Context:
tive
 
bubble
.
 
While
 
housing
 prices
 are
 
based
 on
 what
 competi
ng
 
buyer
s
 are
 
willing
 to
 pay
,
 post
secondary
 education
s
 price

 is
 
suppos
edly
 
linked
 to
 its
 cost
s
 (
with
 the
 exception
 of
 the
 for
-
profit
s
).
 But
 the
 rapid
 
growth
 in
 tu
ition
 is
 myst

ifying
 in
 value
 terms
;
 no
 one
 
could
 
argue
 convin
c
ingly
 the
 quality
 of
 instruction
 or
 the
 market
 value
 of
 
a
 
degree
 has
 in

creased
 ten
-
fold
 in
 the
 past
 four
 de
cades
 (
though
 this
 has
n
t
 stopp
ed
 some
 from
 try
ing
).
 So
 
why
 
would
 
universities
 
raise

 tu
ition
 so
 high
 so
 quick
ly
?
 “
Because
 the
y
 can
 answers
 this
 question
 for
 home
-
sellers
 out
 to
 get
 the
 b
iggest
 return
 on
 

their
 
investments
,
 or
 for
-
profit
s
 out
 to
 grab
 as
 much
 Pell
 Grant
 money
 as
 possible
,
 but
 it
 seem
s
 an
 aw
fully
 cyn
ical

 answer
 
when
 it
 come
s
 to
 non
profit
 education
.
 If
 you
re
 en
rolled
 in
 four
 college
 
classes
 right
 now
,
 you
 have
 
a
 
pretty

 good
 chance
 that
 one
 of
 the
 four
 will
 be
 
t
aught
 by
 
someone
 who
 has
 
earned
 
a
 doctor
ate
 and
 who
se
 
teaching
,
 
scholarship
,

 and
 service
 to
 the
 profession
 has
 under
gone
 the
 
intensive
 pe
er
 scru
tiny
 
associated
 with
 the
 tenu
re
 system
.
 In
 your

 other
 three
 
classes
,
 
however
,
 you
 are
 like
ly
 to
 be
 
t
aught
 by
 
someone
 who
 has
 
started
 
a
 
degree
 but
 not
 
finished
 it
;
 was

 hir
ed
 by
 
a
 manager
,
 not
 professional
 pe
ers
;
 may
 never
 publish
 in
 the
 field
 she
 is
 
teaching
;
 got
 into
 the
 pool
 of
 person

s
 
being
 consider
ed
 for
 the
 job
 
because
 she
 was
 
willing
 to
 work
 for
 wag
es
 around
 the
 official
 p
overty
 line
 (
often
 under

 the
 de
lusion
 that
 she
 
could
 ‘
work
 her
 way
 into
 
a
 tenu
r
able
 position
);
 and
 
does
 not
 plan
 to
 be
 working
 at
 your

 institution
 three
 years
 from
 now
.
 This
 is
 not
 an
 
improvement
;
 
few
er
 than
 for
ty
 years
 ago
,
 
when
 the
 explosi
ve
 
growth
 in

 tu
ition
 be
gan
,
 
these
 proportion
s
 were
 revers
ed
.
 High
ly
 represent
ed
 
among
 the
 new
 prec
arious
 
teachers
 are
 
graduate

 students
;
 with
 so
 much
 available
 
debt
,
 
universities
 can
 force
 
graduate
 student
 
workers
 to
 scrap
e
 by
 on
 sub
-
minimum
-
wage

,
 
making
 them
 
a
 great
 source
 of
 cheap
 instruction
al
 labor
.
 F
ewer
 tenu
re
-
track
 jobs
 mean
 that
 recent
 Ph
D
s
,
 overw
helme
d

 with
 

Input:
ition
 and
 fees
 at
 public
 four
 year
 institutions
 (
i
.
e
.
,
 net
 of
 
CPI
 
inflation
 
rates
)
 had
 grow
n
 to
 be
 over
 three
 and
 
a
 half

 times
 as
 
expensive
 as
 in
 1980
.
 Over
 that
 same
 time
 span
 median
 real
 personal
 
income
 gre
w
 by
 less
 than
 30%
 --
 meaning

 that
 since
 1980
 the
 real
 price
 of
 tu
ition
 and
 fees
 at
 
a
 public
 university
 has
 grow
n
 over
 eight
 times
 more
 than
 median

 personal
 
income
.
 "
If
 you
'
re
 en
rolled
 in
 four
 college
 
classes
 right
 now
,
 you
 have
 
a
 
pretty
 good
 chance
 that
 one
 of
 the

 four
 will
 be
 
t
aught
 by
 
someone
 who
 has
 
earned
 
a
 doctor
ate
 and
 who
se
 
teaching
,
 
scholarship
,
 and
 service
 to
 the

 profession
 has
 under
gone
 the
 
intensive
 pe
er
 scru
tiny
 
associated
 with
 the
 tenu
re
 system
.
 In
 your
 other
 three
 
classes
,
 

however
,
 you
 are
 like
ly
 to
 be
 
t
aught
 by
 
someone
 who
 has
 
started
 
a
 
degree
 but
 not
 
finished
 it
;
 was
 hir
ed
 by
 
a
 manager
,

 not
 professional
 pe
ers
;
 may
 never
 publish
 in
 the
 field
 she
 is
 
teaching
;
 got
 into
 the
 pool
 of
 person
s
 
being
 consider
ed

 for
 the
 job
 
because
 she
 was
 
willing
 to
 work
 for
 wag
es
 around
 the
 official
 p
overty
 line
 (
often
 under
 the
 de
lusion
 that

 she
 
could
 
'
work
 her
 way
 into
'
 
a
 tenu
r
able
 position
);
 and
 
does
 not
 plan
 to
 be
 working
 at
 your
 institution
 three
 years

 from
 now
."
 So
,
 
why
 have
 the
 cost
s
 in
 tu
ition
 and
 fees
 grow
n
 eight
-
fold
 
relative
 to
 median
 
income
s
 since
 1980
 --
 
when

 tenu
red
 professor
s
 like
ly
 
t
aught
 three
 of
 every
 four
 
classes
?
 Easy
 credit
 (
and
 the
 cultural
 
prestige
 of
 
a
 college

 education
)
 
turned
 
higher
 education
 into
 yet
 
another
 "
asset
"
 
bubble
 --
 but
 
secure
d
 in
 this
 case
 only
 by
 the
 gar
nishing

 power
s
 of
 the
 
lenders
.
 And
 it
 
could
 also
 be
 argu
ed
 that
 recent
ly
 
those
 in
creased
 cost
s
 have
 be
gun
 to
 
y
ield
 di
mi
nished

 return
s
:
 salari
es
 for
 2010
 
graduate
s
 with
 major
s
 in
 the
 liberal
 arts
 major
s
 fell
 8
.9%
 nominal
ly
 year
-
over
-
year
,
 to

Targets:
 $3 Idx: 27850, Δloglikelihood: -0.312
3,5 Idx: 45403, Δloglikelihood: 0.358
40 Idx: 2334, Δloglikelihood: 0.166
 -- Idx: 3093, Δloglikelihood: -0.475
  Idx: 259, Δloglikelihood: 0.103
rough Idx: 55904, Δloglikelihood: 0.506
ly Idx: 484, Δloglikelihood: 0.000
  Idx: 259, Δloglikelihood: -0.269
9% Idx: 11859, Δloglikelihood: -0.250
 less Idx: 24691, Δloglikelihood: 0.056
 than Idx: 2421, Δloglikelihood: -0.006
 the Idx: 287, Δloglikelihood: 0.179
  Idx: 259, Δloglikelihood: 0.309
average Idx: 20935, Δloglikelihood: -0.094
 U Idx: 581, Δloglikelihood: 0.241
. Idx: 260, Δloglikelihood: -0.000
S Idx: 399, Δloglikelihood: 0.005
. Idx: 260, Δloglikelihood: 0.002
 per Idx: 393, Δloglikelihood: 1.277
 capita Idx: 73141, Δloglikelihood: -0.095
 dispos Idx: 19766, Δloglikelihood: 0.112
able Idx: 1059, Δloglikelihood: 0.000
  Idx: 259, Δloglikelihood: -0.007
income Idx: 31978, Δloglikelihood: -0.004
 ( Idx: 274, Δloglikelihood: 0.436
which Idx: 1542, Δloglikelihood: -0.359
, Idx: 261, Δloglikelihood: -0.548
 incident Idx: 38707, Δloglikelihood: -0.159
ally Idx: 4621, Δloglikelihood: 0.004
, Idx: 261, Δloglikelihood: -0.015
 had Idx: 1425, Δloglikelihood: -0.557
  Idx: 259, Δloglikelihood: -0.159
actually Idx: 15128, Δloglikelihood: -0.052
 grow Idx: 28158, Δloglikelihood: 0.038
n Idx: 272, Δloglikelihood: 0.001

 2. Idx: 1219, Δloglikelihood: -0.283
2% Idx: 8016, Δloglikelihood: 0.102
 nominal Idx: 83601, Δloglikelihood: -0.022
ly Idx: 484, Δloglikelihood: -0.081
 on Idx: 351, Δloglikelihood: 1.203
 the Idx: 287, Δloglikelihood: 0.636
 same Idx: 4012, Δloglikelihood: -1.091
 year Idx: 3721, Δloglikelihood: 1.160
- Idx: 264, Δloglikelihood: -0.616
over Idx: 4288, Δloglikelihood: 0.029
- Idx: 264, Δloglikelihood: -0.002
year Idx: 12388, Δloglikelihood: -0.001
 basis Idx: 16184, Δloglikelihood: -0.058
). Idx: 483, Δloglikelihood: -0.353
 The Idx: 486, Δloglikelihood: 0.057
 two Idx: 2956, Δloglikelihood: 0.430
 economic Idx: 12936, Δloglikelihood: -0.054
 issues Idx: 17982, Δloglikelihood: 0.333
 are Idx: 418, Δloglikelihood: -0.159
 caus Idx: 26471, Δloglikelihood: -0.543
ally Idx: 4621, Δloglikelihood: 0.408
  Idx: 259, Δloglikelihood: 0.161
related Idx: 7403, Δloglikelihood: 0.115
: Idx: 267, Δloglikelihood: -0.163
  Idx: 259, Δloglikelihood: -0.013
absent Idx: 136623, Δloglikelihood: 1.749
 the Idx: 287, Δloglikelihood: -0.585
 ex Idx: 2121, Δloglikelihood: 0.005
orbit Idx: 136719, Δloglikelihood: 0.521