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# Breaking the Communication-Privacy-Accuracy Tradeoff with $f$ -Differential Privacy

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## Abstract

1 We consider a federated data analytics problem in which a server coordinates the  
2 collaborative data analysis of multiple users with privacy concerns and limited  
3 communication capability. The commonly adopted compression schemes introduce  
4 information loss into local data while improving communication efficiency, and it  
5 remains an open problem whether such discrete-valued mechanisms provide any  
6 privacy protection. In this paper, we study the local differential privacy guaran-  
7 tees of discrete-valued mechanisms with finite output space through the lens of  
8  $f$ -differential privacy (DP). More specifically, we advance the existing literature by  
9 deriving tight  $f$ -DP guarantees for a variety of discrete-valued mechanisms, includ-  
10 ing the binomial noise and the binomial mechanisms that are proposed for privacy  
11 preservation, and the sign-based methods that are proposed for data compression,  
12 in closed-form expressions. We further investigate the amplification in privacy by  
13 sparsification and propose a ternary stochastic compressor. By leveraging comp-  
14 ression for privacy amplification, we improve the existing methods by removing  
15 the dependency of accuracy (in terms of mean square error) on communication  
16 cost in the popular use case of distributed mean estimation, therefore breaking the  
17 three-way tradeoff between privacy, communication, and accuracy.

## 18 1 Introduction

19 Nowadays, the massive data generated and collected for analysis, and consequently the prohibitive  
20 communication overhead for data transmission, are overwhelming the centralized data analytics  
21 paradigm. Federated data analytics is, therefore, proposed as a new distributed computing paradigm  
22 that enables data analysis while keeping the raw data locally on the user devices [1]. Similarly to its  
23 most notable use case, i.e., federated learning (FL) [2, 3], federated data analytics faces two critical  
24 challenges: data privacy and communication efficiency. On one hand, the local data of users may  
25 contain sensitive information, and privacy-preserving mechanisms are needed. On the other hand,  
26 the user devices are usually equipped with limited communication capabilities, and compression  
27 mechanisms are often adopted to improve communication efficiency.

28 Differential privacy (DP) has become the gold standard for privacy measures due to its rigorous  
29 foundation and simple implementation. One classic technique to ensure DP is adding Gaussian or  
30 Laplacian noises to the data [4]. However, they are prone to numerical errors on finite-precision  
31 computers [5] and may not be suitable for federated data analytics with communication constraints due  
32 to their continuous nature. With such consideration, various discrete noises with privacy guarantees  
33 have been proposed, e.g., the binomial noise [6], the discrete Gaussian mechanism [7], and the  
34 Skellam mechanism [8]. Nonetheless, the additive noises in [7] and [8] assume infinite range, which  
35 renders them less communication-efficient without appropriate clipping. Unfortunately, clipping  
36 usually ruins the unbiasedness of the mechanism. [9] develops a Poisson binomial mechanism (PBM)  
37 that does not rely on additive noise. In PBM, each user adopts a binomial mechanism, which takes a

38 continuous input and encodes it into the success probability of a binomial distribution. The output  
39 of the binomial mechanism is shared with a central server which releases the aggregated result that  
40 follows the Poisson binomial distribution. However, [9] focuses on distributed DP in which the server  
41 only observes the output of the aggregated results instead of the data shared by each individual user,  
42 and therefore, requires a secure computation function (e.g., secure aggregation [3]).

43 In addition to discrete DP mechanisms, existing works have investigated the fundamental tradeoff  
44 between communication, privacy, and accuracy under the classic  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP framework (e.g., [10, 11,  
45 12, 13]). Notably, in the case of distributed mean estimation, [13] incorporates Kashin’s representation  
46 and proposed Subsampled and Quantized Kashin’s Response (SQKR), which achieves order-optimal  
47 mean square error (MSE) that has a linear dependency on the dimension of the private data  $d$ . SQKR  
48 first computes Kashin’s representation of the private data and quantizes each coordinate into a 1-bit  
49 message. Then,  $k$  coordinates are randomly sampled and privatized by the  $2^k$ -Random Response  
50 mechanism [14]. SQKR achieves an order-optimal three-way tradeoff between privacy, accuracy, and  
51 communication. Nonetheless, it does not account for the privacy introduced during sparsification.

52 Intuitively, as compression becomes more aggressive, less information will be shared by the users,  
53 which naturally leads to better privacy protection. However, formally quantifying the privacy  
54 guarantees of compression mechanisms remains an open problem. In this work, we close the gap  
55 by investigating the local DP guarantees of discrete-valued mechanisms, based on which a ternary  
56 stochastic compressor is proposed to leverage the privacy amplification by compression and advance  
57 the literature by achieving a better communication-privacy-accuracy tradeoff. More specifically, we  
58 focus on the emerging concept of  $f$ -DP [15] that can be readily converted to  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP and Rényi  
59 differential privacy [16] in a lossless way while enjoying better composition property [17].

60 **Our contributions.** In this work, we derive the closed-form expressions of the tradeoff function  
61 between type I and type II error rates in the hypothesis testing problem for a generic discrete-valued  
62 mechanism with a finite output space, based on which  $f$ -DP guarantees of the binomial noise  
63 (c.f. Section 4.1) and the binomial mechanism (c.f. Section 4.2) that covers a variety of discrete  
64 differentially private mechanisms and compression mechanisms as special cases are obtained. Our  
65 analyses lead to tighter privacy guarantees for binomial noise than [6] and extend the results for  
66 the binomial mechanism in [9] to local DP. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work  
67 that investigates the  $f$ -DP guarantees of discrete-valued mechanisms, and the results could possibly  
68 inspire the design of better differentially private compression mechanisms.

69 Inspired by the analytical results, we also leverage the privacy amplification of the sparsification  
70 scheme and propose a ternary stochastic compressor (c.f. Section 5). By accounting for the privacy  
71 amplification of compression, our analyses reveal that given a privacy budget  $\mu$ -GDP (which is a  
72 special case of  $f$ -DP) with  $\mu < \sqrt{4dr}/(1-r)$  (in which  $r$  is the ratio of non-zero coordinates  
73 in expectation for the sparsification scheme), the MSE of the ternary stochastic compressor only  
74 depends on  $\mu$  in the use case of distributed mean estimation (which is the building block of FL). In  
75 this sense, we break the three-way tradeoff between communication overhead, privacy, and accuracy  
76 by removing the dependency of accuracy on the communication overhead. Compared to SQKR [13],  
77 the proposed scheme yields better privacy guarantees. For the scenario where each user  $i$  observes  
78  $x_i \in \{-c, c\}^d$  for some constant  $c > 0$ , the proposed scheme achieves the same privacy guarantee  
79 and MSE as those of the classic Gaussian mechanism in the large  $d$  regime, which essentially means  
80 that the improvement in communication efficiency is achieved for free. We remark that the regime of  
81 large  $d$  is often of interest in practical FL in which  $d$  is the number of training parameters.

## 82 2 Related Work

83 Recently, there is a surge of interest in developing differentially private data analysis techniques,  
84 which can be divided into three categories: central differential privacy (CDP) that assumes a trusted  
85 central server to perturb the collected data [18], distributed differential privacy that relies on secure  
86 aggregation during data collection [3], and local differential privacy (LDP) that avoids the need for  
87 the trusted server by perturbing the local data on the user side [19]. To overcome the drawbacks of  
88 the Gaussian and Laplacian mechanisms, several discrete mechanisms have been proposed. [18]  
89 introduces the one-dimensional binomial noise, which is extended to the general  $d$ -dimensional case  
90 in [6] with more comprehensive analysis in terms of  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP. [20] analyzes the LDP guarantees of  
91 discrete Gaussian noise, while [7] further considers secure aggregation. [8] studies the Rényi DP

92 guarantees of the Skellam mechanism. However, both the discrete Gaussian mechanism and the  
 93 Skellam mechanism assume infinite ranges at the output, which makes them less communication  
 94 efficient without appropriate clipping. Moreover, all the above three mechanisms achieve differential  
 95 privacy at the cost of exploding variance for the additive noise in the high-privacy regimes.

96 Another line of studies jointly considers privacy preservation and compression. [10, 11] propose  
 97 to achieve DP by quantizing, sampling, and perturbing each entry, while [12] proposes a vector  
 98 quantization scheme with local differential privacy. However, the MSE of these schemes grows  
 99 with  $d^2$ . [13] investigates the three-way communication-privacy-accuracy tradeoff and incorporates  
 100 Kashin’s representation to achieve order-optimal estimation error in mean estimation. [21] proposes  
 101 to first sample a portion of coordinates, followed by the randomized response mechanism [22].  
 102 [23] and [24] further incorporate shuffling for privacy amplification. [25] proposes to compress  
 103 the LDP schemes using a pseudorandom generator, while [26] utilizes the minimal random coding.  
 104 [27] proposes a privacy-aware compression mechanism that accommodates DP requirement and  
 105 unbiasedness simultaneously. However, they consider pure  $\epsilon$ -DP, which cannot be easily generalized  
 106 to the relaxed variants. [9] proposes the Poisson binomial mechanism with Rényi DP guarantees.  
 107 Nonetheless, Rényi DP lacks the favorable hypothesis testing interpretation and the conversion to  
 108  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP is lossy. Moreover, most of the existing works focus on privatizing the compressed data  
 109 or vice versa, leaving the privacy guarantees of compression mechanisms largely unexplored. [28]  
 110 proposes a numerical accountant based on fast Fourier transform [29] to evaluate  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP of general  
 111 discrete-valued mechanisms. Recently, an independent work [30] studies privacy amplification by  
 112 compression for central  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP and multi-message shuffling frameworks. In this work, we consider  
 113 LDP through the lens of  $f$ -DP and eliminate the need for a trusted server or shuffler.

114 Among the relaxations of differential privacy notions [31, 16, 32],  $f$ -DP [15] is a variant of  $\epsilon$ -DP  
 115 with hypothesis testing interpretation, which enjoys the property of lossless conversion to  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP  
 116 and tight composition [33]. As a result, it leads to favorable performance in distributed/federated  
 117 learning [34, 35]. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing works study the  $f$ -DP  
 118 of discrete-valued mechanisms. In this work, we bridge the gap by deriving tight  $f$ -DP guarantees of  
 119 various compression mechanisms in closed form, based on which a ternary stochastic compressor is  
 120 proposed to achieve a better communication-privacy-accuracy tradeoff than existing methods.

## 121 3 Problem Setup and Preliminaries

### 122 3.1 Problem Setup

123 We consider a set of  $N$  users (denoted by  $\mathcal{N}$ ) with local data  $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$ . The users aim to share  $x_i$ ’s  
 124 with a central server in a privacy-preserving and communication-efficient manner. More specifically,  
 125 the users adopt a privacy-preserving mechanism  $\mathcal{M}$  to obfuscate their data and share the perturbed  
 126 results  $\mathcal{M}(x_i)$ ’s with the central server. In the use case of distributed/federated learning, each user has  
 127 a local dataset  $S$ . During each training step, it computes the local stochastic gradients and shares the  
 128 obfuscated gradients with the server. In this sense, the overall gradient computation and obfuscation  
 129 mechanism  $\mathcal{M}$  takes the local dataset  $S$  as the input and outputs the obfuscated result  $\mathcal{M}(S)$ . Upon  
 130 receiving the shared  $\mathcal{M}(S)$ ’s, the server estimates the mean of the local gradients.

### 131 3.2 Differential Privacy

132 Formally, differential privacy is defined as follows.

133 **Definition 1** ( $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP [18]). *A randomized mechanism  $\mathcal{M}$  is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private if for all*  
 134 *neighboring datasets  $S$  and  $S'$  and all  $O \subset \mathcal{O}$  in the range of  $\mathcal{M}$ , we have*

$$P(\mathcal{M}(S) \in O) \leq e^\epsilon P(\mathcal{M}(S') \in O) + \delta, \quad (1)$$

135 *in which  $S$  and  $S'$  are neighboring datasets that differ in only one record, and  $\epsilon, \delta \geq 0$  are the*  
 136 *parameters that characterize the level of differential privacy.*

### 137 3.3 $f$ -Differential Privacy

138 Assuming that there exist two neighboring datasets  $S$  and  $S'$ , from the hypothesis testing perspective,  
 139 we have the following two hypotheses

$$H_0 : \text{the underlying dataset is } S, \quad H_1 : \text{the underlying dataset is } S'. \quad (2)$$

140 Let  $P$  and  $Q$  denote the probability distribution of  $\mathcal{M}(S)$  and  $\mathcal{M}(S')$ , respectively. [15] formulates  
 141 the problem of distinguishing the two hypotheses as the tradeoff between the achievable type I and  
 142 type II error rates. More precisely, consider a rejection rule  $0 \leq \phi \leq 1$  (which rejects  $H_0$  with a  
 143 probability of  $\phi$ ), the type I and type II error rates are defined as  $\alpha_\phi = \mathbb{E}_P[\phi]$  and  $\beta_\phi = 1 - \mathbb{E}_Q[\phi]$ ,  
 144 respectively. In this sense,  $f$ -DP characterizes the tradeoff between type I and type II error rates. The  
 145 tradeoff function and  $f$ -DP are formally defined as follows.

146 **Definition 2** (tradeoff function [15]). *For any two probability distributions  $P$  and  $Q$  on the same*  
 147 *space, the tradeoff function  $T(P, Q) : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$  is defined as  $T(P, Q)(\alpha) = \inf\{\beta_\phi : \alpha_\phi \leq \alpha\}$ ,*  
 148 *where the infimum is taken over all (measurable) rejection rule  $\phi$ .*

149 **Definition 3** ( $f$ -DP [15]). *Let  $f$  be a tradeoff function. With a slight abuse of notation, a mechanism*  
 150  *$\mathcal{M}$  is  $f$ -differentially private if  $T(\mathcal{M}(S), \mathcal{M}(S')) \geq f$  for all neighboring datasets  $S$  and  $S'$ , which*  
 151 *suggests that the attacker cannot achieve a type II error rate smaller than  $f(\alpha)$ .*

152  $f$ -DP can be converted to  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP as follows.

153 **Lemma 1.** [15] *A mechanism is  $f(\alpha)$ -differentially private if and only if it is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially*  
 154 *private with*

$$f(\alpha) = \max\{0, 1 - \delta - e^\epsilon \alpha, e^{-\epsilon}(1 - \delta - \alpha)\}. \quad (3)$$

155 Finally, we introduce a special case of  $f$ -DP with  $f(\alpha) = \Phi(\Phi^{-1}(1 - \alpha) - \mu)$ , which is denoted as  
 156  $\mu$ -GDP. More specifically,  $\mu$ -GDP corresponds to the tradeoff function of two normal distributions  
 157 with mean 0 and  $\mu$ , respectively, and a variance of 1.

## 158 4 Tight $f$ -DP Analysis for Existing Discrete-Valued Mechanisms

159 In this section, we derive the  $f$ -DP guarantees for a variety of existing differentially private discrete-  
 160 valued mechanisms in the scalar case (i.e.,  $d = 1$ ) to illustrate the main ideas. The vector case will  
 161 be discussed in Section 6. More specifically, according to Definition 3, the  $f$ -DP of a mechanism  
 162  $\mathcal{M}$  is given by the infimum of the tradeoff function over all neighboring datasets  $S$  and  $S'$ , i.e.,  
 163  $f(\alpha) = \inf_{S, S'} \inf_{\phi} \{\beta_\phi(\alpha) : \alpha_\phi \leq \alpha\}$ . Therefore, the analysis consists of two steps: 1) we  
 164 obtain the closed-form expressions of the tradeoff functions, i.e.,  $\inf_{\phi} \{\beta_\phi(\alpha) : \alpha_\phi \leq \alpha\}$ , for a  
 165 generic discrete-valued mechanism (see Section A in the supplementary material); and 2) given  
 166 the tradeoff functions, we derive the  $f$ -DP by identifying the mechanism-specific infimums of the  
 167 tradeoff functions over all possible neighboring datasets. We remark that the tradeoff functions for  
 168 the discrete-valued mechanisms are essentially piece-wise functions with both the domain and range  
 169 of each piece determined by both the mechanisms and the datasets, which renders the analysis for the  
 170 second step highly non-trivial.

### 171 4.1 Binomial Noise

172 In this subsection, we consider the binomial noise (i.e., Algorithm 1) proposed in [6], which serves as  
 173 a communication-efficient alternative to the classic Gaussian noise. More specifically, the output of  
 174 stochastic quantization in [6] is perturbed by a binomial random variable.

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**Algorithm 1** Binomial Noise [6]

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**Input:**  $x_i \in [0, 1, \dots, l]$ ,  $i \in \mathcal{N}$ , number of trials  $M$ , success probability  $p$ .

**Privatization:**  $Z_i \triangleq x_i + \text{Binom}(M, p)$ .

---

175 **Theorem 1.** *Let  $\tilde{Z} = \text{Binom}(M, p)$ , the binomial noise mechanism in Algorithm 1 is  $f^{\text{bn}}(\alpha)$ -*  
 176 *differentially private with*

$$f^{\text{bn}}(\alpha) = \min\{\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^+(\alpha), \beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^-(\alpha)\}, \quad (4)$$

177 in which

$$\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^+(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(\tilde{Z} \geq \tilde{k} + l) + \frac{P(Z=\tilde{k}+l)P(\tilde{Z}<\tilde{k})}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})} - \frac{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k}+l)}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} < \tilde{k}), P(\tilde{Z} \leq \tilde{k})], \tilde{k} \in [0, M - l], \\ 0, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} \leq M - l), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

178

$$\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^-(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(\tilde{Z} \leq \tilde{k} - l) + \frac{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - l)P(\tilde{Z} > \tilde{k})}{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k})} - \frac{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - l)}{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k})}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} > \tilde{k})], P(\tilde{Z} \geq \tilde{k}), \tilde{k} \in [l, M], \\ 0, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} \geq l), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

179 Given that  $P(\tilde{Z} = k) = \binom{M}{k}p^k(1-p)^{M-k}$ , it can be readily shown that when  $p = 0.5$ , both  
180  $\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^+(\alpha)$  and  $\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^-(\alpha)$  are maximized, and  $f(\alpha) = \beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^+(\alpha) = \beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^-(\alpha)$ .

181 Fig. 1 shows the impact of  $M$  when  $l = 8$ , which confirms the result in [6] that a larger  $M$  provides  
182 better privacy protection (recall that given the same  $\alpha$ , a larger  $\beta_\alpha$  indicates that the attacker makes  
183 mistakes in the hypothesis testing more likely and therefore corresponds to better privacy protection).  
184 Note that the output of Algorithm 1  $Z_i \in \{0, 1, \dots, M + l\}$ , which requires a communication  
185 overhead of  $\log_2(M + l + 1)$  bits. We can readily convert  $f(\alpha)$ -DP to  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP by utilizing Lemma 1.  
186

187 **Remark 1.** The results derived in this work improve [6] in  
188 two aspects: (1) Theorem 1 in [6] requires  $Mp(1-p) \geq$   
189  $\max(23 \log(10d/\delta), 2l/s) > \max(23 \log(10), 2l/s)$ , in which  
190  $1/s \in \mathbb{N}$  is some scaling factor. When  $p = 1/2$ , it requires  $M \geq 212$ .  
191 More specifically, for  $M = 500$ , [6] requires  $\delta > 0.044$ . Our results  
192 imply that there exists some  $(\epsilon, \delta)$  such that Algorithm 1 is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP  
193 as long as  $M > l$ . For  $M = 500$ ,  $\delta$  can be as small as  $4.61 \times 10^{-136}$ .  
194 (2) Our results are tight, in the sense that no relaxation is applied  
195 in our derivation. As an example, when  $M = 500$  and  $p = 0.5$ ,  
196 Theorem 1 in [6] gives  $(3.18, 0.044)$ -DP while Theorem 1 in this paper yields  $(1.67, 0.039)$ -DP.




Figure 1: Impact of  $M$  on Algorithm 1 with  $l = 8$ .

## 197 4.2 Binomial Mechanism

### Algorithm 2 Binomial Mechanism [9]

**Input:**  $c > 0$ ,  $x_i \in [-c, c]$ ,  $M \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $p_i(x_i) \in [p_{\min}, p_{\max}]$   
**Privatization:**  $Z_i \triangleq \text{Binom}(M, p_i(x_i))$ .

198 In this subsection, we consider the binomial mechanism (i.e., Algorithm 2). Different from Algo-  
199 rithm 1 that perturbs the data with noise following the binomial distribution with the same success  
200 probability, the binomial mechanism encodes the input  $x_i$  into the success probability of the binomial  
201 distribution. We establish the privacy guarantee of Algorithm 2 as follows.

202 **Theorem 2.** The binomial mechanism in Algorithm 2 is  $f^{\text{bm}}(\alpha)$ -differentially private with

$$f^{\text{bm}}(\alpha) = \min\{\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^+(\alpha), \beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^-(\alpha)\}, \quad (7)$$

203 in which

$$\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^+(\alpha) = 1 - [P(Y < k) + \gamma P(Y = k)] = P(Y \geq k) + \frac{P(Y = k)P(X < k)}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)}\alpha,$$

204 for  $\alpha \in [P(X < k), P(X \leq k)]$  and  $k \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, M\}$ , where  $X = \text{Binom}(M, p_{\max})$  and  
205  $Y = \text{Binom}(M, p_{\min})$ , and

$$\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^-(\alpha) = 1 - [P(Y > k) + \gamma P(Y = k)] = P(Y \leq k) + \frac{P(Y = k)P(X > k)}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)}\alpha,$$

206 for  $\alpha \in [P(X > k), P(X \geq k)]$  and  $k \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, M\}$ , where  $X = \text{Binom}(M, p_{\min})$  and  
207  $Y = \text{Binom}(M, p_{\max})$ . When  $p_{\max} = 1 - p_{\min}$ , we have  $\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^+(\alpha) = \beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^-(\alpha)$ .

208 **Remark 2 (Comparison to [9]).** The binomial mechanism is part of the Poisson binomial mechanism  
209 proposed in [9]. More specifically, in [9], each user  $i$  shares the output of the binomial mechanism  
210  $Z_i$  with the server, in which  $p_i(x_i) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\theta}{c}x_i$  and  $\theta$  is some design parameter. It can be readily  
211 verified that  $p_{\max} = 1 - p_{\min}$  in this case. The server then aggregates the result through  $\bar{x} =$   
212  $\frac{c}{MN\theta}(\sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} Z_i - \frac{MN}{2})$ . [9] requires secure aggregation and considers the privacy leakage of  
213 releasing  $\bar{x}$ , while we complement it by showing the LDP, i.e., the privacy leakage of releasing  $Z_i$  for  
214 each user. In addition, we eliminate the constraint  $\theta \in [0, \frac{1}{4}]$ , and the results hold for any selection of  
215  $p_i(x_i)$ . Moreover, the privacy guarantees in Theorem 2 are tight since no relaxation is involved. Fig.  
216 2 shows the impact of  $M$  on the privacy guarantee. In contrast to binomial noise, the privacy of the  
217 binomial mechanisms improves as  $M$  (and equivalently communication overhead) decreases, which

218 implies that it is more suitable for communication-constrained scenarios. We also derive the  $f$ -DP of  
 219 the Poisson binomial mechanism, which are presented in Section C in the supplementary material.

220 In the following, we present two existing compressors that are special  
 221 cases of the binomial mechanism.

222 **Example 1.** We first consider the following stochastic sign compressor  
 223 proposed in [36].

224 **Definition 4 (Two-Level Stochastic Compressor [36]).** For any  
 225 given  $x \in [-c, c]$ , the compressor  $sto\text{-}sign$  outputs

$$sto\text{-}sign(x, A) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{with probability } \frac{A+x}{2A}, \\ -1, & \text{with probability } \frac{A-x}{2A}, \end{cases} \quad (8)$$

226 where  $A > c$  is the design parameter that controls the level of stochasticity.

227 With a slight modification (i.e., mapping the output space from  $\{0, 1\}$  to  $\{-1, 1\}$ ),  $sto\text{-}sign(x, A)$   
 228 can be understood as a special case of the binomial mechanism with  $M = 1$  and  $p_i(x_i) = \frac{A+x_i}{2A}$ . In  
 229 this case, we have  $p_{max} = \frac{A+c}{2A}$  and  $p_{min} = \frac{A-c}{2A}$ . Applying the results in Theorem 2 yields

$$f^{sto\text{-}sign}(\alpha) = \beta_{\phi, \inf}^+(\alpha) = \beta_{\phi, \inf}^-(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{A+c}{A-c}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [0, \frac{A+c}{2A}], \\ \frac{A-c}{A+c} - \frac{A-c}{A+c}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [\frac{A+c}{2A}, 1]. \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

230 Combining (9) with (3) suggests that the  $sto\text{-}sign$  compressor ensures  $(\ln(\frac{A+c}{A-c}), 0)$ -DP.

231 **Example 2.** The second sign-based compressor that we examine is  $CLDP_{\infty}(\cdot)$  [23].

232 **Definition 5 ( $CLDP_{\infty}(\cdot)$  [23]).** For any given  $x \in [-c, c]$ , the compressor  $CLDP_{\infty}(\cdot)$  outputs  
 233  $CLDP_{\infty}(\epsilon)$ , which is given by

$$CLDP_{\infty}(\epsilon) = \begin{cases} +1, & \text{with probability } \frac{1}{2} + \frac{x}{2c} \frac{e^{\epsilon}-1}{e^{\epsilon}+1}, \\ -1, & \text{with probability } \frac{1}{2} - \frac{x}{2c} \frac{e^{\epsilon}-1}{e^{\epsilon}+1}. \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

234  $CLDP_{\infty}(\epsilon)$  can be understood as a special case of  $sto\text{-}sign(x, A)$  with  $A = \frac{c(e^{\epsilon}+1)}{e^{\epsilon}-1}$ . In this case,  
 235 according to (9), we have

$$f^{CLDP_{\infty}}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1 - e^{\epsilon}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [0, \frac{A+c}{2A}], \\ e^{-\epsilon}(1 - \alpha), & \text{for } \alpha \in [\frac{A+c}{2A}, 1]. \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

236 Combining the above result with (3) suggests that  $CLDP_{\infty}(\epsilon)$  ensures  $(\epsilon, 0)$ -DP, which recovers  
 237 the result in [23]. It is worth mentioning that  $CLDP_{\infty}(\epsilon)$  can be understood as the composition of  
 238  $sto\text{-}sign$  with  $A = c$  followed by the randomized response mechanism [22], and is equivalent to the  
 239 one-dimensional case of the compressor in [13]. Moreover, the one-dimensional case of the schemes  
 240 in [10, 11] can also be understood as special cases of  $sto\text{-}sign$ .

## 241 5 The Proposed Ternary Compressor

242 The output of the binomial mechanism with  $M = 1$  lies in the set  $\{0, 1\}$ , which coincides with the  
 243 sign-based compressor. In this section, we extend the analysis to the ternary case, which can be  
 244 understood as a combination of sign-based quantization and sparsification (when the output takes  
 245 value 0, no transmission is needed since it does not contain any information) and leads to improved  
 246 communication efficiency. More specifically, we propose the following ternary compressor.

247 **Definition 6 (Ternary Stochastic Compressor).** For any given  $x \in [-c, c]$ , the compressor  $ternary$   
 248 outputs  $ternary(x, A, B)$ , which is given by

$$ternary(x, A, B) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{with probability } \frac{A+x}{2B}, \\ 0, & \text{with probability } 1 - \frac{A}{B}, \\ -1, & \text{with probability } \frac{A-x}{2B}, \end{cases} \quad (12)$$

249 where  $B > A > c$  are the design parameters that control the level of sparsity.

250 For the ternary stochastic compressor in Definition 6, we establish its privacy guarantee as follows.




Figure 2: Impact of  $M$  on Algorithm 2.

251

252 **Theorem 3.** The ternary stochastic compressor is  $f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha)$ -  
 253 differentially private with

$$f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{A+c}{A-c}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [0, \frac{A-c}{2B}], \\ 1 - \frac{c}{B} - \alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [\frac{A-c}{2B}, 1 - \frac{A+c}{2B}], \\ \frac{A-c}{A+c} - \frac{A-c}{A+c}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [1 - \frac{A+c}{2B}, 1]. \end{cases} \quad (13)$$




Figure 3: Sparsification improves privacy.

254 **Remark 3** (Privacy amplification by sparsification). It can be  
 255 observed from (9) and (13) that  $f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha) > f^{\text{sto-sign}}$  when  
 256  $\alpha \in [\frac{A-c}{2B}, 1 - \frac{A+c}{2B}]$ , and  $f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha) = f^{\text{sto-sign}}$ , otherwise. Fig. 3 shows  $f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha)$  and  
 257  $f^{\text{sto-sign}}$  for  $c = 0.1, A = 0.25, B = 0.5$ , and the shaded gray area corresponds to the improve-  
 258 ment in privacy. That being said, communication efficiency and privacy are improved simulta-  
 259 neously. It is worth mentioning that, if we convert the privacy guarantees to  $(\epsilon, 0)$ -DP, we have  
 260  $\epsilon = \ln(\frac{7}{3})$  for both compressors. However, the ternary compressor ensures  $(\ln(2), 0.05)$ -DP (i.e.,  
 261  $f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha) \geq \max\{0, 0.95 - 2\alpha, 0.5(0.95 - \alpha)\}$ ) while the sto-sign compressor does not.

262 In the following, we present a special case of the proposed ternary stochastic compressor.

263 **Example 3.** The ternary-based compressor proposed in [37] is formally defined as follows.

264 **Definition 7** (*ternarize*( $\cdot$ ) [37]). For any given  $x \in [-c, c]$ , the compressor *ternarize*( $\cdot$ ) outputs  
 265 *ternarize*( $x, B$ ) = *sign*( $x$ ) with probability  $|x|/B$  and *ternarize*( $x, B$ ) = 0 otherwise, in which  
 266  $B > c$  is the design parameter.

267 *ternarize*( $x, B$ ) can be understood as a special case of *ternary*( $x, A, B$ ) with  $A = |x|$ . According  
 268 to Theorem 3,  $f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha) = 1 - \frac{c}{B} - \alpha$  for  $\alpha \in [0, 1 - \frac{c}{B}]$  and  $f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha) = 0$  for  $\alpha \in [1 - \frac{c}{B}, 1]$ .  
 269 Combining the above result with (3), we have  $\delta = \frac{c}{B}$  and  $\epsilon = 0$ , i.e., *ternarize*( $\cdot$ ) provides perfect  
 270 privacy protection ( $\epsilon = 0$ ) with a violation probability of  $\delta = \frac{c}{B}$ . Specifically, the attacker cannot  
 271 distinguish  $x_i$  from  $x'_i$  if the output of *ternarize*( $\cdot$ ) = 0 (perfect privacy protection), while no  
 272 differential privacy is provided if the output of *ternarize*( $\cdot$ )  $\neq 0$  (violation of the privacy guarantee).

273 **Remark 4.** It is worth mentioning that, in [37], the users transmit a scaled version of *ternarize*( $\cdot$ )  
 274 and the scaling factor reveals the magnitude information of  $x_i$ . Therefore, the compressor in [37] is  
 275 not differentially private.

## 276 6 Breaking the Communication-Privacy-Accuracy Tradeoff

277 In this section, we extend the results in Section 5 to the vector case in two different approaches,  
 278 followed by discussions on the three-way tradeoff between communication, privacy, and accuracy.  
 279 The results in Section 4 can be extended similarly. Specifically, in the first approach, we derive the  
 280  $\mu$ -GDP in closed form, while introducing some loss in privacy guarantees. In the second approach, a  
 281 tight approximation is presented. Given the results in Section 5, we can readily convert  $f$ -DP in the  
 282 scalar case to Gaussian differential privacy in the vector case as follows.

283 **Theorem 4.** Given a vector  $x_i = [x_{i,1}, x_{i,2}, \dots, x_{i,d}]$  with  $|x_{i,j}| \leq c, \forall j$ . Applying the ternary  
 284 compressor to the  $j$ -th coordinate of  $x_i$  independently yields  $\mu$ -GDP with  $\mu = -2\Phi^{-1}(\frac{1}{1+(\frac{A+c}{A-c})^d})$ .

285 **Remark 5.** Note that  $\|x_i\|_2 \leq c$  is a sufficient condition for  $|x_{i,j}| \leq c, \forall j$ . In the proof of Theorem  
 286 4, we first convert  $f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha)$ -DP to  $(\epsilon, 0)$ -DP for the scalar case, and then obtain  $(d\epsilon, 0)$ -DP  
 287 for the  $d$ -dimensional case, followed by the conversion to GDP. One may notice that some loss in  
 288 privacy guarantee is introduced since the extreme case  $|x_{i,j}| = c, \forall j$  actually violates the condition  
 289  $\|x_i\|_2 \leq c$ . To address this issue, following a similar method in [13, 38, 9], one may introduce  
 290 Kashin's representation to transform the  $l_2$  geometry of the data into the  $l_\infty$  geometry. More  
 291 specifically, [39] shows that for  $D > d$ , there exists a tight frame  $U$  such that for any  $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$ , one  
 292 can always represent each  $x_i$  with  $y_i \in [-\gamma_0/\sqrt{d}, \gamma_0/\sqrt{d}]^D$  for some  $\gamma_0$  and  $x_i = U y_i$ .

293 In Theorem 4, some loss in privacy guarantees is introduced when we convert  $f$ -DP to  $\mu$ -GDP. In  
 294 fact, since each coordinate of the vector is processed independently, the extension from the scalar  
 295 case to the  $d$ -dimensional case may be understood as the  $d$ -fold composition of the mechanism in the

296 scalar case. The composed result can be well approximated or numerically obtained via the central  
 297 limit theorem for  $f$ -DP in [15] or the Edgeworth expansion in [33]. In the following, we present the  
 298 result for the ternary compressor by utilizing the central limit theorem for  $f$ -DP.

299 **Theorem 5.** For a vector  $x_i = [x_{i,1}, x_{i,2}, \dots, x_{i,d}]$  with  $|x_{i,j}| \leq c, \forall j$ , the ternary compressor with  
 300  $B \geq A > c$  is  $f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha)$ -DP with

$$G_\mu(\alpha + \gamma) - \gamma \leq f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha) \leq G_\mu(\alpha - \gamma) + \gamma, \quad (14)$$

301 in which

$$\mu = \frac{2\sqrt{dc}}{\sqrt{AB - c^2}}, \quad \gamma = \frac{0.56 \left[ \frac{A-c}{2B} \left| 1 + \frac{c}{B} \right|^3 + \frac{A+c}{2B} \left| 1 - \frac{c}{B} \right|^3 + \left( 1 - \frac{A}{B} \right) \left| \frac{c}{B} \right|^3 \right]}{\left( \frac{A}{B} - \frac{c^2}{B^2} \right)^{3/2} d^{1/2}}. \quad (15)$$

302 Given the above results, we investigate the communication-privacy-accuracy tradeoff and compare  
 303 the proposed ternary stochastic compressor with the state-of-the-art method SQKR in [13] and the  
 304 classic Gaussian mechanism. According to the discussion in Remark 5, given the  $l_2$  norm constraint,  
 305 Kashin's representation can be applied to transform it into the  $l_\infty$  geometry. Therefore, for ease of  
 306 discussion, we consider the setting in which each user  $i$  stores a vector  $x_i = [x_{i,1}, x_{i,2}, \dots, x_{i,d}]$   
 307 with  $|x_{i,j}| \leq c = \frac{C}{\sqrt{d}}, \forall j$ , and  $\|x_i\|_2 \leq C$ .

308 **Ternary Stochastic Compressor:** Let  $Z_{i,j} = \text{ternary}(x_{i,j}, A, B)$ , then  $\mathbb{E}[BZ_{i,j}] = x_{i,j}$  and  
 309  $\text{Var}(BZ_{i,j}) = AB - x_{i,j}^2$ . In this sense, applying the ternary stochastic compressor to each  
 310 coordinate of  $x_i$  independently yields an unbiased estimator with a variance of  $ABd - \|x_i\|_2^2$ . The  
 311 privacy guarantee is given by Theorem 5, and the communication overhead is  $(\log_2(d) + 1) \frac{A}{B} d$  bits  
 312 in expectation.

313 **SQKR:** In SQKR, each user first quantizes each coordinate of  $x_i$  to  $\{-c, c\}$  with 1-bit stochastic  
 314 quantization. Then, it samples  $k$  coordinates (with replacement) and privatizes the  $k$  bit message via  
 315 the  $2^k$  Random response mechanism with  $\epsilon$ -LDP [14]. The SQKR mechanism yields an unbiased  
 316 estimator with a variance of  $\frac{d}{k} \left( \frac{e^\epsilon + 2^k - 1}{e^\epsilon - 1} \right)^2 C^2 - \|x_i\|_2^2$ . The privacy guarantee is  $\epsilon$ -LDP, and the  
 317 corresponding communication overhead is  $(\log_2(d) + 1)k$  bits.

318 **Gaussian Mechanism:** We apply the Gaussian mechanism (i.e., adding independent zero-mean  
 319 Gaussian noise  $n_{i,j} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$  to  $x_{i,j}$ ), followed by a sparsification probability of  $1 - A/B$  as in  
 320  $\text{ternary}(x_{i,j}, A, B)$ , which gives  $Z_{i,j}^{\text{Gauss}} = \frac{B}{A}(x_{i,j} + n_{i,j})$  with probability  $A/B$  and  $Z_{i,j}^{\text{Gauss}} = 0$ ,  
 321 otherwise. It can be observed that  $\mathbb{E}[Z_{i,j}^{\text{Gauss}}] = x_{i,j}$  and  $\text{Var}(Z_{i,j}^{\text{Gauss}}) = \frac{B}{A}\sigma^2 + \left( \frac{B}{A} - 1 \right) x_{i,j}^2$ . There-  
 322 fore, the Gaussian mechanism yields an unbiased estimator with a variance of  $\frac{B}{A}\sigma^2 d + \left( \frac{B}{A} - 1 \right) \|x_i\|_2^2$ .  
 323 By utilizing the post-processing property, it can be shown that the above Gaussian mechanism is  
 324  $\frac{2\sqrt{dc}}{\sigma}$ -GDP [15], and the communication overhead is  $(\log_2(d) + 32) \frac{A}{B} d$  bits in expectation.

325 **Discussion:** It can be observed that for SQKR, with a given privacy guarantee  $\epsilon$ -LDP, the variance  
 326 (i.e., MSE) depends on  $k$  (i.e., the communication overhead). When  $e^\epsilon \ll 2^k$  (which corresponds  
 327 to the high privacy regime), the variance grows rapidly as  $k$  increases. For the proposed ternary  
 328 stochastic compressor, it can be observed that both the privacy guarantee (in terms of  $\mu$ -GDP) and  
 329 the variance depend on  $AB$ . Particularly, with a given privacy guarantee  $\mu < \sqrt{4dr}/(1-r)$  for  
 330  $r = A/B$ , the variance is given by  $(4d/\mu^2 + 1)C^2 - \|x_i\|_2^2$ , which remains the same regardless of the  
 331 communication overhead. **In this sense, we essentially remove the dependency of accuracy on the**  
 332 **communication overhead and therefore break the three-way tradeoff between communication**  
 333 **overhead, privacy, and accuracy.** This is mainly realized by accounting for privacy amplification  
 334 by sparsification. At a high level, when fewer coordinates are shared (which corresponds to a larger  
 335 privacy amplification and a larger MSE), the ternary stochastic compressor introduces less ambiguity  
 336 to each coordinate (which corresponds to worse privacy protection and a smaller MSE) such that  
 337 both the privacy guarantee and the MSE remain the same. Since we use different differential privacy  
 338 measures from [13] (i.e.,  $\mu$ -GDP in this work and  $\epsilon$ -DP in [13]), we focus on the comparison between  
 339 the proposed ternary stochastic compressor and the Gaussian mechanism (which is order-optimal in  
 340 most parameter regimes, see [30]) in the following discussion and present the detailed comparison  
 341 with SQKR in the experiments in Section 7.

342 Let  $AB = c^2 + \sigma^2$ , it can be observed that the  $f$ -DP guarantee of the ternary compressor ap-  
 343 proaches that of the Gaussian mechanism as  $d$  increases, and the corresponding variance is given  
 344 by  $\text{Var}(BZ_{i,j}) = \sigma^2 + c^2 - x_{i,j}^2$ . When  $A = B$ , i.e., no sparsification is applied, we have




Figure 4: For the left figure, we set  $k = 10$  and derive the corresponding variance for SQKR, based on which  $A$  and  $B$  for the ternary stochastic compressor are computed such that they have the same communication overhead and MSE in expectation. The middle and right figures show the tradeoff between  $\mu$ -GDP and MSE. For the middle figure, we set  $\sigma \in \{\frac{2}{5}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{2}{3}, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10\}$  for the Gaussian mechanism, given which  $A$  and  $B$  are computed such that  $AB = c^2 + \sigma^2$  and the sparsity ratio is  $A/B$ . For the right figure, we set  $A \in \{5c, 10c, 20c, 30c\}$  and  $A/B \in \{0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0\}$ , given which the corresponding  $\sigma$ 's are computed such that  $AB = c^2 + \sigma^2$ .

345  $Var(BZ_{i,j}) - Var(Z_{i,j}^{Gauss}) = c^2 - x_{i,j}^2$ . Specifically, when  $x_{i,j} \in \{-c, c\}, \forall 1 \leq j \leq d$ , the  
 346 ternary compressor demonstrates the same  $f$ -DP privacy guarantee and variance as that for the Gaus-  
 347 sian mechanism, i.e., **the improvement in communication efficiency is obtained for free (in the**  
 348 **large  $d$  regime)**. When  $B > A$ , we have  $Var(BZ_{i,j}) - Var(Z_{i,j}^{Gauss}) = (1 - \frac{B}{A})\sigma^2 + c^2 - \frac{B}{A}x_{i,j}^2$ ,  
 349 and there exists some  $B$  such that the ternary compressor outperforms the Gaussian mechanism  
 350 in terms of both variance and communication efficiency. It is worth mentioning that the privacy  
 351 guarantee of the Gaussian mechanism is derived by utilizing the post-processing property. We believe  
 352 that sparsification brings improvement in privacy for the Gaussian mechanism as well, which is,  
 353 however, beyond the scope of this paper.

## 354 7 Experiments

355 In this section, we examine the performance of the proposed ternary compressor in the case of  
 356 distributed mean estimation. We follow the set-up of [9] and generate  $N = 1000$  user vectors with  
 357 dimension  $d = 250$ , i.e.,  $x_1, \dots, x_N \in \mathbb{R}^{250}$ . Each local vector has bounded  $l_2$  and  $l_\infty$  norms, i.e.,  
 358  $\|x_i\|_2 \leq C = 1$  and  $\|x_i\|_\infty \leq c = \frac{1}{\sqrt{d}}$ .

359 Fig. 4 compares the proposed ternary stochastic compressor with SQKR and the Gaussian mechanism.  
 360 More specifically, the left figure in Fig. 4 compares the privacy guarantees (in terms of the tradeoff  
 361 between type I and type II error rates) of the ternary stochastic compressor and SQKR given the  
 362 same communication overhead and MSE. It can be observed that the proposed ternary stochastic  
 363 compressor outperforms SQKR in terms of privacy preservation, i.e., given the same type I error  
 364 rate  $\alpha$ , the type II error rate  $\beta$  of the ternary stochastic compressor is significantly larger than that  
 365 of SQKR, which implies better privacy protection. The middle and right figures in Fig. 4 show the  
 366 tradeoff between MSE and DP guarantees for the Gaussian mechanism and the proposed ternary  
 367 compressor. Particularly, in the middle figure, the tradeoff curves for the ternary compressor with  
 368 all the examined sparsity ratios overlap with that of the Gaussian mechanism with  $A/B = 1$  since  
 369 they essentially have the same privacy guarantees, and the difference in MSE is negligible. For  
 370 the Gaussian mechanism with  $\frac{A}{B} < 1$ , the MSE is larger due to sparsification, which validates  
 371 our discussion in Section 6. In the right figure, we examine the MSEs of the proposed ternary  
 372 compressor with various  $A$ 's and  $B$ 's. It can be observed that the corresponding tradeoff between  
 373 MSE and privacy guarantee matches that of the Gaussian mechanism well, which validates that the  
 374 improvement in communication efficiency for the proposed ternary compressor is obtained for free.

## 375 8 Conclusion

376 In this paper, we derived the privacy guarantees of discrete-valued mechanisms with finite output  
 377 space in the lens of  $f$ -differential privacy, which covered various differentially private mechanisms  
 378 and compression mechanisms as special cases. Through leveraging the privacy amplification by  
 379 sparsification, a ternary compressor that achieves better accuracy-privacy-communication tradeoff  
 380 than existing methods is proposed. It is expected that the proposed methods can find broader  
 381 applications in the design of communication efficient and differentially private federated data analysis  
 382 techniques.

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## Breaking the Communication-Privacy-Accuracy Tradeoff with $f$ -Differential Privacy: Supplementary Material

### 488 A Tradeoff Functions for a Generic Discrete-Valued Mechanism

489 We consider a general randomization protocol  $\mathcal{M}(\cdot)$  with discrete and finite output space. In this  
490 case, we can always find a one-to-one mapping between the range of  $\mathcal{M}(\cdot)$  and a subset of  $\mathbb{Z}$ .  
491 With such consideration, we assume that the output of the randomization protocol is an integer,  
492 i.e.,  $\mathcal{M}(S) \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathcal{M}} \subset \mathbb{Z}, \forall S$ , without loss of generality. Given the randomization protocol and the  
493 hypothesis testing problem in (2), we derive its tradeoff function as a function of the type I error rate  
494 in the following lemma.

495 **Lemma 2.** For two neighboring datasets  $S$  and  $S'$ , suppose that the range of the randomized  
496 mechanism  $\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{M}(S)) \cup \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{M}(S')) = \mathbb{Z}_{\mathcal{M}}^U = [\mathcal{Z}_L^U, \dots, \mathcal{Z}_R^U] \subset \mathbb{Z}$  and  $\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{M}(S)) \cap \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{M}(S')) =$   
497  $\mathbb{Z}_{\mathcal{M}}^I = [\mathcal{Z}_L^I, \dots, \mathcal{Z}_R^I] \subset \mathbb{Z}$ . Let  $X = \mathcal{M}(S)$  and  $Y = \mathcal{M}(S')$ . Then,

498 *Case (1)* If  $\mathcal{M}(S) \in [\mathcal{Z}_L^I, \mathcal{Z}_L^I + 1, \dots, \mathcal{Z}_R^U]$ ,  $\mathcal{M}(S') \in [\mathcal{Z}_L^U, \mathcal{Z}_L^U + 1, \dots, \mathcal{Z}_R^I]$ , and  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is a  
499 decreasing function of  $k$  for  $k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathcal{M}}^I$ , the tradeoff function in Definition 2 is given by

$$\beta_{\phi}^+(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(Y \geq k) + \frac{P(Y=k)P(X < k)}{P(X=k)} - \frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}\alpha, & \text{if } \alpha \in (P(X < k), P(X \leq k)], k \in [\mathcal{Z}_L^I, \mathcal{Z}_R^I]. \\ 0, & \text{if } \alpha \in (P(X < \mathcal{Z}_R^I + 1), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (16)$$

500 *Case (2)* If  $\mathcal{M}(S) \in [\mathcal{Z}_L^U, \mathcal{Z}_L^U + 1, \dots, \mathcal{Z}_R^I]$ ,  $\mathcal{M}(S') \in [\mathcal{Z}_L^I, \mathcal{Z}_L^I + 1, \dots, \mathcal{Z}_R^U]$ , and  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is an  
501 increasing function of  $k$  for  $k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathcal{M}}^I$ , the tradeoff function in Definition 2 is given by

$$\beta_{\phi}^-(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(Y \leq k) + \frac{P(Y=k)P(X > k)}{P(X=k)} - \frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}\alpha, & \text{if } \alpha \in (P(X > k), P(X \geq k)], k \in [\mathcal{Z}_L^I, \mathcal{Z}_R^I]. \\ 0, & \text{if } \alpha \in (P(X > \mathcal{Z}_L^I - 1), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (17)$$

502 **Remark 6.** It is assumed in Lemma 2 that  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is a decreasing function (for part (1)) or an  
503 increasing function (for part (2)) of  $k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathcal{M}}^I$ , without loss of generality. In practice, thanks to the  
504 post-processing property of DP [15], one can relabel the output of the mechanism to ensure that this  
505 condition holds and Lemma 2 can be adapted accordingly.

506 **Remark 7.** We note that in Lemma 2, both  $X$  and  $Y$  depend on both the randomized mechanism  
507  $\mathcal{M}(\cdot)$  and the neighboring datasets  $S$  and  $S'$ . Therefore, the infimums of the tradeoff functions in  
508 (16) and (17) are mechanism-specific, which should be analyzed individually. After identifying the  
509 neighboring datasets  $S$  and  $S'$  that minimize  $\beta_{\phi}^+(\alpha)$  and  $\beta_{\phi}^-(\alpha)$  for a mechanism  $\mathcal{M}(\cdot)$  (which is  
510 highly non-trivial), we can obtain the distributions of  $X$  and  $Y$  in (16) and (17) and derive the  
511 corresponding  $f$ -DP guarantees.

512 **Remark 8.** Since  $\beta_{\phi}^+(\alpha)$  is a piecewise function with decreasing slopes w.r.t  $k$  (see, e.g., Fig. 1), it can  
513 be readily shown that  $\beta_{\phi}^+(\alpha) \geq \max\{P(Y \geq k) + \frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}P(X < k) - \frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}\alpha, 0\}, \forall k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathcal{M}}^I$ .  
514 As a result, utilizing Lemma 1, we may obtain different pairs of  $(\epsilon, \delta)$  given different  $k$ 's.

515 **Remark 9.** Although we assume a finite output space, a similar method can be applied to the  
516 mechanisms with an infinite range. Taking the discrete Gaussian noise [20] as an example,  $\mathcal{M}(x) =$   
517  $x + V$  with  $P(V = v) = \frac{e^{-v^2/2\sigma^2}}{\sum_{v \in \mathbb{Z}} e^{-v^2/2\sigma^2}}$ . One may easily verify that  $\frac{P(\mathcal{M}(x_i)=k)}{P(\mathcal{M}(x'_i)=k)}$  is a decreasing  
518 function of  $k$  if  $x'_i > x_i$  (and increasing otherwise). Then we can find some threshold  $v$  for the rejection  
519 rule  $\phi$  such that  $\alpha_{\phi} = P(\mathcal{M}(x_i) \leq v) = \alpha$ , and the corresponding  $\beta_{\phi}(\alpha) = 1 - P(\mathcal{M}(x'_i) \leq v)$ .

520 The key to proving Lemma 2 is finding the rejection rule  $\phi$  such that  $\beta_{\phi}(\alpha)$  is minimized for a  
521 pre-determined  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ . To this end, we utilize the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [40], which states  
522 that for a given  $\alpha$ , the most powerful rejection rule is threshold-based, i.e., if the likelihood ratio  
523  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is larger than/equal to/smaller than a threshold  $h$ ,  $H_0$  is rejected with probability  $1/\gamma/0$ . More

524 specifically, since  $X$  and  $Y$  may have different ranges, we divide the discussion into two cases (i.e.,  
 525 Case (1) and Case (2) in Lemma 2). The Neyman-Pearson Lemma [40] is given as follows.

526 **Lemma 3.** (Neyman-Pearson Lemma [40]) Let  $P$  and  $Q$  be probability distributions on  $\Omega$  with  
 527 densities  $p$  and  $q$ , respectively. For the hypothesis testing problem  $H_0 : P$  vs  $H_1 : Q$ , a test  
 528  $\phi : \Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$  is the most powerful test at level  $\alpha$  if and only if there are two constants  $h \in [0, +\infty]$   
 529 and  $\gamma \in [0, 1]$  such that  $\phi$  has the form

$$\phi(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \frac{q(x)}{p(x)} > h, \\ \gamma, & \text{if } \frac{q(x)}{p(x)} = h, \\ 0, & \text{if } \frac{q(x)}{p(x)} < h, \end{cases} \quad (18)$$

530 and  $\mathbb{E}_P[\phi] = \alpha$ . The rejection rule suggests that  $H_0$  is rejected with a probability of  $\phi(x)$  given the  
 531 observation  $x$ .

532 Given Lemma 3, the problem is then reduced to finding the corresponding  $h$  and  $\gamma$  such that the  
 533 type I error rate  $\alpha_\phi = \alpha$ . For part (1) (the results for part (2) can be shown similarly), we divide the  
 534 range of  $\alpha$  (i.e.,  $[0, 1]$ ) into multiple segments, as shown in Fig. 5. To achieve  $\alpha = 0$ , we set  $h = \infty$   
 535 and  $\gamma = 1$ , which suggests that the hypothesis  $H_0$  is always rejected when  $k < \mathcal{Z}_L^I$  and accepted  
 536 otherwise. To achieve  $\alpha \in (P(X < k), P(X \leq k)]$ , for  $k \in [\mathcal{Z}_L^I, \mathcal{Z}_R^I]$ , we set  $h = \frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  and  
 537  $\gamma = \frac{\alpha - P(X < k)}{P(X=k)}$ . In this case, it can be shown that  $\alpha_\phi = \alpha \in (P(X < k), P(X \leq k)]$ . To achieve  
 538  $\alpha \in (P(X < \mathcal{Z}_R^I + 1), 1]$ , we set  $h = 0$ , and  $\gamma = \frac{\alpha - P(X < \mathcal{Z}_R^I + 1)}{P(X > \mathcal{Z}_R^I)}$ . In this case, it can be shown that  
 539  $\alpha_\phi = \alpha \in (P(X < \mathcal{Z}_R^I + 1), 1]$ . The corresponding  $\beta_\phi$  can be derived accordingly, which is given  
 540 by (16). The complete proof is given below.

541 *Proof.* Given Lemma 3, the problem is reduced to finding the parameters  $h$  and  $\gamma$  in (18) such that  
 542  $\mathbb{E}_P[\phi] = \alpha$ , which can be proved as follows.

543 **Case (1)** We divide  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$  into  $\mathcal{Z}_R^U - \mathcal{Z}_L^I + 1$  segments:  $[P(X < \mathcal{Z}_L^U), P(X < \mathcal{Z}_L^I)] \cup (P(X <$   
 544  $\mathcal{Z}_L^I), P(X \leq \mathcal{Z}_L^I)] \cup \dots \cup (P(X < k), P(X \leq k)] \cup \dots \cup (P(X < \mathcal{Z}_R^U), P(X \leq \mathcal{Z}_R^U)]$ , as shown  
 545 in Fig. 5.




Figure 5: Dividing  $\alpha$  into multiple segments for part (1).

546 When  $\alpha = P(X < \mathcal{Z}_L^U) = P(X < \mathcal{Z}_L^I) = 0$ , we set  $h = +\infty$ . In this case, noticing that  
 547  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)} = h$  for  $k < \mathcal{Z}_L^I$ , and  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)} < h$  otherwise, we have

$$\mathbb{E}_P[\phi] = \gamma P(X < \mathcal{Z}_L^I) = 0 = \alpha, \quad (19)$$

548 and

$$\beta_\phi^+(0) = 1 - \mathbb{E}_Q[\phi] = 1 - \gamma P(Y < \mathcal{Z}_L^I). \quad (20)$$

549 The infimum is attained when  $\gamma = 1$ , which yields  $\beta_\phi^+(0) = P(Y \geq \mathcal{Z}_L^I)$ .

550 When  $\alpha \in (P(X < k), P(X \leq k)]$  for  $k \in [\mathcal{Z}_L^I, \mathcal{Z}_R^I]$ , we set  $h = \frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$ . In this case,  $\frac{P(Y=k')}{P(X=k')} =$   
 551  $h$  for  $k' = k$ , and  $\frac{P(Y=k')}{P(X=k')} > h$  for  $k' < k$ , and therefore

$$\mathbb{E}_P[\phi] = P(X < k) + \gamma P(X = k). \quad (21)$$

552 We adjust  $\gamma$  such that  $\mathbb{E}_P[\phi] = \alpha$ , which yields

$$\gamma = \frac{\alpha - P(X < k)}{P(X = k)}, \quad (22)$$

553 and

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_\phi^+(\alpha) &= 1 - [P(Y < k) + \gamma P(Y = k)] \\ &= P(Y \geq k) - P(Y = k) \frac{\alpha - P(X < k)}{P(X = k)} \\ &= P(Y \geq k) + \frac{P(Y = k)P(X < k)}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)} \alpha \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

554 When  $\alpha \in (P(X < k), P(X \leq k)]$  for  $k \in (\mathcal{Z}_R^I, \mathcal{Z}_R^U]$ , we set  $h = 0$ . In this case,  $\frac{P(Y=k')}{P(X=k')} = h$  for  
 555  $k' > \mathcal{Z}_R^I$ , and  $\frac{P(Y=k')}{P(X=k')} > h$  for  $k' \leq \mathcal{Z}_R^I$ . As a result,

$$\mathbb{E}_P[\phi] = P(X \leq \mathcal{Z}_R^I) + \gamma P(X > \mathcal{Z}_R^I), \quad (24)$$

556 and

$$\beta_\phi^+(\alpha) = 1 - [P(Y \leq \mathcal{Z}_R^I) + \gamma P(Y > \mathcal{Z}_R^I)] = 0 \quad (25)$$

557 Similarly, we can prove the second part of Lemma 2 as follows.

558 **Case (2)** We also divide  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$  into  $\mathcal{Z}_R^U - \mathcal{Z}_L^I + 1$  segments:  $[P(X > \mathcal{Z}_L^U), P(X \geq \mathcal{Z}_L^U)] \cup$   
 559  $\dots \cup (P(X > k), P(X \geq k)] \cup \dots \cup (P(X > \mathcal{Z}_R^I), P(X \geq \mathcal{Z}_R^I)]$ , as shown in Fig. 6.




Figure 6: Dividing  $\alpha$  in to multiple segments for part (2).

560 When  $\alpha \in (P(X > k), P(X \geq k)]$  for  $k \in [\mathcal{Z}_L^U, \mathcal{Z}_L^I]$ , we set  $h = 0$ . In this case,

$$\mathbb{E}_P[\phi] = P(X \geq \mathcal{Z}_L^I) + \gamma P(X < \mathcal{Z}_L^I), \quad (26)$$

561 and

$$\beta_\phi^-(\alpha) = 1 - [P(Y \geq \mathcal{Z}_L^I) + \gamma P(Y < \mathcal{Z}_L^I)] = 0 \quad (27)$$

562 When  $\alpha \in (P(X > k), P(X \geq k)]$  for  $k \in [\mathcal{Z}_L^I, \mathcal{Z}_R^I]$ , we set  $h = \frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$ . In this case,

$$\mathbb{E}_P[\phi] = P(X > k) + \gamma P(X = k). \quad (28)$$

563 Setting  $\mathbb{E}_P[\phi] = \alpha$  yields

$$\gamma = \frac{\alpha - P(X > k)}{P(X = k)}, \quad (29)$$

564 and

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_\phi^-(\alpha) &= 1 - [P(Y > k) + \gamma P(Y = k)] \\ &= P(Y \leq k) - P(Y = k) \frac{\alpha - P(X > k)}{P(X = k)} \\ &= P(Y \leq k) + \frac{P(Y = k)P(X > k)}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)} \alpha \end{aligned} \quad (30)$$

565 When  $\alpha = P(X > \mathcal{Z}_R^I) = 0$ , we set  $h = +\infty$ . In this case,

$$\mathbb{E}_P[\phi] = \gamma P(X > \mathcal{Z}_R^I) = 0 = \alpha, \quad (31)$$

566 and

$$\beta_\phi^+(0) = 1 - \mathbb{E}_Q[\phi] = 1 - \gamma P(Y > \mathcal{Z}_R^I). \quad (32)$$

567 The infimum is attained when  $\gamma = 1$ , which yields  $\beta_\phi^-(0) = P(Y \leq \mathcal{Z}_R^I)$ .  $\square$

## 568 B Proofs of Theoretical Results

### 569 B.1 Proof of Theorem 1

570 **Theorem 1.** Let  $\tilde{Z} = \text{Binom}(M, p)$ , the binomial noise mechanism in Algorithm 1 is  $f^{bn}(\alpha)$ -  
 571 differentially private with

$$f^{bn}(\alpha) = \min\{\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^+(\alpha), \beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^-(\alpha)\}, \quad (33)$$

572 in which

$$\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^+(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(\tilde{Z} \geq \tilde{k} + l) + \frac{P(Z=\tilde{k}+l)P(\tilde{Z}<\tilde{k})}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})} - \frac{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k}+l)}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})} \alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} < \tilde{k}), P(\tilde{Z} \leq \tilde{k})], \tilde{k} \in [0, M-l], \\ 0, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} \leq M-l), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (34)$$

$$\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^-(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(\tilde{Z} \leq \tilde{k} - l) + \frac{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - l)P(\tilde{Z} > \tilde{k})}{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k})} - \frac{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - l)}{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k})}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} > \tilde{k}), P(\tilde{Z} \geq \tilde{k})], \tilde{k} \in [l, M], \\ 0, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} \geq l), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (35)$$

574 Given that  $P(\tilde{Z} = k) = \binom{M}{k}p^k(1-p)^{M-k}$ , it can be readily shown that when  $p = 0.5$ , both  
575  $\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^+(\alpha)$  and  $\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^-(\alpha)$  are maximized, and  $f(\alpha) = \beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^+(\alpha) = \beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^-(\alpha)$ .

576 Before proving Theorem 1, we first show the following lemma.

577 **Lemma 4.** Let  $X = x_i + \text{Binom}(M, p)$  and  $Y = x'_i + \text{Binom}(M, p)$ . Then, if  $x_i > x'_i$ ,

$$\beta_{\phi}^+(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(Y \geq k) + \frac{P(Y=k)P(X < k)}{P(X=k)} - \frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}\alpha, & \text{if } \alpha \in [P(X < k), P(X \leq k)], k \in [x_i, x'_i + M]. \\ 0, & \text{if } \alpha \in (P(X < x'_i + M + 1), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (36)$$

578 If  $x_i < x'_i$ ,

$$\beta_{\phi}^-(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(Y \leq k) + \frac{P(Y=k)P(X > k)}{P(X=k)} - \frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}\alpha, & \text{if } \alpha \in [P(X > k), P(X \geq k)], k \in [x'_i, x_i + M]. \\ 0, & \text{if } \alpha \in (P(X > x'_i - 1), 1] \end{cases} \quad (37)$$

579 *Proof of Lemma 4.* When  $x_i > x'_i$ , it can be easily verified that  $P(X = k) > 0$  only for  $k \in [x_i, x_i +$   
580  $1, \dots, x_i + M]$ ,  $P(Y = k) > 0$  only for  $k \in [x'_i, x'_i + 1, \dots, x'_i + M]$ . For  $k \in [x_i, \dots, x'_i + M]$ ,  
581 we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)} &= \frac{\binom{M}{k-x'_i}p^{k-x'_i}(1-p)^{M-k+x'_i}}{\binom{M}{k-x_i}p^{k-x_i}(1-p)^{M-k+x_i}} \\ &= \frac{(N-k+x'_i+1)(N-k+x'_i+2) \cdots (N-k+x'_i)}{(k-x_i+1)(k-x_i+2) \cdots (k-x'_i)} \left(\frac{1-p}{p}\right)^{x'_i-x_i}. \end{aligned} \quad (38)$$

582 It can be observed that  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is a decreasing function of  $k$ .

583 When  $x_i < x'_i$ , it can be easily verified that  $P(X = k) > 0$  only for  $k \in [x_i, x_i + 1, \dots, x_i + M]$ ,  
584  $P(Y = k) > 0$  only for  $k \in [x'_i, x'_i + 1, \dots, x'_i + M]$ . For  $k \in [x'_i, \dots, x_i + M]$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)} &= \frac{\binom{M}{k-x'_i}p^{k-x'_i}(1-p)^{M-k+x'_i}}{\binom{M}{k-x_i}p^{k-x_i}(1-p)^{M-k+x_i}} \\ &= \frac{(k-x'_i+1)(k-x'_i+2) \cdots (k-x_i)}{(N-k+x_i+1)(N-k+x_i+2) \cdots (N-k+x'_i)} \left(\frac{1-p}{p}\right)^{x'_i-x_i}. \end{aligned} \quad (39)$$

585 It can be observed that  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is an increasing function of  $k$ , and invoking Lemma 2 completes the  
586 proof.  $\square$

587 Given Lemma 4, we are ready to prove Theorem 1.

588 *Proof of Theorem 1.* Let  $\tilde{Z} = \text{Binom}(M, p)$ ,  $X = x_i + \tilde{Z}$  and  $Y = x'_i + \tilde{Z}$ . Two cases are  
589 considered:

590 **Case 1:**  $x_i > x'_i$ .

591 In this case, according to Lemma 4, we have

$$\beta_{\phi}^+(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(Y \geq k) + \frac{P(Y=k)P(X < k)}{P(X=k)} - \frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(X < k), P(X \leq k)], k \in [x_i, x'_i + M], \\ 0, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(X \leq x'_i + M), 1], \end{cases} \quad (40)$$

592 In the following, we show the infimum of  $\beta_\phi^+(\alpha)$ . For the ease of presentation, let  $\tilde{k} = k - x_i$  and  
 593  $x_i - x'_i = \Delta$ . Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned} P(Y \geq k) &= P(x'_i + \tilde{Z} \geq k) = P(\tilde{Z} \geq \tilde{k} + \Delta), \\ P(Y = k) &= P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} + \Delta), \\ P(X < k) &= P(x_i + \tilde{Z} < k) = P(\tilde{Z} < \tilde{k}), \\ P(X = k) &= P(x_i + \tilde{Z} = k) = P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k}). \end{aligned} \quad (41)$$

594 (40) can be rewritten as

$$\beta_\phi^+(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(\tilde{Z} \geq \tilde{k} + \Delta) + \frac{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k}+\Delta)P(\tilde{Z}<\tilde{k})}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})} - \frac{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k}+\Delta)}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} < \tilde{k}), P(\tilde{Z} \leq \tilde{k})], \\ 0, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} \leq M - \Delta), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (42)$$

595 Let  $J(\Delta, \tilde{k}) = P(\tilde{Z} \geq \tilde{k} + \Delta) + \frac{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k}+\Delta)P(\tilde{Z}<\tilde{k})}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})} - \frac{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k}+\Delta)}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})}\alpha$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} J(\Delta + 1, \tilde{k}) - J(\Delta, \tilde{k}) &= -P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} + \Delta) \\ &+ \frac{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} + \Delta + 1) - P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} + \Delta)}{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k})} [P(\tilde{Z} < \tilde{k}) - \alpha]. \end{aligned} \quad (43)$$

596 Since  $\alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} < \tilde{k}), P(\tilde{Z} \leq \tilde{k})]$ , we have  $P(\tilde{Z} < \tilde{k}) - \alpha \in [-P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k}), 0]$ . If  $P(\tilde{Z} =$   
 597  $\tilde{k} + \Delta + 1) - P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} + \Delta) > 0$ ,  $J(\Delta + 1, \tilde{k}) - J(\Delta, \tilde{k}) < -P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} + \Delta) < 0$ . If  
 598  $P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} + \Delta + 1) - P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} + \Delta) < 0$ ,  $J(\Delta + 1, \tilde{k}) - J(\Delta, \tilde{k}) < -P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} + \Delta + 1) < 0$ .  
 599 As a result, the infimum of  $\beta_\phi^+(\alpha)$  is attained when  $\Delta = l$ , i.e.,  $x_i = l$  and  $x'_i = 0$ , which yields

$$\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^+(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(\tilde{Z} \geq \tilde{k} + l) + \frac{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k}+l)P(\tilde{Z}<\tilde{k})}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})} - \frac{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k}+l)}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} < \tilde{k}), P(\tilde{Z} \leq \tilde{k})], \tilde{k} \in [0, M - l], \\ 0, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} \leq M - l), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (44)$$

600 **Case 2:**  $x_i < x'_i$ .

601 In this case, according to Lemma 4, we have

$$\beta_\phi^-(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(Y \leq k) + \frac{P(Y=k)P(X>k)}{P(X=k)} - \frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(X > k), P(X \geq k)], k \in [x'_i, x_i + M], \\ 0, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(X \geq x'_i), 1], \end{cases} \quad (45)$$

602 In the following, we show the infimum of  $\beta(\alpha)$ . For the ease of presentation, let  $\tilde{k} = k - x_i$  and  
 603  $x'_i - x_i = \Delta$ . Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned} P(Y \leq k) &= P(x'_i + \tilde{Z} \leq k) = P(\tilde{Z} \leq \tilde{k} - \Delta), \\ P(Y = k) &= P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - \Delta), \\ P(X > k) &= P(x_i + \tilde{Z} > k) = P(\tilde{Z} > \tilde{k}), \\ P(X = k) &= P(x_i + \tilde{Z} = k) = P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k}). \end{aligned} \quad (46)$$

604 (45) can be rewritten as

$$\beta_\phi^-(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(\tilde{Z} \leq \tilde{k} - \Delta) + \frac{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k}-\Delta)P(\tilde{Z}>\tilde{k})}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})} - \frac{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k}-\Delta)}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} > \tilde{k}), P(\tilde{Z} \geq \tilde{k})], \tilde{k} \in [\Delta, M], \\ 0, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} \geq \Delta), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (47)$$

605 Let  $J(\Delta, \tilde{k}) = P(\tilde{Z} \leq \tilde{k} - \Delta) + \frac{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k}-\Delta)P(\tilde{Z}>\tilde{k})}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})} - \frac{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k}-\Delta)}{P(\tilde{Z}=\tilde{k})}\alpha$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} J(\Delta + 1, \tilde{k}) - J(\Delta, \tilde{k}) &= -P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - \Delta) \\ &+ \frac{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - \Delta - 1) - P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - \Delta)}{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k})} [P(\tilde{Z} > \tilde{k}) - \alpha] \end{aligned} \quad (48)$$

606 Since  $\alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} > \tilde{k}), P(\tilde{Z} \geq \tilde{k})]$ , we have  $P(\tilde{Z} > \tilde{k}) - \alpha \in [-P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k}), 0]$ . If  $P(\tilde{Z} =$   
607  $\tilde{k} - \Delta - 1) - P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - \Delta) > 0$ , then  $J(\Delta + 1, \tilde{k}) - J(\Delta, \tilde{k}) < -P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - \Delta) < 0$ . If  
608  $P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - \Delta - 1) - P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - \Delta) < 0$ , then  $J(\Delta + 1, \tilde{k}) - J(\Delta, \tilde{k}) < -P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - \Delta - 1) < 0$ .  
609 As a result, the infimum of  $\beta_{\phi}^{-}(\alpha)$  is attained when  $\Delta = l$ , i.e.,  $x_i = 0$  and  $x'_i = l$ , which yields

$$\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^{-}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} P(\tilde{Z} \leq \tilde{k} - l) + \frac{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - l)P(\tilde{Z} > \tilde{k})}{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k})} - \frac{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k} - l)}{P(\tilde{Z} = \tilde{k})}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} > \tilde{k}), P(\tilde{Z} \geq \tilde{k})], \tilde{k} \in [l, M], \\ 0, & \text{for } \alpha \in [P(\tilde{Z} \geq l), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (49)$$

610 Combining (44) and (49) completes the first part of the proof. When  $p = 0.5$ , it can be found that  
611 both  $\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^{+}(\alpha)$  and  $\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^{-}(\alpha)$  are maximized, and  $f(\alpha) = \beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^{+}(\alpha) = \beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^{-}(\alpha)$ .  $\square$

## 612 B.2 Proof of Theorem 2

613 **Theorem 2.** *The binomial mechanism in Algorithm 2 is  $f^{bm}(\alpha)$ -differentially private with*

$$f^{bm}(\alpha) = \min\{\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^{+}(\alpha), \beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^{-}(\alpha)\}, \quad (50)$$

614 *in which*

$$\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^{+}(\alpha) = 1 - [P(Y < k) + \gamma P(Y = k)] = P(Y \geq k) + \frac{P(Y = k)P(X < k)}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)}\alpha,$$

615 *for  $\alpha \in [P(X < k), P(X \leq k)]$  and  $k \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, M\}$ , where  $X = \text{Binom}(M, p_{\max})$  and  
616  $Y = \text{Binom}(M, p_{\min})$ , and*

$$\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^{-}(\alpha) = 1 - [P(Y > k) + \gamma P(Y = k)] = P(Y \leq k) + \frac{P(Y = k)P(X > k)}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)}\alpha,$$

617 *for  $\alpha \in [P(X > k), P(X \geq k)]$  and  $k \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, M\}$ , where  $X = \text{Binom}(M, p_{\min})$  and  
618  $Y = \text{Binom}(M, p_{\max})$ . When  $p_{\max} = 1 - p_{\min}$ , we have  $\beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^{+}(\alpha) = \beta_{\phi, \text{inf}}^{-}(\alpha)$ .*

619 *Proof.* Observing that the output space of the binomial mechanism remains the same for different  
620 data  $x_i$ , i.e.,  $\mathcal{Z}_L^I = \mathcal{Z}_L^U = 0$  and  $\mathcal{Z}_R^I = \mathcal{Z}_R^U = M$  in Lemma 2. Moreover, let  $X = \text{Binom}(M, p)$   
621 and  $Y = \text{Binom}(M, q)$ , we have  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)} = \frac{\binom{M}{k}q^k(1-q)^{M-k}}{\binom{M}{k}p^k(1-p)^{M-k}} = \left(\frac{1-q}{1-p}\right)^M \left(\frac{q(1-p)}{p(1-q)}\right)^k$ . Similarly, we  
622 consider the following two cases.

623 **Case 1:**  $q < p$ .

624 In this case, we can find that  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is a decreasing function of  $k$ . Therefore, according to Lemma  
625 2, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_{\phi}^{+}(\alpha) &= 1 - [P(Y < k) + \gamma P(Y = k)] \\ &= P(Y \geq k) - P(Y = k) \frac{\alpha - P(X < k)}{P(X = k)} \\ &= P(Y \geq k) + \frac{P(Y = k)P(X < k)}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)}\alpha \end{aligned} \quad (51)$$

626 In the following, we show that the infimum is attained when  $p = p_{\max}$  and  $q = p_{\min}$ . For Binomial  
627 distribution  $Y$ , we have  $\frac{\partial P(Y < k)}{\partial q} \leq 0$  and  $\frac{\partial P(Y \leq k)}{\partial q} \leq 0, \forall k$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \beta_{\phi}^{+}(\alpha)}{\partial q} &= -\frac{\partial P(Y < k)}{\partial q} - \gamma \frac{\partial P(Y = k)}{\partial q} \\ &= -(1 - \gamma) \frac{\partial P(Y < k)}{\partial q} - \gamma \frac{\partial P(Y \leq k)}{\partial q} \\ &\geq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (52)$$

628 Therefore, the infimum is attained when  $q = p_{\min}$ .

629 Suppose  $X = \text{Binom}(M, p)$  and  $\hat{X} = \text{Binom}(M, \hat{p})$ . Without loss of generality, assume  $p > \hat{p}$ .  
630 Suppose that  $\alpha \in [P(X < k), P(X \leq k)]$  and  $\alpha \in [P(\hat{X} < \hat{k}), P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k})]$  for some  $k$  and  $\hat{k}$   
631 are satisfied simultaneously, it can be readily shown that  $k \geq \hat{k}$ . In addition,  $\alpha \in [\max\{P(X <$

632  $k), P(\hat{X} < \hat{k})\}, \min\{P(X \leq k), P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k})\}$ . Let

$$\beta_{\phi,p}^+(\alpha) = P(Y \geq k) + \frac{P(Y = k)[P(X < k) - \alpha]}{P(X = k)}, \quad (53)$$

633 and

$$\beta_{\phi,\hat{p}}^+(\alpha) = P(Y \geq \hat{k}) + \frac{P(Y = \hat{k})[P(\hat{X} < \hat{k}) - \alpha]}{P(\hat{X} = \hat{k})}, \quad (54)$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \beta_{\phi,p}^+(\alpha) - \beta_{\phi,\hat{p}}^+(\alpha) \\ &= P(Y \geq k) - P(Y \geq \hat{k}) + \frac{P(Y = k)[P(X < k) - \alpha]}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = \hat{k})[P(\hat{X} < \hat{k}) - \alpha]}{P(\hat{X} = \hat{k})} \\ &= P(Y > k) - P(Y > \hat{k}) + \frac{P(Y = k)[P(X \leq k) - \alpha]}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = \hat{k})[P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k}) - \alpha]}{P(\hat{X} = \hat{k})}. \end{aligned} \quad (55)$$

634 Obviously,  $P(Y \geq k) - P(Y \geq \hat{k}) \leq 0$  and  $P(Y > k) - P(Y > \hat{k}) \leq 0$  for  $k \geq \hat{k}$ . Observing  
635 that  $\beta_{\phi,p}^+(\alpha) - \beta_{\phi,\hat{p}}^+(\alpha)$  is a linear function of  $\alpha \in [\max\{P(X < k), P(\hat{X} < \hat{k})\}, \min\{P(X \leq$   
636  $k), P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k})\}]$  given  $Y, X, \hat{X}, k$  and  $\hat{k}$ , we consider the following four possible cases:

637 **1)**  $P(X < k) \leq P(\hat{X} < \hat{k})$  and  $\alpha = P(\hat{X} < \hat{k})$ : In this case,  $\frac{P(Y=k)[P(X<k)-\alpha]}{P(X=k)} =$   
638  $\frac{P(Y=k)[P(X<k)-P(\hat{X}<\hat{k})]}{P(X=k)} \leq 0$ . As a result,  $\beta_{\phi,p}^+(\alpha) - \beta_{\phi,\hat{p}}^+(\alpha) \leq 0$ .

639 **2)**  $P(X < k) > P(\hat{X} < \hat{k})$  and  $\alpha = P(X < k)$ : In this case,

$$\begin{aligned} & \beta_{\phi,p}^+(\alpha) - \beta_{\phi,\hat{p}}^+(\alpha) \\ &= P(Y \geq k) - P(Y \geq \hat{k}) + \frac{P(Y = k)[P(X < k) - \alpha]}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = \hat{k})[P(\hat{X} < \hat{k}) - \alpha]}{P(\hat{X} = \hat{k})} \\ &= P(Y \geq k) - P(Y \geq \hat{k}) - \frac{P(Y = \hat{k})[P(\hat{X} < \hat{k}) - P(X < k)]}{P(\hat{X} = \hat{k})}. \end{aligned} \quad (56)$$

640 When  $k = \hat{k}$ , since  $p > \hat{p}$ , we have  $P(\hat{X} < \hat{k}) - P(X < k) > 0$ , which violates the condition that  
641  $P(X < k) > P(\hat{X} < \hat{k})$ .

642 When  $k > \hat{k}$ , we have  $P(Y \geq k) - P(Y \geq \hat{k}) \leq -P(Y = \hat{k})$ . Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_{\phi,p}^+(\alpha) - \beta_{\phi,\hat{p}}^+(\alpha) &\leq -P(Y = \hat{k}) - \frac{P(Y = \hat{k})[P(\hat{X} < \hat{k}) - P(X < k)]}{P(\hat{X} = \hat{k})} \\ &= -\frac{P(Y = \hat{k})[P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k}) - P(X < k)]}{P(\hat{X} = \hat{k})} \\ &\leq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (57)$$

643 **3)**  $P(X \leq k) \leq P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k})$  and  $\alpha = P(X \leq k)$ : In this case,

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(Y = k)[P(X \leq k) - \alpha]}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = \hat{k})[P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k}) - \alpha]}{P(\hat{X} = \hat{k})} = \\ & -\frac{P(Y = \hat{k})[P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k}) - P(X \leq k)]}{P(\hat{X} = \hat{k})} \leq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (58)$$

644 As a result,  $\beta_{\phi,p}^+(\alpha) - \beta_{\phi,\hat{p}}^+(\alpha) \leq P(Y > k) - P(Y > \hat{k}) \leq 0$ .

645 **4)**  $P(X \leq k) > P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k})$  and  $\alpha = P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k})$ : In this case, when  $k = \hat{k}$ ,  $P(X \leq k) - P(\hat{X} \leq$   
646  $\hat{k}) > 0$ , which violates the condition that  $P(X \leq k) > P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k})$ .

647 When  $k > \hat{k}$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}
& \beta_{\phi,p}^+(\alpha) - \beta_{\phi,\hat{p}}^+(\alpha) \\
&= P(Y \geq k) - P(Y \geq \hat{k}) + \frac{P(Y = k)[P(X < k) - P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k})]}{P(X = k)} \\
&\quad - \frac{P(Y = \hat{k})[P(\hat{X} < \hat{k}) - P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k})]}{P(\hat{X} = \hat{k})} \\
&= P(Y \geq k) - P(Y > \hat{k}) + \frac{P(Y = k)[P(X < k) - P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k})]}{P(X = k)}.
\end{aligned} \tag{59}$$

648 Since  $k > \hat{k}$ ,  $P(Y \geq k) - P(Y > \hat{k}) \leq 0$ . In addition,  $P(X < k) - P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k}) \leq 0$  since  
649  $\alpha \in [\max\{P(X < k), P(\hat{X} < \hat{k})\}, P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k})]$ . As a result,  $\beta_{\phi,p}^+(\alpha) - \beta_{\phi,\hat{p}}^+(\alpha) \leq P(Y >$   
650  $k) - P(Y > \hat{k}) \leq 0$ .

651 Now that  $\beta_{\phi,p}^+(\alpha) - \beta_{\phi,\hat{p}}^+(\alpha)$  is a linear function of  $\alpha \in [\max\{P(X < k), P(\hat{X} < \hat{k})\}, \min\{P(X \leq$   
652  $k), P(\hat{X} \leq \hat{k})\}]$ , which is non-positive in the extreme points (i.e., the boundaries), we can conclude  
653 that  $\beta_{\phi,p}^+(\alpha) - \beta_{\phi,\hat{p}}^+(\alpha) \leq 0$  for any  $\alpha \in [\max\{P(X < k), P(\hat{X} < \hat{k})\}, \min\{P(X \leq k), P(\hat{X} \leq$   
654  $\hat{k})\}]$ . Therefore, the infimum of  $\beta_{\phi}^+(\alpha)$  is attained when  $p = p_{max}$ .

655 **Case 2:**  $q > p$ .

656 In this case, we can find that  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is an increasing function of  $k$ . As a result, according to Lemma  
657 2, we have

$$\beta_{\phi}^-(\alpha) = P(Y \leq k) + \frac{P(Y = k)P(X > k)}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)}\alpha. \tag{60}$$

658 Similarly, it can be shown that the infimum is attained when  $q = p_{max}$  and  $p = p_{min}$ .

659 As a result, we have

$$T(P, Q)(\alpha) = \min\{\beta_{\phi,inf}^+(\alpha), \beta_{\phi,inf}^-(\alpha)\} \tag{61}$$

660

□

### 661 B.3 Proof of Theorem 3

662 **Theorem 3.** *The ternary stochastic compressor is  $f^{ternary}(\alpha)$ -differentially private with*

$$f^{ternary}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{A+c}{A-c}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [0, \frac{A-c}{2B}], \\ 1 - \frac{c}{B} - \alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [\frac{A-c}{2B}, 1 - \frac{A+c}{2B}], \\ \frac{A-c}{A+c} - \frac{A-c}{A+c}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [1 - \frac{A+c}{2B}, 1]. \end{cases} \tag{62}$$

663 We provide the  $f$ -DP analysis for a generic ternary stochastic compressor defined as follows.

664 **Definition 8 (Generic Ternary Stochastic Compressor).** *For any given  $x \in [-c, c]$ , the generic*  
665 *compressor ternary outputs ternary( $x, p_1, p_0, p_{-1}$ ), which is given by*

$$\text{ternary}(x, p_1, p_0, p_{-1}) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{with probability } p_1(x), \\ 0, & \text{with probability } p_0, \\ -1, & \text{with probability } p_{-1}(x), \end{cases} \tag{63}$$

666 where  $p_0$  is the design parameter that controls the level of sparsity and  $p_1(x), p_{-1}(x) \in [p_{min}, p_{max}]$ .

667 It can be readily verified that  $p_1 = \frac{A+x}{2B}, p_0 = 1 - \frac{A}{B}, p_{-1} = \frac{A-x}{2B}$  (and therefore  $p_{min} = \frac{A-c}{2B}$  and  
668  $p_{max} = \frac{A+c}{2B}$ ) for the ternary stochastic compressor in Definition 6.

669 In the following, we show the  $f$ -DP of the generic ternary stochastic compressor, and the corre-  
670 sponding  $f$ -DP guarantee for the compressor in Definition 6 can be obtained with  $p_{min} = \frac{A-c}{2B}$ ,

671  $p_{max} = \frac{A+c}{2B}$ , and  $p_0 = 1 - \frac{A}{B}$ .

672 **Lemma 5.** Suppose that  $p_0$  is independent of  $x$ ,  $p_{max} + p_{min} = 1 - p_0$ , and  $p_1(x) > p_1(y), \forall x > y$ .  
673 The ternary compressor is  $f^{ternary}(\alpha)$ -differentially private with

$$f^{ternary}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{p_{max}}{p_{min}}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [0, p_{min}], \\ p_0 + 2p_{min} - \alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [p_{min}, 1 - p_{max}], \\ \frac{p_{min}}{p_{max}} - \frac{p_{min}}{p_{max}}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [1 - p_{max}, 1], \end{cases} \quad (64)$$

674 *Proof.* Similar to the binomial mechanism, the output space of the ternary mechanism remains the same  
675 for different inputs. Let  $Y = ternary(x'_i, p_1, p_0, p_{-1})$  and  $X = ternary(x_i, p_1, p_0, p_{-1})$ , we  
676 have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{P(Y = -1)}{P(X = -1)} &= \frac{p_{-1}(x'_i)}{p_{-1}(x_i)}, \\ \frac{P(Y = 0)}{P(X = 0)} &= 1, \\ \frac{P(Y = 1)}{P(X = 1)} &= \frac{p_1(x'_i)}{p_1(x_i)}. \end{aligned} \quad (65)$$

677 When  $x_i > x'_i$ , it can be observed that  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is a decreasing function of  $k$ . According to Lemma 2,  
678 we have

$$\beta_\phi^+(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{p_{-1}(x'_i)}{p_{-1}(x_i)}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [0, p_{-1}(x_i)], \\ p_0 + p_1(x'_i) + p_{-1}(x_i) - \alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [p_{-1}(x_i), 1 - p_1(x_i)], \\ \frac{p_1(x'_i)}{p_1(x_i)} - \frac{p_1(x'_i)}{p_1(x_i)}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [1 - p_1(x_i), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (66)$$

679 When  $x_i < x'_i$ , it can be observed that  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is an increasing function of  $k$ . According to Lemma  
680 2, we have

$$\beta_\phi^-(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{p_1(x'_i)}{p_1(x_i)}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [0, p_1(x_i)], \\ p_0 + p_{-1}(x'_i) + p_1(x_i) - \alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [p_1(x_i), 1 - p_{-1}(x_i)], \\ \frac{p_{-1}(x'_i)}{p_{-1}(x_i)} - \frac{p_{-1}(x'_i)}{p_{-1}(x_i)}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [1 - p_{-1}(x_i), 1]. \end{cases} \quad (67)$$

681 The infimum of  $\beta_\phi^+(\alpha)$  is attained when  $p_{-1}(x'_i) = p_{max}$  and  $p_{-1}(x_i) = p_{min}$ , while the infimum  
682 of  $\beta_\phi^-(\alpha)$  is attained when  $p_1(x'_i) = p_{max}$  and  $p_1(x_i) = p_{min}$ . As a result, we have

$$f^{ternary}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{p_{max}}{p_{min}}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [0, p_{min}], \\ p_0 + 2p_{min} - \alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [p_{min}, 1 - p_{max}], \\ \frac{p_{min}}{p_{max}} - \frac{p_{min}}{p_{max}}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [1 - p_{max}, 1], \end{cases} \quad (68)$$

683 which completes the proof.  $\square$

#### 684 B.4 Proof of Theorem 4

685 **Theorem 4.** Given a vector  $x_i = [x_{i,1}, x_{i,2}, \dots, x_{i,d}]$  with  $|x_{i,j}| \leq c, \forall j$ . Applying the ternary  
686 compressor to the  $j$ -th coordinate of  $x_i$  independently yields  $\mu$ -GDP with  $\mu = -2\Phi^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{1+(\frac{A+c}{A-c})^d}\right)$ .

687 Before proving Theorem 4, we first introduce the following lemma.

688 **Lemma 6.** [41, 42] Any  $(\epsilon, 0)$ -DP algorithm is also  $\mu$ -GDP for  $\mu = -2\Phi^{-1}\left(\frac{1}{1+\epsilon}\right)$ , in which  $\Phi(\cdot)$   
689 is the cumulative density function of normal distribution.

690 *Proof.* According to Theorem 3, in the scalar case, the ternary stochastic compressor is  $f^{ternary}(\alpha)$ -  
691 differentially private with

$$f^{ternary}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{A+c}{A-c}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [0, \frac{A-c}{2B}], \\ 1 - \frac{c}{B} - \alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [\frac{A-c}{2B}, 1 - \frac{A+c}{2B}], \\ \frac{A-c}{A+c} - \frac{A-c}{A+c}\alpha, & \text{for } \alpha \in [1 - \frac{A+c}{2B}, 1]. \end{cases} \quad (69)$$

692 It can be easily verified that  $f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha) \geq \max\{0, 1 - (\frac{A+c}{A-c})\alpha, (\frac{A-c}{A+c})(1-\alpha)\}$ . Invoking Lemma 1  
693 suggests that it is  $(\log(\frac{A+c}{A-c}), 0)$ -DP. Extending it to the  $d$ -dimensional case yields  $(d \log(\frac{A+c}{A-c})^M, 0)$ -  
694 DP. As a result, according to Lemma 6, it is  $-2\Phi^{-1}(\frac{1}{1+(\frac{A+c}{A-c})^d})$ -GDP.  $\square$

## 695 B.5 Proof of Theorem 5

696 **Theorem 5.** For a vector  $x_i = [x_{i,1}, x_{i,2}, \dots, x_{i,d}]$  with  $|x_{i,j}| \leq c, \forall j$ , the ternary compressor with  
697  $B \geq A > c$  is  $f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha)$ -DP with

$$G_\mu(\alpha + \gamma) - \gamma \leq f^{\text{ternary}}(\alpha) \leq G_\mu(\alpha - \gamma) + \gamma, \quad (70)$$

698 in which

$$\mu = \frac{2\sqrt{dc}}{\sqrt{AB - c^2}}, \quad \gamma = \frac{0.56 \left[ \frac{A-c}{2B} \left| 1 + \frac{c}{B} \right|^3 + \frac{A+c}{2B} \left| 1 - \frac{c}{B} \right|^3 + \left( 1 - \frac{A}{B} \right) \left| \frac{c}{B} \right|^3 \right]}{\left( \frac{A}{B} - \frac{c^2}{B^2} \right)^{3/2} d^{1/2}}. \quad (71)$$

699 Before proving Theorem 5, we first define the following functions as in [15],

$$\text{kl}(f) = - \int_0^1 \log |f'(x)| dx, \quad (72)$$

$$\kappa_2(f) = \int_0^1 \log^2 |f'(x)| dx, \quad (73)$$

$$\kappa_3(f) = \int_0^1 |\log |f'(x)||^3 dx, \quad (74)$$

$$\bar{\kappa}_3(f) = \int_0^1 |\log |f'(x)| + \text{kl}(f)|^3 dx. \quad (75)$$

703 The central limit theorem for  $f$ -DP is formally introduced as follows.

704 **Lemma 7** ([15]). Let  $f_1, \dots, f_n$  be symmetric trade-off functions such that  $\kappa_3(f_i) < \infty$  for all  
705  $1 \leq i \leq d$ . Denote

$$\mu = \frac{2\|\text{kl}\|_1}{\sqrt{\|\kappa_2\|_1 - \|\text{kl}\|_2^2}}, \text{ and } \gamma = \frac{0.56\|\bar{\kappa}_3\|_1}{(\|\kappa_2\|_1 - \|\text{kl}\|_2^2)^{3/2}},$$

706 and assume  $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$ . Then, for all  $\alpha \in [\gamma, 1 - \gamma]$ , we have  
 $G_\mu(\alpha + \gamma) - \gamma \leq f_1 \otimes f_2 \otimes \dots \otimes f_d(\alpha) \leq G_\mu(\alpha - \gamma) + \gamma.$  (76)

707 Given Lemma 7, we are ready to prove Theorem 5.

708 *Proof.* Given  $f_i(\alpha)$  in (62), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{kl}(f) &= - \left[ \frac{A-c}{2B} \log \left( \frac{A+c}{A-c} \right) + \frac{A+c}{2B} \log \left( \frac{A-c}{A+c} \right) \right] \\ &= \left[ \frac{A+c}{2B} - \frac{A-c}{2B} \right] \log \left( \frac{A+c}{A-c} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (77)$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \frac{c}{B} \log \left( \frac{A+c}{A-c} \right), \\ \kappa_2(f) &= \left[ \frac{A-c}{2B} \log^2 \left( \frac{A+c}{A-c} \right) + \frac{A+c}{2B} \log^2 \left( \frac{A-c}{A+c} \right) \right] \\ &= \frac{A}{B} \log^2 \left( \frac{A+c}{A-c} \right), \end{aligned} \quad (78)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa_3(f) &= \left[ \frac{A-c}{2B} \left| \log \left( \frac{A+c}{A-c} \right) \right|^3 + \frac{A+c}{2B} \left| \log \left( \frac{A-c}{A+c} \right) \right|^3 \right] \\ &= \frac{A}{B} \left| \log \left( \frac{A+c}{A-c} \right) \right|^3, \end{aligned} \quad (79)$$

$$\bar{\kappa}_3(f) = \left[ \frac{A-c}{2B} \left| 1 + \frac{c}{B} \right|^3 + \frac{A+c}{2B} \left| 1 - \frac{c}{B} \right|^3 + \left( 1 - \frac{A}{B} \right) \left| \frac{c}{B} \right|^3 \right] \left| \log \left( \frac{A+c}{A-c} \right) \right|^3. \quad (80)$$

712 The corresponding  $\mu$  and  $\gamma$  are given as follows

$$\mu = \frac{2d\frac{c}{B}}{\sqrt{\frac{A}{B}d - \frac{c^2}{B^2}d}} = \frac{2\sqrt{dc}}{\sqrt{AB - c^2}}, \quad (81)$$

$$\gamma = \frac{0.56 \left[ \frac{A-c}{2B} \left| 1 + \frac{c}{B} \right|^3 + \frac{A+c}{2B} \left| 1 - \frac{c}{B} \right|^3 + \left( 1 - \frac{A}{B} \right) \left| \frac{c}{B} \right|^3 \right]}{\left( \frac{A}{B} - \frac{c^2}{B^2} \right)^{3/2} d^{1/2}}, \quad (82)$$

713 which completes the proof.  $\square$

## 714 C $f$ -DP of the Poisson Binomial Mechanism

The Poisson binomial mechanism [9] is presented in Algorithm 3. In the following, we show the

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**Algorithm 3** Poisson Binomial Mechanism

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**Input:**  $p_i \in [p_{min}, p_{max}], \forall i \in \mathcal{N}$

Privatization:  $Z_{pb} \triangleq PB(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_N) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} Binom(M, p_i)$ .

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715  $f$ -DP guarantee of the Poisson binomial mechanism with  $M = 1$ . The extension to the proof for  
716  $M > 1$  is straightforward by following a similar technique.

717 **Theorem 6.** *The Poisson binomial mechanism with  $M = 1$  in Algorithm 3 is  $f^{pb}(\alpha)$ -differentially  
718 private with*

$$f^{pb}(\alpha) = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ 0, 1 - \frac{1 - p_{min}}{1 - p_{max}} \alpha, \frac{p_{min}}{p_{max}} (1 - \alpha) \right\}, \right. \\ \left. \max \left\{ 0, 1 - \frac{p_{max}}{p_{min}} \alpha, \frac{1 - p_{max}}{1 - p_{min}} (1 - \alpha) \right\} \right\}. \quad (83)$$

720 *Proof.* For Poisson Binomial, let

$$\begin{aligned} X &= PB(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_{i-1}, p_i, p_{i+1}, \dots, p_N), \\ Y &= PB(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_{i-1}, p'_i, p_{i+1}, \dots, p_N), \\ Z &= PB(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_{i-1}, p_{i+1}, \dots, p_N), \end{aligned} \quad (84)$$

721 in which  $PB$  stands for Poisson Binomial. In this case,

$$\frac{P(Y = k + 1)}{P(X = k + 1)} = \frac{P(Z = k + 1)(1 - p'_i) + P(Z = k)p'_i}{P(Z = k + 1)(1 - p_i) + P(Z = k)p_i}. \quad (85)$$

722 In addition,

$$\begin{aligned} &P(Y = k + 1)P(X = k) - P(Y = k)P(X = k + 1) \\ &= [P(Z = k + 1)P(Z = k - 1) - (P(Z = k))^2](p_i - p'_i). \end{aligned} \quad (86)$$

723 Since  $P(Z = k + 1)P(Z = k - 1) - (P(Z = k))^2 < 0$  for Poisson Binomial distribution, we have

$$P(Y = k + 1)P(X = k) - P(Y = k)P(X = k + 1) \begin{cases} > 0, & \text{if } p_i < p'_i, \\ < 0, & \text{if } p_i > p'_i. \end{cases} \quad (87)$$

724 That being said,  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is an increasing function of  $k$  if  $p_i < p'_i$  and a decreasing function of  $k$  if  
725  $p_i > p'_i$ . Following the same analysis as that in the proof of Theorem 2, for  $p_i > p'_i$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_\phi^+(\alpha) &= 1 - [P(Y < k) + \gamma P(Y = k)] \\ &= P(Y \geq k) - P(Y = k) \frac{\alpha - P(X < k)}{P(X = k)} \\ &= P(Y \geq k) + \frac{P(Y = k)P(X < k)}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)} \alpha, \end{aligned} \quad (88)$$

726 for  $\alpha \in [P(X < k), P(X \leq k)]$  and  $k \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, N\}$ .

727 In the following, we show that the infimum of  $\beta_\phi^+(\alpha)$  is attained when  $p_i = p_{max}$  and  $p'_i = p_{min}$ .

728 **Case 1:**  $k = 0$ . In this case,

$$\begin{aligned} P(Y \geq 0) &= 1, \\ P(Y = 0) &= P(Z = 0)(1 - p'_i), \\ P(X < 0) &= 0, \\ P(X = 0) &= P(Z = 0)(1 - p_i). \end{aligned} \quad (89)$$

729 Plugging (89) into (88) yields

$$\beta_\phi^+(\alpha) = 1 - \frac{1 - p'_i}{1 - p_i} \alpha. \quad (90)$$

730 It is obvious that the infimum is attained when  $p_i = p_{max}$  and  $p'_i = p_{min}$ .

731 **Case 2:**  $k > 0$ . In this case,

$$\begin{aligned} P(Y \geq k) &= P(Z \geq k) + P(Z = k - 1)p'_i, \\ P(Y = k) &= P(Z = k)(1 - p'_i) + P(Z = k - 1)p'_i, \\ P(X < k) &= P(Z < k) - P(Z = k - 1)p_i, \\ P(X = k) &= P(Z = k)(1 - p_i) + P(Z = k - 1)p_i. \end{aligned} \quad (91)$$

732 Plugging (91) into (88) yields

$$\beta_\phi^+(\alpha) = p(Z > k) + P(Z = k)p'_i + [P(X \leq k) - \alpha] \frac{[P(Z = k) - [P(Z = k) - P(Z = k - 1)p'_i]]}{P(X = k)}. \quad (92)$$

733 The  $p'_i$  related term is given by

$$\left[ \frac{P(X = k)P(Z = k)}{P(X = k)} - \frac{[P(Z = k) - P(Z = k - 1)] [P(X \leq k) - \alpha]}{P(X = k)} \right] p'_i. \quad (93)$$

734 Observing that (93) is a linear function of  $\alpha$ , we only need to examine  $\alpha \in \{P(X < k), P(X \leq k)\}$ .  
735 More specifically, when  $\alpha = P(X \leq k)$ , it is reduced to  $P(Z = k)p'_i$ ; when  $\alpha = P(X < k)$ , it is  
736 reduced to  $P(Z = k - 1)p'_i$ . In both cases, the infimum is attained when  $p'_i = p_{min}$ .

737 Given that  $p'_i = p_{min}$ , the same technique as in the proof of Theorem 2 can be applied to show that  
738 the infimum is attained when  $p = p_{max}$ .

739 Since  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is a decreasing function of  $k$  when  $p_i > p'_i$ , we have

$$\frac{p_{min}}{p_{max}} \leq \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)} \leq \frac{1 - p_{min}}{1 - p_{max}}. \quad (94)$$

740 Given that  $\beta_\phi^+(\alpha)$  is a decreasing function of  $\alpha$  with  $\beta_\phi^+(0) = 1$  and  $\beta_\phi^+(1) = 0$ , we can readily  
741 conclude that  $\beta_\phi^+(\alpha) \geq \max\{0, 1 - \frac{1-p_{min}}{1-p_{max}}\alpha\}$  and  $\beta_\phi^+(\alpha) \geq \frac{p_{min}}{p_{max}}(1 - \alpha)$ . That being said,  
742  $\beta_\phi^+(\alpha) \geq \max\{0, 1 - \frac{1-p_{min}}{1-p_{max}}\alpha, \frac{p_{min}}{p_{max}}(1 - \alpha)\}$ .

743 Similarly, for  $p_i < p'_i$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_\phi^-(\alpha) &= 1 - [P(Y > k) + \gamma P(Y = k)] \\ &= P(Y \leq k) - P(Y = k) \frac{\alpha - P(X > k)}{P(X = k)} \\ &= P(Y \leq k) + \frac{P(Y = k)P(X > k)}{P(X = k)} - \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)} \alpha \end{aligned} \quad (95)$$

744 for  $\alpha \in [P(X > k), P(X \geq k)]$  and  $k \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, N\}$ . The infimum is attained when  $p_i = p_{min}$ ,  
745  $p'_i = p_{max}$ .

746 Since  $\frac{P(Y=k)}{P(X=k)}$  is an increasing function of  $k$  when  $p_i < p'_i$ , we have

$$\frac{1 - p_{max}}{1 - p_{min}} \leq \frac{P(Y = k)}{P(X = k)} \leq \frac{p_{max}}{p_{min}}. \quad (96)$$

747 Given that  $\beta_\phi^-(\alpha)$  is an increasing function of  $\alpha$  with  $\beta_\phi^-(0) = 1$  and  $\beta_\phi^-(1) = 0$ , we can easily  
748 conclude that  $\beta_\phi^-(\alpha) \geq \max\{0, 1 - \frac{p_{max}}{p_{min}}\alpha\}$  and  $\beta_\phi^-(\alpha) \geq \frac{1-p_{max}}{1-p_{min}}(1 - \alpha)$ . That being said,  
749  $\beta_\phi^-(\alpha) \geq \max\{0, 1 - \frac{p_{max}}{p_{min}}\alpha, \frac{1-p_{max}}{1-p_{min}}(1 - \alpha)\}$ .  $\square$