of epistemic states on causal judgments for abnormal negligent behavior. (Murray, et al., 2021) (Dropbox). Experiment 2: Outcome expectation is not necessary for abnormal inflation, 2 (Knowledge) x 2 (Normality), Vignette 1 (No knowledge). (Mean = approx. 8) vs. (Mean = approx. 3).
- Story What you foresee isn't what you forget: No evidence for the influence of epistemic states on causal judgments for abnormal
- Story Degrading causation (O'Neill, et al., 2019). Experiment 2. Conjunctive Electricity, Number of Causes 3. Normal vs. Abnormal. We only picked out ones where we can binarize (>0.5). We modified the question from "To what extent did X cause Y" ("totally vs. "not at all") to "Did X cause Y" ("Yes" vs. "No"). Testing abnormal inflation.
- Story Crossed Wires: Blaming Artifacts for Bad Outcomes (Sytsma, 2021), Study 1: Machine Case with Responsibility Attributions. ($M=4.89$, $SD=1.94$) vs. ($M=2.83$, $SD= 1.86$)
- Story Crossed Wires: Blaming Artifacts for Bad Outcomes (Sytsma, 2021), Study 3: Machine Case with Movement. ($M=5.03$, $SD=2.24$) vs. ($M=2.88$, $SD=2.07$)
- Story Causation, norm violation, and culpable control (Dropbox) (Alicke, et al., 2011), Study 2, condition 1. Cheat vs. Did not Cheat condition is not so interesting (moral violation is judged as more causal). However, in Did not Cheat condition, norm vs. counternorm is more nuanced. Norm vs. Counternorm. ($M=4.12$ vs. $M=2.62$) Figure 5.
- Story Counterfactual thinking and recency effects in causal judgment (Dropbox) (Henne, et al., 2021). Experiment 1, Vignette 1 (Overdetermination, Early vs. Late). ($M=35.33$ vs. $M=-3.44$)

- Story Counterfactual thinking and recency effects in causal judgment (Dropbox) (Henne, et al., 2021). Experiment 1, Vignette 1
- Story The good, the bad, and the timely: how temporal order and moral judgment influence causal selection, (Reuter, et al, 2014), Rule violation. Scenario 1 (no rule violation) vs. Scenario 10 (Zoe violates a rule). These results are more comparative because the raw experiment has 5 options: Alice, Zoe, Both, None of the two, Not sure.
- Annotations for moral stories (Trolley problems only). Moral Machine Dataset and Simplified Moral Machine Dataset are synthetic, we documented the rationale at the beginning of this appendix.
- Story Throwing a Bomb on a Person Versus Throwing a Person on a Bomb Intervention Myopia in Moral Intuitions (Dropbox) (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007), Experiment 2 (based on Experiment 1 Trolley version, but with modifications), agent intervention with harm to two people as a side effect (AI/S), (M = 4.85, SD = 1.01). AI/M (Agent intervention, use people as means) (M=4.74).
- Story Inference of Intention and Permissibility in Moral Decision Making (Dropbox) (Kleiman-Weiner, et al., 2015). Trial 1 (2v1). Trolley dilemma story based on Mikhail, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence and the future. Trends in cognitive sciences, 11(4), 143–152. Trial 2 (1vB)
- Story Inference of Intention and Permissibility in Moral Decision Making (Dropbox) (Kleiman-Weiner, et al., 2015). Trial 1 (2vB). Trolley dilemma story based on Mikhail, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence and the future. Trends in cognitive sciences, 11(4), 143–152. Trial 2 (Bv2)
- Story Moral judgment reloaded: a moral dilemma validation study (Christensen, et al., 2014), Personal-Instrumental (1) vs. Impersonal-Accidental (2) – BURNING BUILDING (a) vs. BURNING BUILDING (b) Mean = 3.3953488372093 vs. 5.27906976744186