How They Vote:
Issue-Adjusted Models of Legislative Behavior

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Abstract

We develop a probabilistic model of legislative data that uses the text of the bills to uncover lawmakers’ positions on specific political issues. Our model can be used to explore how a lawmaker’s voting patterns deviate from what is expected and how that deviation depends on what is being voted on. We derive approximate posterior inference algorithms based on variational methods. Across 12 years of legislative data, we demonstrate both improvement in heldout predictive performance and the model’s utility in interpreting an inherently multi-dimensional space.

1 Introduction

Legislative behavior centers around the votes made by lawmakers. Capturing regularity in these votes, and characterizing patterns of legislative behavior, is one of the main goals of quantitative political science. Voting behavior exhibits enough regularity that simple statistical models, particularly ideal point models, easily capture the broad political structure of legislative bodies. However, some lawmakers do not fit neatly into the assumptions made by these models. In this paper, we develop a new model of legislative behavior that captures when and how lawmakers vote differently than expected.

Ideal point models assume that lawmakers and bills are represented as points in a latent space. A lawmaker’s (stochastic) voting behavior is characterized by the relationship between her position in this space and the bill’s position \[1] \[2] \[3]. Given the data of how each lawmaker votes on each bill (known as a roll call), we can use ideal point models to infer the latent position of each lawmaker. In U.S. politics, these inferred positions reveal the commonly-known political spectrum: right-wing lawmakers are at one extreme, and left-wing lawmakers are at the other. Figure 1 illustrates example inferences from an ideal point model.

But there are some votes that ideal point models fail to capture. For example, Ronald Paul, Republican representative from Texas, and Dennis Kucinich, Democratic representative from Ohio, are poorly modeled by ideal points because they diverge from the left-right spectrum on issues like foreign policy. Because some lawmakers deviate from their party on certain issues, their positions on these issues are not captured by ideal point models.

To this end, we develop the issue-adjusted ideal point model, a latent variable model of roll-call data that accounts for the contents of the bills that lawmakers are voting on. The idea is that each lawmaker has both a general position and a sparse set of position adjustments, one for each issue. The votes on a bill depend on a lawmaker’s position, adjusted for the bill’s content. The text of the bill encodes the issues it discusses. Our model can be used as an exploratory tool for identifying
exceptional voting patterns of individual legislators, and it provides a richer description of lawmakers’ voting behavior than the models traditionally used in political science.

In the following sections, we develop our model and describe an approximate posterior inference algorithm based on variational methods. We analyze six Congresses (12 years) of legislative data from the United States Congress. We show that our model gives a better fit to legislative data and provides an interesting exploratory tool for analyzing legislative behavior.

2 Exceptional issue voting

We first review ideal point models of legislative roll call data and discuss their limitations. We then present a model that accounts for how legislators vote on specific issues.

Modeling politics with ideal points.

Ideal point models are based on item response theory, a statistical theory that models how members of a population judge a set of items. Applied to voting records, one-dimensional ideal point models place lawmakers on an interpretable political spectrum. These models are widely used in quantitative political science [3, 4, 5].

One-dimensional ideal point models posit an ideal point \( x_u \in \mathbb{R} \) for each lawmaker \( u \). Each bill \( d \) is characterized by its polarity \( a_d \) and its popularity \( b_d \). The probability that lawmaker \( u \) votes “Yes” on bill \( d \) is given by the logistic regression

\[
p(v_{ud} = \text{yes} | x_u, a_d, b_d) = \sigma(x_u a_d + b_d),
\]

where \( \sigma(s) = \frac{\exp(s)}{1 + \exp(s)} \) is the logistic function. When the popularity of a bill \( b_d \) is high, nearly everyone votes “Yes”; when the popularity is low, nearly everyone votes “No”. When the popularity is near zero, the probability that a lawmaker votes “Yes” depends on how her ideal point \( x_u \) interacts with bill polarity \( a_d \). The variables \( a_d, b_d, \) and \( x_u \) are usually assigned standard normal priors [3].

Given a matrix of votes, we can infer the ideal point of each lawmaker. We illustrate ideal points fit to votes in the U.S. House of Representatives from 2009-2010 in Figure 1. The model has clearly separated lawmakers by their political party (colour) and provides an intuitive measure of their political leanings.

Limitations of ideal point models. A one-dimensional ideal point model fit to the U.S. House from 2009-2010 correctly models 98% of lawmakers’ votes on training data. But it only captures 83% of Baron Hill’s (D-IN) votes and 80% of Ronald Paul’s (R-TX) votes. Why is this?

The ideal point model assumes that lawmakers are ordered. Each bill \( d \) splits them at a cut point \( -\frac{b_d}{a_d} \). Lawmakers to one side of the cut point are more likely to support the bill, and lawmakers to the other side are likely to reject it. For lawmakers like Paul and Hill, this assumption is too strong because their voting behavior does not fit neatly into a single ordering. Their location among the other lawmakers changes with different bills.

Lawmakers do not vote randomly, however. They vote consistently within individual areas of policy, such as foreign policy and education. For example, Rep. Paul consistently votes against United States involvement in foreign military engagements, a position that contrasts with other Republicans.

We refer to voting behavior like this as issue voting. An issue is any federal policy area, such as “financial regulation,” “foreign policy,” “civil liberties,” or “education,” on which lawmakers are expected to take positions. Lawmakers’ positions on these issues often diverge from their traditional left/right stances. The model we will develop captures these deviations. Some examples are illustrated

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1 These are sometimes called the discrimination and difficulty, respectively.
2 Many ideal point models use a probit function instead [1][3].
Figure 2: In a traditional ideal point model, lawmakers’ ideal points are static (top line of each figure). In the issue-adjusted ideal point model, lawmakers’ ideal points change when they vote on certain issues, such as Taxation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>national guard</td>
<td>family</td>
<td>substitute</td>
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Figure 3: Left: Top words from topics fit using labeled LDA [6]. Right: the issue-adjusted ideal point model, which models votes \( v_{ud} \) from lawmakers and legislative items. Classic item response theory models votes \( v \) using \( x_u \) and \( a_d, b_d \). For our work, documents’ issue vectors \( \theta \) were estimated fit with a topic model (left of dashed line) using bills’ words \( w \) and labeled topics \( \beta \). Expected issue vectors \( \mathbb{E}_{q}[\theta|w] \) are then treated as constants in the issue model (right of dashed line).

in Figure 2 Charles Djou is more similar to Republicans on Taxation (right) and more similar to Democrats on Health (left), while Ronald Paul is more Republican-leaning on Health and less extreme on Taxation. The model we will introduce uses lawmakers’ votes and the text of bills to model deviations like this, on a variety of issues. This allows us to take into account whether a bill was about Taxation or Education (or both) when predicting a lawmaker’s vote.

**Issue-adjusted ideal points.**

We now describe the issue-adjusted ideal point model, a new model of lawmaker behavior that takes into account both the content of the bills and the voting patterns of the lawmakers. We build on the ideal point model so that each lawmaker’s ideal point can be adjusted for each issue.

Suppose that there are \( K \) issues in the political landscape. We will use the words \( w_d \) of each bill \( d \) to code it with a mixture \( \theta_d \) of issues, where each element \( \theta_{dk} \) corresponds to an issue; the components of \( \theta_d \) are positive and sum to one. (These vectors will come from a topic model, which we describe below.) In our proposed model, each lawmaker is also associated with a \( K \)-vector \( z_u \in \mathbb{R}^K \), which describes how her ideal point changes for bills about each issue.

We use these variables in a model based on the traditional ideal point model of Equation 1. As above, \( x_u \) is the ideal point for lawmaker \( u \) and \( a_d, b_d \) are the polarity and popularity of bill \( d \). In our model, votes are modeled with a logistic regression

\[
p(v_{ud}|a_d, b_d, z_u, x_u, w_d) = \sigma \left( (z_u^\top \mathbb{E}_{q}[\theta_d|w_d] + x_u) a_d + b_d \right),
\]

where we use an estimate \( \mathbb{E}_{q}[\theta_d|w_d] \) of the bill’s issue vector from its words \( w_d \) as described below.

We put standard normal priors on the ideal points, polarity, and difficulty variables. We use Laplace priors for \( z_u \): \( p(z_{uk} | \lambda_1) \propto \exp(-\lambda_1 |z_{uk}|_{1}) \). This enforces a sparse penalty with MAP inference and a “nearly-sparse” penalty with Bayesian inference. See Figure 3 (left) for the graphical model.
To better understand the model, assume that bill $d$ is only about *Finance*. This means that $\theta_d$ has a one in the *Finance* dimension and zero everywhere else. With a classic ideal point model, a lawmaker $u$’s ideal point, $x_u$, gives his position on each issue, including *Finance*. With the issue-adjusted ideal point model, his effective ideal point for *Finance*, $x_u + z_{u,Finance}$, gives his position on *Finance*. The adjustment $z_{u,Finance}$ affects how lawmaker $u$ feels about *Finance* alone. When $z_{u,k} = 0$ for all $u, k$, the model becomes the classic ideal point model.

This model lets us inspect lawmakers’ overall voting patterns by issue. Given a collection of votes and a coding of bills to issues, posterior estimates of the ideal points and per-issue adjustments give us a window into voting behavior that is not available to classic ideal point models.

**Using Labeled LDA to associate bills with issues.**

Equation 2 adjusts a lawmaker’s ideal point by using the conditional expectation of a bill’s thematic labels $\theta_d$ given its words $w_d$. We estimate this vector using labeled latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) [6]. Labeled LDA is a topic model, a bag-of-words model that assumes a set of themes for the collection of bills and that each bill exhibits a mixture of those themes. The themes, called topics, are distributions over a fixed vocabulary. In unsupervised LDA [7] they are learned from the data. In labeled LDA, they are defined by using an existing tagging scheme. Each tag is associated with a topic; its distribution is found by taking the empirical distribution of words for documents assigned to that tag. This gives interpretable names (the tags) to the topics.

We used tags provided by the Congressional Research Service [8], which provides subject codes for all bills passing through Congress. These subject codes describe the bills using phrases which correspond to traditional issues, such as *Civil rights* and *National security*. Each bill may cover multiple issues, so multiple codes may apply to each bill. (Many bills have more than twenty labels.) We used the 74 most-frequent issue labels. Figure 3 (right) illustrates the top words from several of these labeled topics. We fit the issue vectors $E[\theta_d | w_d]$ as a preprocessing step. In the issue-adjusted ideal point model (Equation 3), $E[\theta_d]_d$ was treated as observed when estimating the posterior distribution $p(x_u, a_d, b_d, z_d | E[\theta_d]_d, v_{ud})$. We summarize all 74 issue labels in §A.2.

**Related Work.** Item response theory has been used for decades in political science [3, 4, 5]; see Enelow and Hinich for a historical perspective [9] and Albert for Bayesian treatments of the model [10]. Some political scientists have used higher-dimensional ideal points, where each legislator is attached to a vector of ideal points $x_u \in \mathbb{R}^K$ and each bill polarization $a_d$ takes the same dimension $K$ [11]. The probability of a lawmaker voting “Yes” is $\sigma(x_u^T a_d + b_d)$. The principal component of ideal points explains most of the variance and explains party affiliation. However, other dimensions are not attached to issues, and interpreting beyond the principal component is painstaking [2].

Recent work in machine learning has provided joint models of legislative text and the bill-making process. This includes using transcripts of U.S. Congressional floor debates to predict whether speeches support or oppose pending legislation [12] and predicting whether a bill will survive congressional committee by incorporating a number of features, including bill text [13]. Other work has aimed to predict individual votes. Gerrish and Blei aimed to predict votes on bills which had not yet received any votes [14]. Their model fits $a_d$ and $b_d$ using supervised topics, but the underlying voting model was one-dimensional: it could not model individual votes better than a one-dimensional ideal point model. Wang et al. created a Bayesian nonparametric model of votes and text over time [15]. We note that these models have different purposes from ours, and neither addresses individuals’ affinity toward issues.

The issue-adjusted model is conceptually more similar to recent models for content recommendation. Wang and Blei describe a method to recommend academic articles to individuals [16], and Agarwal and Chen propose a model to match users to Web content [17]. Though they do not consider roll-call data, these recommendation models also try to match user behavior with textual item content.

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1Ramage et al. explore more sophisticated approaches [6], but we found this simplified version to work well.

2After defining topics, we performed two iterations of LDA with variational inference to smooth the topics.

3We refer to specific sections in the supplementary materials (appendix) as §A.4.
3 Posterior estimation

The central computational challenge in this model is to uncover lawmakers’ issue preferences $z_u$ by using their votes $v$ and bills’ issues $\theta_d$. We do this by estimating the posterior distribution $p(x, z, a, b|v, \theta)$. Bayesian ideal point models are usually fit with Gibbs sampling [2, 3, 5, 18]. However, fast Gibbs samplers are unavailable for our model because the conditionals needed are not analytically computable. We estimate the posterior with variational Bayes.

In variational Bayes, we posit a family of distributions $\{q_\eta\}$ over the latent variables that is likely to contain a distribution similar to the true posterior [19]. This variational family is indexed by parameters $\eta$, which are fit to minimize the KL divergence between the variational and true posteriors. Specifically, we let $\{q_\eta\}$ be the family of fully factorized distributions

$$
q(x, z, a, b|\eta) = \prod_U \mathcal{N}(x_u|\bar{x}_u, \sigma^2_{x_u}) \mathcal{N}(z_u|\bar{z}_u, \lambda_{z_u}) \prod_D \mathcal{N}(a_d|\bar{a}_d, \sigma^2_{a_d}) \mathcal{N}(b_d|\bar{b}_d, \sigma^2_{b_d}),
$$

where we parameterize the variational posterior with $\eta = \{(\bar{x}_u, \sigma_x), (\bar{z}_u, \lambda_{z_u}), (\bar{a}_d, \sigma_a), (\bar{b}_d, \sigma_b)\}$. We assumed full factorization to make inference tractable. Though simpler than the true posterior, fitted variational distributions can be excellent proxies for it. The similarity between ideal points fit with variational inference and MCMC has been demonstrated in Gerrish in Blei [14].

Variational inference usually proceeds by optimizing the variational objective

$$
\mathcal{L}_\eta = E_{q_\eta}\left[ \log p(x, z, a, b|v, \theta) \right] - E_{q_\eta}\left[ \log q_\eta(x, z, a, b) \right]
$$

with gradient or coordinate ascent (this is equivalent to optimizing the KL divergence between $q$ and the posterior). Optimizing this bound is challenging when the expectation is not analytical, which makes computing the exact gradient $\nabla_{q_\eta} \mathcal{L}_\eta$ more difficult. We optimize this bound with stochastic gradient ascent [20, 21], approximating the gradient with samples from $q_\eta$;

$$
\nabla_{q_\eta} \mathcal{L}_\eta \approx \frac{1}{M} \sum_{y_m \sim q_\eta} \frac{\partial q_\eta}{\partial \eta}(\log p(y_m, v, \theta) - \log q_\eta(y_m));
$$

where $y_m = (x_m, z_m, a_m, b_m)$ is a sample from $q_\eta$. The algorithm proceeds by following this stochastic gradient with decreasing step size; we provide further details in §A.1.

4 Analyzing twelve years of U.S. legislative history

We used our model to investigate twelve years of U.S. legislative history. We compare the posterior fit with this model to the same data fit with traditional ideal points and validate the model quantitatively. We then provide a closer look at the collection of issues, lawmakers, and bills and explore several interesting results of the model.

4.1 Data and Experiment Setup

We studied U.S. Senate and House of Representative roll-call votes from 1999 to 2010. This period spanned Congresses 106 to 111 and covered an historic period in recent U.S. politics, the majority of which Republican President George W. Bush held office. Bush’s inauguration and the attacks of September 11th, 2001 marked the first quarter of this period, followed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress became more partisan over this period, and Democratic President Obama was inaugurated in January 2009.

We provide a more complete summary of statistics for our datasets in §A.3. For context, the median session we considered had 540 lawmakers, 507 bills, and 201,061 votes in both the House and Senate. Altogether, there were 865 unique lawmakers, 3,113 bills, and 1,208,709 votes.

Corpus preparation. For each congress, we considered only bills for which votes were explicitly recorded in a roll-call. We ignored votes on bills for which text was unavailable. To fit the labeled topic model to each bill, we removed stop words and grouped common phrases as n-grams. All bills were downloaded from www.govtrack.us [22], a nonpartisan website which provides records of U.S. Congressional voting. We fit the Senate and House separately for each two-year Congress because lawmakers’ strategies change at each session boundary.
We first evaluate the issue-adjusted model by measuring how it can predict held out votes. (This is a straightforward.)

Table 1: Average log-likelihood of heldout votes using six-fold cross validation. These results cover Congresses 106 to 111 (1999-2010) with regularization $\lambda = 1$. The issue-adjusted model yields higher heldout log-likelihood for all congresses in both chambers than a standard ideal point model. Perm. Issue illustrates the issue model fit when bills’ issue labels were randomly permuted. Perm. Issue is results for the issue model fit using permuted document labels.

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<td>107</td>
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<td>-0.209</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
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<td><strong>-0.209</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Perm. Issue</td>
<td>-0.210</td>
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<tbody>
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<td>-0.154</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
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<td><strong>-0.093</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Perm. Issue</td>
<td>-0.210</td>
<td>-0.211</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
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</table>

4.2 Comparison of classic and exploratory ideal points

How do classic ideal points compare with issue-adjusted ideal points? We fit classic ideal points to the 11th House (2009 to 2010) to compare them with issue-adjusted ideal points $\tilde{x}_a$ from the same period, using regularization $\lambda = 1$. The models’ ideal points $\tilde{x}_a$ were very similar, correlated at 0.998. While traditional ideal points cleanly separate Democrats and Republicans in this period, issue-adjusted ideal points provide an even cleaner break between the parties. Although the issue-adjusted model is able to use other parameters—lawmakers’ adjustments $\tilde{z}_a$—to separate the parties better, the improvement is much greater than expected by chance ($p < 0.001$ using a permutation test).

4.3 Evaluation and significance

We first evaluate the issue-adjusted model by measuring how it can predict held-out votes. (This is a measure of model fitness.) We used six fold cross-validation. For each fold, we computed the average predictive log-likelihood $\log p(v_{ud|\text{train}}|v_{ud|\text{test}} = \log p(v_{ud|\text{train}}|\tilde{x}_a, \tilde{z}_a, \tilde{a}_d, \tilde{b}_d, E_q(\theta_d|w))$ of the test votes and averaged this across folds. We compared these with the ideal point model, evaluating the latter in the same way. We give implementation details of the model fit in §A.1.

Note that we cannot evaluate how well this model predicts votes on a heldout bill $d$. As with the ideal point model, our model cannot predict $\tilde{a}_d, \tilde{b}_d$ without votes on $d$. Gerrish and Blei [14] accomplished this by predicting $\tilde{a}_d$ and $\tilde{b}_d$ using the document’s text. (Combining these two models would be straightforward.)

Performance. We compared the issue-adjusted model’s ability to represent heldout votes with the ideal point model. We fit the issue-adjusted model to both the House and Senate for Congresses 106 to 110 (1999-2010) with regularization $\lambda = 1$. For comparison we also fit an ideal point model to each of these congresses. In all Congresses and both chambers, the issue-adjusted model represents heldout votes with higher log-likelihood than an ideal point model. We show these results in Table 1.

Sensitivity to regularization. To measure sensitivity to parameters, we fit the issue-adjusted model to the 109th Congress (1999-2000) of the House and Senate for a range $\lambda = 0.0001, \ldots, 1000$ of regularizations. We fixed variance $\sigma_0^2, \sigma_2^2, \sigma_3^2, \sigma_4^2 = \exp(-5)$. The variational implementation generalized well for the entire range, with heldout log likelihood highest for $1 \leq \lambda \leq 10$.

Permutation test. We used a permutation test to understand how the issue-adjusted model improves upon ideal point models. This test strengthens the argument that issues (and not some other model change, such as the increase in dimension) help to improve predictive performance. To do this test, we randomly permuted topic vectors’ document labels to completely remove the relationship between topics and bills: $(\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_D) \rightarrow (\theta_{\pi_1(1)} \ldots \theta_{\pi_D(D)})$, for five permutations $\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_5$. We then fit the issue model using these permuted document labels. As shown in Table 1 models fit with the original, unpermuted issues always formed better predictions than models fit with the permuted issues. From this, we draw the conclusion that issues indeed help the model to represent votes.
Figure 4: Ideal points $x_u$ and issue-adjusted ideal points $x_u + z_{uk}$ from the 111th House for the Finance issue. Republicans (red) saw more adjustment than Democrats (blue).

Ron Paul Offsets $\hat{z}_{u,k}$

Donald Young Offsets $\hat{z}_{u,k}$

Figure 5: Significant issue adjustments for exceptional senators in Congress 111. Statistically significant issue adjustments are shown with each $\times$.

4.4 Analyzing issues, lawmakers, and bills

In this section we take a closer look at how issue adjustments improve on ideal points and demonstrate how the issue-adjusted ideal point model can be used to analyze specific lawmakers. We focus on an issue-adjusted model fit to all votes in the 111th House of Representatives (2009-2010).

We can measure the improvement by comparing the training likelihoods of votes in the issue-adjusted and traditional ideal point models. The training log-likelihood of each vote is

$$ J_{ud} = 1_{\{v_{ud}=\text{Yes}\}} p - \log(1 + \exp(p)), $$

where $p = (\bar{x}_u + \bar{x}_E \theta_a | w) \bar{a}_d + \bar{b}_d$ is the log-odds of a vote under the issue adjusted voting model. The corresponding log-likelihood $I_{ud}$ under the ideal point model is $p = \bar{x}_u \bar{a}_d + \bar{b}_d$.

4.4.1 Per-issue improvement

To inspect the improvement of issue $k$, for example, we take the sum of the improvement in log-likelihood weighted by each issue:

$$ \text{Imp}_k = \sum_{V_{ud} \in \mathcal{E}_q} \theta_{d,k} | w] (J_{ud} - I_{ud}) \sum_{V_{ud} \in \mathcal{E}_q} \theta_{d,k} | w]. $$(7)

A high value of $\text{Imp}_k$ indicates that issue $k$ is associated with an increase in log-likelihood, while a low value indicates that the issue saw a decrease in log-likelihood.

Procedural issues such as Congressional sessions (in contrast to substantive issues) were among the most-improved issues; they were also much more partisan. This is a result predicted by procedural cartel theory [23, 24, 25, 26], which posits that lawmakers will be more polarized in procedural votes (which describe how Congress will be run) than substantive votes (the issues discussed during elections). A substantive issue which was better-predicted was Finance, which we illustrate in Figure[4]. Infrequent issues like Women and Religion were nearly unaffected by lawmakers’ offsets. In §A.4, we illustrate $\text{Imp}_k$ for all issues.
4.4.2 Per-lawmaker improvement

In the 111th House, the per-lawmaker improvement $\text{Imp}_u = \sum_j (J_{ud} - I_{ud})$ was invariably positive or negligible, because each lawmaker has many more parameters in the issue-adjusted model. Some of most-improved lawmakers were Ron Paul and Donald Young.

We corrected lawmakers’ issue adjustments to account for their left/right leaning and performed permutation tests as in §4.3 to find which of these corrected adjustments $\hat{z}_{uk}$ were statistically significant at $p < 0.05$ (see supplementary section §A.5 for how we obtain $\hat{z}_{uk}$ from $z_{uk}$ and §A.5 for details on the permutation test). We illustrate these issue adjustments for Paul and Young in Figure 5.

**Ron Paul.** Paul’s offsets were extreme; he voted more conservatively than expected on *Health, Human rights* and *International affairs*. He voted more liberally on social issues such as *Racial and ethnic relations*. The issue-adjusted training accuracy of Paul’s votes increased from 83.8% to 87.9% with issue offsets, placing him among the two most-improved lawmakers with this model.

The issue-adjusted improvement $\text{Imp}_K$ (Equation 7), when restricted to Paul’s votes, indicate significant improvement in *International affairs* and *East Asia* (he tends to vote against U.S. involvement in foreign countries); *Congressional sessions; Human rights*; and *Special months* (he tends to vote against recognition of special months and holidays). The model hurt performance related to *Law, Racial and ethnic relations*, and *Business*, none of which were statistically significant issues for Paul.

**Donald Young.** One of the most exceptional legislators in the 111th House was Alaska Republican Donald Young. Young stood out in a topic used frequently in House bills about naming local landmarks. Young voted against the majority of his party (and the House in general) on a series of largely symbolic bills and resolutions. In an *Agriculture* topic, Young voted (with only two other Republicans and against the majority of the House) not to commend “members of the Agri-business Development Teams of the National Guard [to] increase food production in war-torn countries.”

Young’s divergent voting was also evident in a series of votes against naming various landmarks—such as post offices—in a topic about such symbolic votes. Notice that Young’s ideal point is not particularly distinctive: using the ideal point alone, we would not recognize his unique voting behavior.

4.4.3 Per-bill improvement

Per-bill improvement $\text{Imp}_d = \sum_U (J_{ud} - I_{ud})$ decreased for some bills. The bill which decreased the most from the ideal point model in the 111th House was the *Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010* (H.R. 3534). This bill had substantial weight in five issues, with most in *Public lands and natural resources, Energy*, and *Land transfers*, but its placement in many issues harmed our predictions. This effect—worse performance on bills about many issues—suggests that methods which represent bills more sparsely may perform better than the current model.

5 Discussion

Traditional models of roll call data cannot capture how individual lawmakers deviate from their latent position on the political spectrum. In this paper, we developed a model that captures how lawmakers vary, issue by issue, and used the text of the bills to attach specific votes to specific issues. We demonstrated, across 12 years of legislative data, that this model better captures lawmaker behavior. We also illustrated how to use the model as an exploratory tool of legislative data.

Future areas of work include incorporating external behavior by lawmakers. For example, lawmakers make some (but not all) issue positions public. Many raise campaign funds from interest groups. Matching these data to votes would help us to understand what drives lawmakers’ positions.

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